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## Worldwide Report

# ARMS CONTROL



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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20 June 1985

## WORLDWIDE REPORT

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GENERAL

TERMS OF SOVIET INSPECTION AGREEMENT WITH IAEA EXPLAINED

Moscow MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN' in Russian No 4, Apr 85 pp 66-70

[Article by V. Misharin: "An Act of Good Will"]

[Text] An important direction in the Soviet Union's struggle for peace and international security is the prevention of the occurrence of new states that possess nuclear weapons. In today's world the opinion has been established that the further expansion of the group of countries that have this most terrifying mass-destruction weapons will considerably increase the danger that a nuclear war will occur, will hinder the carrying out of the efforts to limit nuclear weapons, and will lead to the further aggravation of the international situation.

The Soviet Union has invariably and consistently spoken out, and will continue to speak out, in favor of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form is one of the most important norms that must guide the nuclear powers in order to prevent a nuclear war.

When carrying out its well-principled line in the area of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union actively uses, in addition to other forms of international activity, the large capabilities that are linked with our country's participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. The IAEA, which was created for the purpose of rendering cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, has also been given important functions in monitoring or, as people still say, in providing guarantees with respect to the nuclear activity of countries with regard to the checking of their fulfillment of their pledges in the area of nonproliferation.

The countries participating in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which is the basis of the entire international system for regulating nonproliferation, have given the IAEA the functions of monitoring with the purpose of checking the carrying out of the basic pledges in conformity with the treaty, the essence of which pledges consists in preventing the acquisition by the nonnuclear countries of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The agency also employs guarantees in conformity with a number of other international treaties, agreements, and understandings, in particular the Treaty of Nuclear Nonproliferation in Latin America and the understanding concerning the directive principles in nuclear export, which understanding was

achieved by the countries that are the basic suppliers in the worldwide nuclear market.

The monitoring carried out by IAEA is an important component of the international system for regulating the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. During the quarter-century of the agency's existence, the system of guarantees provided by this international organization has been considerably developed. At the present time IAEA monitors practically all the nuclear activity of the countries that do not possess nuclear weapons. The only nuclear units that are beyond outside its monitoring function, according to data provided by the agency's secretariat, are individual nuclear units in a number of countries, particularly Israel, Pakistan, and the YuAR [Republic of South Africa].

The Soviet Union does not formally bear any international pledges relative to placing under IAEA guarantee its peaceful nuclear activity, inasmuch as the Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Treaty does not stipulate the carrying out of monitoring by the agency with respect to the nuclear states. However, in response to the desires of a number of nonnuclear countries and guided by the desire to reinforce the trust among states, the USSR has come forward with a proposal on a unilateral basis to place under IAEA control some of its peaceful nuclear activity, that is, several Soviet nuclear electric-power plants and research reactors. At the 2nd Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament, which was held in June 1982, that was announced in the name of the Soviet government by A. A. Gromyko.

That act of good will, in the opinion of the Soviet government, will undoubtedly promote the further reinforcement of the international system of regulating the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and thus, in the broader view, will promote the creation of an atmosphere of trust in the world. In our country it is felt that this step is leading to an increase in the authority of the Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Treaty. It completely corresponds to the task of the further expansion of the number of countries participating in this treaty, in order to make this extremely important international agreement a universal one.

The decision of the Soviet Union unilaterally to place under IAEA control some of its peaceful nuclear activity became a significant contribution to the matter of increasing the authority of the agency itself, the activity of which agency, as the peaceful use of nuclear energy is developing, has been taking on greater and greater importance. Without a doubt, the application of IAEA guarantees with respect to part of the nuclear activity in our country will, to a considerable degree, promote the reinforcement of the system of monitoring by this international organization as a whole.

In 1983-1984 in Vienna, where the central institutions of IAEA are situated, and in Moscow, there were several rounds of negotiations between the USSR and the agency for the purpose of working out a draft version of the agreement governing IAEA guarantees with respect to part of the peaceful nuclear activity in our country. As a result of those negotiations, which were conducted in an atmosphere of complete mutual understanding and cooperation, the preliminary coordination of the draft of the corresponding agreement was carried out.

On 20 February 1985 the IAEA council of governors approved that draft. A signing ceremony was held. The agreement was signed, on the Soviet side, by A. M. Petros'yants, chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Use of Nuclear Energy, and, on the IAEA side, by the General Director of the agency, (H. Blix).

The agreement is based on the standard draft governing IAEA guarantees for the nonnuclear states participating in the Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Treaty. At the same time it takes into complete consideration the status of the Soviet Union as a nuclear power, as well as the voluntary nature of the proposal that was made.

The agreement grants IAEA the necessary opportunities for the effective carrying out of the guarantees in the Soviet Union. The agreement defines to the proper degree the rights and pledges of the USSR and the agency with respect to control, and the procedure for carrying out that control. There was also a confirmation of all the political principles, juridical norms, and scientific-technical methods and procedures that are employed by IAEA when carrying out the guarantees on such nuclear units as nuclear electric-power plants and research reactors.

At the same time, the agreement reflects the well-principled approach of the Soviet Union to the question of the nature of the control by IAEA in the nuclear states. As is mentioned in the preamble, the purpose of the agreement governing the guarantees of the agency in the USSR will inevitably differ from the purposes of the agreements governing guarantees that have been concluded between the agency and the states participating in the treaty which do not possess nuclear weapons. The basic direction of IAEA control in our country, the text of the agreement emphasizes, consists in promoting the broad annexation of the states that had not done so to the Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Treaty, to the further development of the agency's guarantees, and to the adoption of those guarantees by an increasingly larger number of countries.

The document establishes the pledges of the Soviet Union and the IAEA when that agency carries out control of part of the peaceful nuclear activity in our country. The USSR has given its consent to the application of the IAEA guarantees to the initial or special fissionable material at those nuclear units which have been included in the list to be submitted by the Soviet side. Provision is made for the right of the USSR, at its own discretion, to make changes in that list, and also to withdraw nuclear materials from control by the agency.

The IAEA, in its turn, has the right to apply guarantees to initial or special fissionable material at nuclear units that have been included in the list submitted by the Soviet Union. However, the agency can carry out the control only at certain of those units. It also has the right periodically to select for control new nuclear units that have been included in the list and to refuse to carry out control of other units over which that control has already been carried out.



The purpose of the IAEA control is clearly defined. It is to provide the agency with the opportunity to check to see that the nuclear materials that have been put under control are not withdrawn from the nuclear units that have been selected for the carrying out of control, that is, that those materials remain within the confines of peaceful nuclear activity.

The agreement has firmly established the principle that the Soviet Union and the IAEA are cooperating for purposes of promoting the carrying out of the guarantees that are stipulated by this agreement. The inclusion of this principle in the text of the document is the reflection of the self-interestedness of the USSR in the effective carrying out of control by the agency in our country in complete conformity with the letter and spirit of the agreement that has been worked out. This principle has been called upon to guarantee the success of the activity of IAEA in monitoring, which success, as is completely obvious, is impossible without good will on the part of the state that is applying that monitoring.

There is also a definition of the nature of control by the agency that must be carried out in such a way as not to create any obstacles for the economic and technical development of the USSR or our country's international cooperation in the area of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, including the exchange of nuclear materials with other states. The agreement has also firmly established the obligation of IAEA to prevent unsubstantiated interference into the peaceful nuclear activity of the USSR, in particular into the operation of the nuclear units at which the agency's monitoring will be carried out.

In the signed agreement it is emphasized that IAEA must take all precautionary steps to defend the commercial and industrial secrets and other confidential information that may become accessible to the agency in the course of carrying out the monitoring in the USSR. IAEA does not have the right to publish or to transmit to any other states, their legal or physical persons, or international organizations any information received by the agency as a result of carrying out that monitoring. Specific information pertaining to the carrying out of IAEA guarantees can be offered only to the council of governors, the operational administrative organ of the agency, and also to those IAEA associates who require that information for the purpose of executing their official duties in connection with those guarantees, but only in the volume that is necessary for allowing the agency to execute its duties in conformity with this agreement.

An article of great importance in the agreement is the one in which there is a definition of the procedure for assigning IAEA inspectors in the process of applying the guarantees. The agency must receive the consent of the Soviet side for the assigning of its inspectors in the USSR. Provision is made for the right of the USSR to recall various inspectors at all stages of monitoring being carried out by the agency. If, as a result of the repeated recall of inspectors, there arise difficulties with the application of the guarantees, then, on the recommendation of the IAEA general director, the question of assignments of inspectors can be considered at the council of governors for the purpose of taking the appropriate steps. Our country takes the necessary

steps to guarantee for the agency's inspectors the proper conditions with the purpose of their effective carrying out of their functions.

There has also been a firm statement of the obligation of IAEA to organize the activity of their inspectors in the USSR in such a way that all the possible inconveniences and hindrances for the Soviet side will be reduced to the minimum, including, naturally those for the peaceful nuclear activity being carried out in the USSR. As the agency inspectors execute their functions, there must be provision for the protection of the industrial secrets or any other confidential information that becomes known to them.

In the agreement governing the placement of some of the peaceful nuclear activity of the USSR under control, there is a definition of the conditions for the cessation of the application of the agency's guarantees to the nuclear materials being monitored. The control ceases if IAEA establishes that the particular material has been expended or diluted in such a way that it is no longer suitable for nuclear activity that would be of interest from the point of view of IAEA control, or if it has become, practically speaking, unregeneratable. Control also ceases in the event that the USSR, in conformity with its right, informs the agency of the withdrawal of various materials from the guarantees. Control ceases also with respect to nuclear materials that are transmitted to other countries. IAEA, in its turn, maintains accounting documents pertaining to each such transmittal and, when necessary, pertaining to the renewal of the application of the guarantees to the material being transmitted.

Provision has also been made for another instance of cessation of IAEA control. In the agreement it is established that, when various nuclear materials are being transferred to nonnuclear activity, for example, to the production of alloys and ceramics, the USSR prior to that transfer coordinates with IAEA the procedure for cessation of the application of guarantees with respect to them. Thus, the agency's control even in this instance does not hinder the free use by the Soviet side, at its discretion, of the nuclear materials that have been put under control.

The agreement has firmly established the principle pertaining to the expenses linked with the carrying out of IAEA control on the territory of the USSR.

It also contains a special article pertaining to the regulation of claims that can arise in the course of carrying out IAEA control in the Soviet Union. It states that, in the event that such claims arise on the part of one of the participants in the agreement toward another participant, they are regulated in conformity with the generally accepted norms of modern international law. The only instances that constitute an exception here are those pertaining to the incurring of a loss caused by a nuclear disaster.

In a number of articles there is mention of the measures linked with the checking of the rate of fulfillment of the agreement and the procedure for the

settlement of disputes that might arise as a result of its interpretation or application.

A special article also stipulates the right of the USSR to participate in the work of the IAEA council of governors when considering instances linked with the interpretation or application of the agreement governing the agency's guarantees in our country. It is established that the USSR retains the right to insist that any question arising with respect to the interpretation or application of the agreement is considered at the council. The council of governors, on its part, is obliged to invite the USSR to take part in the discussion of these questions.

In the article concerning the settlement of disputes linked with the interpretation or application of the agreement, it is established that any such dispute, with the exception of disputes arising as a result of the findings or actions of the board of governors, is to be regulated by means of negotiations or other means that have been coordinated between the Soviet Union and IAEA. In the event of the consent by the two sides, these disputes can also be transferred to an arbitration tribunal. The decisions of the arbitration tribunal are mandatory for both sides.

The final articles pertain to the procedure for making amendments in the text of the agreement, for putting the signed document into effect, and the period of its activity. In those articles it is emphasized that the Soviet Union and IAEA, at the request of one of the sides, consult with one another with regard to questions of the making of amendments to the present agreement. All the amendments require the consent both of the USSR and the agency. The agreement goes into effect immediately, as soon as IAEA receives from the Soviet Union written notification that the requirements necessary for the agreement to go into effect, which requirements have been established by the USSR Constitution and other Soviet legislative enactments, have been executed.

The agreement remains in force as long as the Soviet Union is a participant in the Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Treaty. Any side, by giving the other six months' notification, can cease the action of the agreement if, after consultations between them, it feels that it is no longer possible to achieve the goal for which this document was signed.

The conclusion of the agreement between the Soviet Union and IAEA concerning the placing of some of the peaceful nuclear activity in the USSR under the agency's guarantees is yet another proof of the great importance that our country places on the task of the further reinforcement of a system for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The signing of this document has been met with a large amount of interest throughout the world. It has also been perceived among IAEA circles as an extremely important event of political importance. IAEA General Director H. Blix, in his report to the 28th Session of the IAEA General Conference, remarked that this agreement is desirable to the highest degree, primarily because it will expand the experience of IAEA in the area of guarantees. In addition, the signing of this agreement takes on great importance in the light of the conference that will occur in August-September 1985 to consider the effect of the Nuclear



Weapons Nonproliferation Treaty, at which there will be a discussion of an entire series of complicated problems linked with the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons over our planet.

This agreement is also a graphic practical confirmation of the attitude of the USSR to international control, which has been called upon, by deed, to serve the goals of limiting arms and of disarmament. With the appearance of nuclear weapons, when the question of control arose, the USSR from the very beginning proposed the broadest and most all-encompassing control. That is our well-principled approach to control. And the recently concluded agreement is yet another convincing example in this regard.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

SOVIET COMMENTARIES ON FIRST ROUND OF TALKS

PRAVDA Editorial Article

PM281740 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 May 85 First Edition p 4

[Editorial article entitled: "Geneva: What Has the First Round of Talks Shown?"]

[Text] The situation in the world remains complex, and more than that, dangerous. It is no secret that it has become such in the years of the Reagan administration's stay in office in the United States; in other words, it is a direct result of Washington's policy. Having frustrated the ratification of the SALT II treaty, the United States embarked on the road of disorganizing the process of limiting and reducing arms, sabotaging earlier concluded agreements, launching ever new military programs, deploying American first-strike missiles in Europe, and then deliberately derailed the talks on strategic and nuclear arms in Europe. The proclamation of the "star wars" program, clearly intended not only to make the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms impossible but also to impart a qualitatively new dimension to the entire arms race, to totally undermine the very idea of stability, equality, and equal security crowned, if one can say so, all these actions by Washington that are hostile to the cause of peace and the interests of peoples.

The danger of the continuation of the development of events in this direction is obvious. That is why the U.S. policy causes rising concern in the world; that is why the demand is sounding ever more persistently for the adoption of urgent measures to prevent a further decline to nuclear catastrophe, for a solution of this matter by way of businesslike talks and the reaching of mutually acceptable agreements. It is not by chance that the close attention of the world's public is riveted on the talks in Geneva. Hopes are pinned on them and results are expected of them.

As is known, the Geneva talks were started on the Soviet Union's initiative. These are new talks that by the range of questions encompassed — attack space weapons, strategic offensive arms and medium-range nuclear means — fully take into account the realities of the present strategic situation and reflect the objective organic connection of all the three above-mentioned problems.

It is absolutely clear that the acquisition by the United States of attack space arms would drastically disrupt the strategic equilibrium between the USSR and the United States. As an inevitable result of this there would be a quantitative buildup and qualitative perfection of nuclear offensive weapons, an arms race in all directions. It is equally clear that it is impossible to determine the size of the reduction of strategic arms without due account for medium-range arms, for on being deployed in Western Europe the U.S. Pershing II's and cruise missiles are essentially strategic weapons in respect of the Warsaw Treaty countries.

This objective interdependence of problems found its reflection in the joint Soviet-U.S. statement that was adopted in Geneva on January 8 of this year. It is defined in the statement in no uncertain terms that the aim of the talks should be the prevention of an arms race in space and ending it on earth. Effective measures along these directions would ensure a genuine consolidation of strategic stability and open the road to the subsequent total liquidation of nuclear arms everywhere.

The accord reached in Geneva in January serves as a sort of foundation of the talks on nuclear and space arms. It is the starting position that alone can lead them to success. It should be adhered to strictly and in all its parts.

That has the first round of the talks shown? Its results cannot be described as satisfactory.

Nobody, of course, expected the entire complex set of problems of space and nuclear arms to be solved in the course of 6 weeks, but at least one could have hoped that readiness to work out practical solutions in line with the accord reached in Geneva in January would be displayed by both sides. The Soviet side did display such a readiness and backed it up with concrete proposals on all aspects of the talks. The position of the American side, however, was void of any elements of constructiveness whatsoever and actually ran counter to the meaning of the January accord on the aims and subject of the talks.

Washington now is trying to conceal this by directing all sorts of rebukes against the Soviet Union, which, supposedly, proceeds from a "tough" stance in Geneva, sets forth "preliminary conditions", and so on. Officials in Washington take turns in exercising in statements on this theme. The positions of the sides at the talks are being directly distorted. More than that, as reported by the newspaper LA SUISSE in Geneva, the United States delegation is involved in these distortions: In violation of the accord on confidentiality it regularly organizes a calculated "leakage" of information, or rather misinformation, into the Western press. However, facts remain facts and here is one: The USSR and the United States have an accord to work out decisions on preventing an arms race in space. To "prevent" means not to allow, to nip in the bud. This word does not have any other meaning either in Russian or English.

How does the American side carry on in respect of this central and priority issue of the talks? It behaves in a manner suggesting it has forgotten what it has agreed on. Both publicly and at the talks the American representatives declare that the U.S. Administration intends under all circumstances to continue the fulfillment of its "star wars" program; that is, the program of creating attack space weapons. Then what about the prevention of the arms race in space? It turns out that it is enough to reach agreement on the "rules" of conducting it: exactly at what time, in what amounts, and which space means should be deployed... and there will be no arms race.

The crux of the matter is absolutely clear: an overt sabotage of studying and solving the question of preventing an arms race in space, an attempt to get through and legalize Washington's program of an accelerated militarization of outer space by any method.

All means look good to Washington in achieving this aim. The plans to create a large-scale ABM system with elements of space basing is arbitrarily declared to be in line with the 1972 ABM Treaty, although in the treaty it is stated with utmost clarity that the creation of any ABM systems of space basing is strictly prohibited. They want to divert attention from this obvious contradiction by claiming that the

treaty supposedly does not prohibit "research" to create attack space arms. More than that, attempts are being made to involve the NATO allies and Japan in the realization of the so-called "presidential defense initiative".

However, observance of the ABM Treaty is incompatible with efforts to prepare for the creation of arms banned by this treaty. Besides, what we are dealing with is not research but something much bigger than that. The actions of the U.S. Administration are unlawful by their very essence.

The fact that Washington urges other states to participate in these actions does not make them in any way more legitimate or respectable. Those who play up to the United States in this take grave responsibility upon themselves. In order to justify their reluctance to reach agreement on the prevention of an arms race in space, the American politicians have vigorously started to circulate rumors to the effect that they are only "catching up" with the Soviet Union, which supposedly has surged far ahead in the development of attack space arms.

The U.S. Administration has used such methods more than once in the past as well. More and more invented violations of the ABM Treaty are being imputed to the Soviet side. In its contacts with allies the U.S. Administration passes off these inventions as "reliable" information.

During contacts with the Soviet side the very same inventions are being used as a pretext for blunt proposals to accede to the U.S. line of revising the ABM Treaty. It is intimated that the United States will not back away from such a revision under any circumstances anyway.

The Soviet Union has not and is not conducting any research or experimental and design work that would not fit within the framework of the ABM Treaty. It is not creating attack space weapons. All statements to the contrary do not accord with reality and are being made with a single quite obvious purpose: to delude the public in the United States and other countries and to try to justify the U.S. line of violating the ABM Treaty and militarizing outer space.

With the same purpose the American program of creating attack space arms is being "embellished" with all sorts of false labels. It is being called a "defense initiative", a means of ridding mankind of nuclear arms, and an embodiment of "humanitarian concern" and faith in "scientific progress".

In reality, however, the issue concerns measures that are part of the general offensive plan based on breaking the strategic parity, unrestrained arms race, acquisition of military superiority, and preparation to deliver a first nuclear strike calculated on impunity. The U.S. Administration's line of militarization of space and deployment of strike weapons there runs contrary to humanism and human morals. It is only capable of intensifying even further the threat of nuclear war, and by no means of eliminating it. Pursuing the goal of breaking the ABM Treaty, Washington wants to destroy the very foundation on which the process of limiting and reducing nuclear arms is built. It is deliberately pushing mankind toward a new and exhausting spiral of the arms race and senseless expenditure of colossal material and intellectual resources.

True, in the process, Washington is trying to put on the appearance that it supposedly stands for a reduction of nuclear arms, but in reality this readiness is total eye-wash. By refusing to stop its programs of developing attack space arms, the United States puts into question the very possibility of a limitation and, the more so, a reduction of nuclear arsenals. Washington will not be able to conceal this objective side of the matter behind propaganda statements that the Soviet Union allegedly makes the question of outer space a "preliminary condition" of solving questions of reducing nuclear arms.

The United States cannot count on any reduction whatsoever by the Soviet Union of its return-strike nuclear means while Washington is furthering its program of measures to "render impotent" the Soviet nuclear arms in the hope of acquiring the ability to carry out aggression with impunity.

Under these conditions the demand that the USSR reduce its nuclear arms can actually pursue only one aim: to make it easier for the American strategists to achieve the insane task they have set themselves, the task of delivering a disarming first strike and, as far as possible, of sheltering themselves from the strike of retribution. In Washington and in the NATO capitals they are acutely aware that the USSR will not agree to this, that the calls to reduce nuclear arms against the backdrop of frenzied activities to realize the so-called "presidential defense initiative" are nothing more than demagoguery.

In practice the United States has no intention at all to reduce its nuclear arsenals. The programs of expanding and perfecting them are being pursued at full speed and, as it was openly stated by the not unknown presidential adviser Paul Nitze, they will be continued at least until the end of the century.

At the talks in Geneva the U.S. side limits itself only to a repetition of its old proposals, made earlier at the talks on nuclear arms in Europe and the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear arms in 1981-1983, which have proved their untenability and, as it was frankly explained at the time in Washington, were not at all intended for reaching agreement with the USSR.

In the field of strategic arms the United States again proposes to limit the number of warheads [boyezaryad] only on intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, thus leaving open a channel to build up warheads [boyezaryad] carried by long-range cruise missiles. The U.S. side evades the adoption of the Soviet proposal to ban such missiles, stating in general form that the United States is prepared somewhat to limit only air-launched cruise missiles. It is clear that the U.S. side orients itself not at a reduction but at the mass deployment of these dangerous destabilizing armaments.

The position of the United States on medium-range nuclear arms remains nonconstructive as well. The absurd "zero option" directed at the unilateral disarmament of the USSR in face of nuclear threats to its security from the West and East is again being produced, as well as the threadbare so-called "interim option" that does not count in the European balance the hundreds of warheads [boyezaryad] mounted on British and French medium-range missiles, removes from the limitation the U.S. carrier-based aviation, and groundlessly includes in the count the Soviet medium-range missiles in the east of the country. Obviously, this is not a basis for agreement.

The nonconstructive nature of the U.S. approach, its directedness not at stopping but at intensifying the arms race, manifested itself especially strikingly in the attitude of the United States to the moratorium proposed by the Soviet Union. As is known, the Soviet Union proposed, in order to ensure proper conditions for effective agreements on the entire set of problems under study, to agree to introduce for the entire duration of the talks a moratorium on attack space arms, nuclear arms, strategic arms, and medium-range missiles in Europe.

This is a natural and reasonable step, it would seem, to stop the arms race so as to commence arms reduction without delay, but Washington is against this. The pretext for its rejection of this is the same: references to the mythical military "superiority" of the USSR that, as the U.S. Administration knows well, does not exist. There exists



a rough balance with the United States and NATO retaining superiority in the number of nuclear munitions and, in what concerns Europe, also in the number of medium-range delivery vehicles.

The refusal of the United States to reach agreement on the moratorium under conditions when the USSR's unilateral moratorium on first deployment of antisatellite weapons in outer space, announced back in August 1983, is still in force and when the Soviet Union, also unilaterally, has suspended in April of this year the deployment of medium-range missiles and the implementation of other reply measures in Europe, patently shows which of the two sides wants to use talk about readiness for disarmament merely as camouflage for its military preparations and which strives not in words but by deeds for the ending of the arms race, for the attainment of constructive agreements.

In contrast to the United States, in Geneva the Soviet side suggested an extensive and concrete program of measures directed at effectively preventing an arms race in space and stopping it on earth.

On the key question of the talks, space arms, the Soviet side came out in Geneva for reaching agreement on banning the development (including research), testing, and deployment of attack space arms. The already existing antisatellite means of the United States and the USSR, the testing of which has not yet been completed, would be subject to destruction.

On strategic offensive arms, the USSR proposed, given a total ban on attack space arms, to radically reduce strategic arms and to simultaneously scrap programs of developing and deploying new strategic arms (long-range cruise missiles, new types of intercontinental ballistic missiles, new types of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, new heavy bombers), or strictly to limit such programs. Naturally, restrictions on strategic weapons would be decided upon also with due account of the way in which the question of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe would be resolved.

The U.S. side was offered to reach agreement on radical reductions in strategic armaments. Those reductions would embrace both strategic delivery vehicles and the total number of nuclear charges [yadernyy zaryad] on them. The Soviet side put forward the proposal on the mutual renunciation of such a dangerous new type of strategic offensive weapon as long-range cruise missiles of every basing mode.

The Soviet side also took a clear and unequivocal position on the third area of the talks, on medium-range nuclear weapons. To prevent the further deterioration of the situation on the European Continent and outside it, the USSR called for an immediate end to the deployment of new U.S. missiles in Western Europe with a simultaneous halt in the buildup of the Soviet countermeasures and with the subsequent reduction of medium-range nuclear means in Europe to a level to be agreed upon.

In so doing, the Soviet side expressed its readiness, in case the U.S. missiles now being deployed in Western Europe are withdrawn from it, to ensure a situation in which the total number of warheads [boyegolovka] on our medium-range missiles remaining in Europe would be gradually brought to the number of the warheads on the French and British missiles.

The translation of this approach into practice would mean a drastic lessening of the level of nuclear confrontation in Europe. A dangerous source of the growth of the war threat would thus be removed from Europe.

The question of the medium-range nuclear-capable planes was to be resolved in the context of the solution of the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe through the establishment of agreed-upon ceilings on such planes for the USSR and NATO.

The Soviet side voiced its readiness for an even more radical settlement of the question; namely, the complete removal of both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons from Europe.

The beginning of the next round of the Geneva negotiations is scheduled for 30 May. If one listens to public statements made by high-ranking Washington officials, it turns out that they are not going to change anything in the U.S. position in the positive vein. On the contrary, they speak of the intention to speed up the development of attack space means, and fail to respond to the Soviet Union's proposal for a radical reduction of strategic offensive arms. Such a position comes as evidence of the stubborn desire of certain quarters in Washington to continue evading the realization of the January agreement on the subject and objectives of the negotiations.

Meanwhile, the interests of preventing an arms race in outer space and terminating it on earth demand a different thing, a resolute review of the U.S. position in the direction of a constructive and businesslike approach.

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Mikhail Gorbachev stressed: "What is needed for a success in Geneva is political goodwill for reaching agreement with strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security. Despite a complex and strained situation in the world and difficulties in the negotiations in Geneva, we remain soberly optimistic.

"We hope that our partners will heed the voice of peoples who want peace and a termination of the arms race. We hope that common sense, political realism, and the feeling of responsibility for a peaceful future will prevail. We have faith in the ability of peoples to safeguard their right to life."

#### 'Disappointing' Results Laid to U.S.

LD281700 Moscow TASS in English 1627 GMT 28 May 85

[Text] Moscow May 28 TASS -- TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev writes:

The Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons, which are in the focus of world public attention, will resume in Geneva on Thursday [30 May]. Regrettably, the results of their first round can in no way be considered satisfactory.

What is the cause of these disappointing results and who is to blame? Apparently, there was a good base for progress, laid by the January accord to the effect that the subject matter of the talks would be space and nuclear weapons, both strategic and medium-range ones, and their goal would be to reach accords to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on earth, and also to limit and reduce nuclear weapons. It was agreed specifically that all the questions will be examined and decided in their interrelationship, which stems directly from the objective interdependence of the problems themselves.

The Soviet Union, fully in accordance with that agreement, put forward in Geneva a broad and concrete programme of measures aimed at effectively preventing the militarisation of space, at radical reductions in nuclear armaments, and at the renunciation of the programmes for the development and deployment of new strategic armaments. To create a favourable situation for the talks, the USSR has offered already now, without waiting for the talks to produce agreements, to impose a moratorium on the development, tests and deployment of attack space systems, and to freeze strategic offensive armaments, the deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles and Soviet counter-measures in Europe. Moreover, it has taken a practical step in the spirit of goodwill by unilaterally imposing a moratorium on the deployment of its medium-range missiles and by halting other counter-measures in Europe. This shows that the Soviet Union for its part has done everything within its power to make a good start in Geneva.

And has the American side made an equally constructive contribution? No, it has not. It did not display any readiness to produce practical solutions in accordance with the agreement reached in January. There was nothing constructive in its position, which was actually at odds with the meaning of that agreement. Instead of a constructive approach, we saw outright sabotage of the examination and solution of the problem of preventing the militarisation of space, and instead of a desire to look for effective ways for a common goal -- attempts to push through and legalise Washington's dangerous "star wars" programme.

The situation with nuclear armaments is no better. Washington just limited itself to reiteration of its old proposals, made in 1981-1983, which were absolutely untenable and not at all intended to achieve accord with the USSR. While failing to propose anything which could be mutually acceptable and conducive to positive results at the talks, Washington did not show either any desire to consider in a businesslike manner the initiatives put forward by the Soviet Union.

All this makes it possible for any unbiased observer clearly to answer the question "who is to blame?" It is the present day U.S. Administration, which intends to go ahead under any circumstances with its "star wars" programme and which is merely trying to create the impression that it stands for reductions in nuclear arms arsenals.

Many politicians, statesmen and experts point out that the U.S. stand on attack space arms is especially dangerous to the talks. At the British SUNDAY TELEGRAPH has pointed out, if the Geneva talks are to be derailed by anything, it will be by the "star wars" programme.

If Washington does not want these prophesies to come true, it should drastically revise its position and take a constructive and businesslike approach. Common sense, political realism and the sense of responsibility for a peaceful future must prevail.

#### U.S. Stand Not Constructive

LD211101 Moscow World Service in English 0910 GMT 21 May 85

[Text] The policy of the American Administration gives no indication of any positive change on issues of arms limitation. Here's a commentary by Spartak Beglov, a political analyst of the NOVOSTI press agency.

Washington is clearly unwilling to take a constructive stand on key problems which are basic to the success of the talks in Geneva on nuclear and space weapons. It is refusing to observe the January agreement about the subject and goals of the talks, that is, to act on the understanding that the problems of nonmilitarization of space and the halting of the arms race buildup on earth should be considered as inseparable one from the other.

The Soviet proposal to start elaborating practical measures to prevent the militarization of space is essentially being ignored at the talks and has been subjected to massive propaganda barrages in the public speeches of American leaders. Influential American groups hold negative views on another important problem which is essential for creating the best possible conditions for success at Geneva. This is the recent proposal of the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, to set a mutual and all-enbracing moratorium on the development and deployment of nuclear and space systems. The freeze would also affect research and development and the testing and deployment of space weapons. The American star wars plan, on the other hand, is just aimed at developing space weapons. The WASHINGTON POST



has quoted General Abrahamson, who is in charge of the star wars program, as saying that the United States has already developed 10 prototypes of anti-missile systems and one of them was successfully tested last November. Laser weapons, using nuclear energy, are being tested at present.

To stop now would mean to regain the possibility of radical cuts in nuclear armaments. A freeze would make for a reduction. The Soviet proposal for a mutual and all-embracing moratorium on the development and deployment of nuclear and space weapons remains on the agenda. It serves as a touchstone of Washington's true intentions in the military field. The ball remains in the American court.

#### U.S. Violated Agreement

LD210245 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 20 May 85

[Text] On 14 May Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz met in Vienna. The Soviet foreign minister conveyed his government's concern at the unconstructive stand adopted by the United States at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons. During the first round of the talks, between 12 March and 23 April, the American side attempted to avoid the discussion of the most crucial issue of preventing the militarization of space. When the issue of space was raised, the American delegation proceeded to advertise the so-called strategic defense initiative. To carry on with the program amounts to preparing for space militarization. It was decided by the two sides in January, as they discussed the scope and objectives of the talks, that the issues of nuclear and space weapons would be discussed at them as related to one another, with a view to halting the arms race on earth and preventing it in space.

During the first round of the talks, Washington violated the Soviet-American agreement reached in January. Under that agreement the issues of preventing space militarization are to be discussed and dealt with as an integral part of the problem of reducing nuclear weapons. That stand of the United States has naturally aroused concern in the Soviet Union. The Soviet side at the talks underlined at the Vienna talks that the January agreement must be complied with. The Soviet Union has complied with it and will continue so doing.

In order to facilitate progress in Geneva, the Soviet Union proposed that a mutual and comprehensive moratorium be imposed on the development and deployment of nuclear and space weapons. If Washington supported that Soviet initiative, a practical first step could be made towards strengthening confidence and facilitating progress towards far-reaching agreements. On the other hand Washington's commitment to the star wars space weapons program aggravates the talks and international relations generally, and the Soviet Government considered it its duty to warn the governments and public around the world of this danger. In its appeal to the peoples, parliaments and governments of the world on the 40th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany, the USSR National Parliament and Soviet Government said that an agreement on limiting and reducing nuclear weapons cannot be reached in conditions of space militarization. The militarization of space would be a catalyst of an unbridled arms race in every avenue. It would bring about another extremely dangerous arms race and a dramatic weakening of strategic stability.

## U.S. Responsible for Deadlock

LD120514 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 11 May 85

["Saturday commentary" by Valentin Zorin from the "Moscow Viewpoint" feature]

[Text] The first round of the Geneva talks unfortunately gave no cause for optimism. American leaders have been talking and acting in a manner showing their clearly nonconstructive attitude. Moscow has got the impression that the White House doesn't treat the talks seriously enough. In fact the administration seems to pursue a line contrary to the aims of the talks, using the dialogue as a smokescreen.

Last January, Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko agreed that the talks should deal with the three closely interlinked problems: the problem of preventing an arms race in space; the problem of reducing strategic nuclear weapons; and the problem of reducing medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. But the American policy makers have gone back on this agreement. From remarks made by the president, the secretary of state, and the defense secretary, Washington will carry on with its star wars project regardless of what happens at Geneva.

Though it sits at the negotiating table, Washington is continuing its arms build-up and is preparing ground for an arms race in space. In Moscow's opinion, disarmament talks are incompatible with an arms race, unless you fall into hypocrisy and try to mislead public opinion. Those who are playing a political game instead of doing serious politics should know that the Soviet Union will not overlook such attempts.

This country doesn't want the current talks to have as pitiful an outcome as the previous talks had. The Soviet Union is greatly interested in a fair and mutually-acceptable agreement, but it won't be a party to anybody's [word indistinct] political (?gain). This should be understood now before the two countries begin the second round of the talks.

Those who show no desire to make headway at the talks hope to blame the Soviet Union for any stalemate at the talks afterwards. To this end, the Americans are being persuaded that the Soviet position is to blame for the slow progress at Geneva. But isn't it a sign of a Soviet genuine desire to make headway possible that this country has set a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of medium range missiles and has suspended the other measures it took in Europe to offset the deployment of American medium-range missiles close to its borders? The Soviet Union did so to help create a favourable atmosphere at Geneva.

As for the United States, it failed to respond, and in fact continues to deploy Euromissiles, aiming them at Soviet cities.

The Soviet Union has proposed that the two countries call a moratorium for the whole duration of the talks on the development of space weapons and freeze strategic nuclear arsenals. But the American answer again was no.

The Soviet proposals are being presented as propaganda, but after the Soviet Union, in spite of the American action, actually stopped deploying (?its missiles) [word indistinct] called it propaganda. This move showed the Soviet Union's true intentions, as did the Soviet unilateral pledge in 1982 not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. In 1983 this country pledged not to be the first to orbit antisatellite weapons.

The world cannot help seeing that Washington gives no response to any Soviet initiative. This, better than any empty rhetoric shows who is responsible for the deadlock over the talks that are to end the race in nuclear and space weapons. Those who cherish world peace and security would like the American delegation to return to Geneva with new proposals correcting its previous position. This would help to achieve mutually acceptable agreement. The near future will show whether Washington is ready to change from merely stating its good intentions to doing real business.

CSO: 5200/1171

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

WEEKLY MOSCOW DISCUSSION SHOW VIEWS TALKS

Lavrentyev, Shishkin Participants

LD172322 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 17 May 85

["International Situation—Questions and Answers" program presented by Commentator Vyacheslav Lavrentyev, with TASS political observer Gennadiy Arkadiyevich Shishkin]

[Excerpts] [Lavrentyev] The problem of Soviet-U.S. relations is touched upon more often than others in the letters received at the editorial offices.

These letters support the precise and principled course of the Soviet Government, which is aimed at easing the international situation and curbing the arms race. At the same time, radio listeners raise the legitimate question: Why is it that the U.S. Administration, while apparently expressing the desire for peace in what it says, aggravates relations in what it does, starting a new twist in the arms race, on this occasion one in space? Comrade (Shishkin) from Rostov-on-Don asks the following question: Why does the Reagan administration hold so stubbornly to the Strategic Defense Initiative, the so-called "star wars" program? I have asked Gennadiy Arkadiyevich Shishkin, TASS political observer, to reply to this and to a number of other questions. If your please, Gennadiy Arkadiyevich:

Strategic Defense Initiative

[Text] [Shishkin] The quite obvious desire of the United States of America to rush into space with the very latest type of weapons by whatever means, at an expenditure running into many billions, is indicative of just one thing: that over there they still want to achieve a dominating position in the world. Having got as far as the levers of state, the representatives of the extreme reactionary forces of the United States are still dreaming of social revenge, striving to replay history and establish their domination over the world. The aggressive aspirations of the U.S. ruling elite is displayed in attempts to undermine the military strategic balance, that foundation of international security; in the spiralling of the arms race, primarily the nuclear arms race; and in the dangerous plans for the militarization of outer space. The efforts of those who advocate and organize "star wars" run in two directions: along the road of creating antisatellite defense based in space and on earth.

Both of these directions are closely linked with each other. The destruction of the other side's satellites in order to cripple it has always been viewed by the Pentagon as a most important and integral part of the sudden first strike. In the thinking of the Washington strategists, it is the job of a vast antimissile system to oppose the other side's retaliatory strike, weakened by a U.S. nuclear attack. In this, those Americans who pass themselves off as strategists are proceeding from the false premise that the Soviet Union will supposedly be unable to keep up with the United States in its plans for the militarization of outer space. Hence the arrogant statements made by highly placed figures who are vying with each other in making assertions about the need for the United States to adopt a hard-line and unyielding position at the Geneva talks, particularly as regards the U.S. "star wars" plans, that is to say the use of space for military purposes.

The hot-heads in Washington should remember what the reality of the current situation in the world amounts to. It amounts to this: Military-strategic parity exists between the Soviet Union and the United States, that is to say an approximate equality of strengths. The Soviet Union is not striving for military supremacy, but of course it will not permit anyone to upset the parity that has come into being to the detriment of its own security. This was stressed again with complete resolve and firmness at our party's Central Committee April Plenum and also during the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the great victory over German fascism. Washington should know if some people over there want to transform space into a fighting arena in the hope of dictating their will to other states, then the Soviet Union's reply will be as follows: The plans for achieving military superiority will not be able to be realized, either on earth or in space. Calculations upon being able to take cover behind an antimissile shield against retribution for aggression are an illusion.

The openly militaristic course of the United States and its obstructionist line at the Geneva talks have given rise to concern among the NATO partners, too, and among broad sections of the population of Western Europe -- and also among the American people itself. Quite indicative from this point of view is a recent statement by Baker, an eminent American scientist in the field of nuclear physics, who took part in the program for the creation of atomic weapons by the United States.

The history of the past 40 years, the American scientist stressed, shows that the Soviet Union has been able to put up retaliatory measures against any technological innovation of the United States in the nuclear arms field. Each new twist in the arms race makes the security of the United States more and more fragile.

#### Missile Moratorium, Geneva Talks

[Text( [Lavrentyev] Gennadiy Arkadiyevich: Viktor Alekseyevich Pomerantsev, a party and labor veteran from Penza asks: How did Washington react to our initiative on the moratorium on the deployment of medium-range means in Europe?

[Shishkin] The practical and highly constructive step by our country was given its due by many sober-minded American and West European politicians. It did not, however, receive a positive reaction in return in Washington. At the same time, it is perfectly obvious that if they approached the appraisal of this Soviet initiative more



seriously and more thoughtfully in the U.S. capital, and if, for their own part, they displayed restraint in the question of the deployment of U.S. missiles in Western Europe, then this would help to put the Geneva talks onto the level of practical solutions and to play its own part in the settlement of other more complex problems, too.

However, the first stage of the Geneva talks, which has already ended, provides all the grounds for drawing the conclusion that Washington is on a course that is not toward an accord with the Soviet Union. This is obvious, if only from the fact that it is totally refusing to discuss the question of the nonextension of the arms race to outer space simultaneously with discussion of the question of nuclear weapons limitation and reduction. As recently as 14 May, U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger, replying to the question of whether the administration intends to change its position toward the "star wars" program, stated cynically: I consider that from all points of view it is essential for us to continue work on this program. It is for this very reason that the President is filled with such resolve not to give up this program in exchange for concessions from the Soviet side, and not to stop our research on this program under any circumstances.

Statements of this kind, and not just statements, but concrete deeds and concrete behavior of the Americans at the Geneva talks, cannot be viewed other than as a violation by the United States of America of the understanding reached in January about the interconnection of three directions: prevention of the arms race in space; reduction of strategic nuclear armaments; and reduction of medium-range nuclear armaments in Europe. As we see, it is both easy and difficult to answer the question: Will a Soviet-U.S. bridge be built? It is easy because both logic and good sense and the lessons of the war are pushing the two sides onto the path of normalizing their relations and developing cooperation. It is difficult because influential forces still remain in the United States that are trying in vain to settle by military means the historic dispute between the two social systems.

#### Soviet-U.S. Relations

[Text] [Lavrentyev] A final question for you, Gennadiy Arkadiyevich, and a more general one. Boris Andreyevich Zhilkin, a war veteran and one of our regular listeners who comes from the village of (Sredniy Khrashovets) in Kursk Oblast, asks: What must be done for good relations to be established between the USSR and the United States?

[Shishkin] In replying to this question I would first of all like to dwell on the enormous positive influence for reducing the military threat that would be exerted by the normalization of Soviet-U.S. relations and the development of Soviet-U.S. cooperation.

At the present time, when it is not only individual countries and peoples but the whole world that is faced with a real threat of destruction in a thermonuclear disaster, all states, both large and small, must of course take part in the search for realistic solutions to the acute problems of the present day and the lessening of international tension. There is a special role here that belongs first and foremost to the Soviet Union and the United States. For it is precisely in the arsenals of these two countries that the fantastic forces of destruction capable of destroying everything living upon earth many times over are concentrated. Alongside this destructive potential, an enormous potential for peace has been built up over the 40 years that have passed since the end of the Great Patriotic War -- a multifaceted, and quite historic potential to put Soviet-U.S. relations onto constructive lines now.

So what, then, must be done first of all in order to bring Soviet-U.S. relations out of the ice age in which they have found themselves? A reply of principle to this question was given by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the Central Committee April Plenum. He said: If one considers both the positive and the negative experience which has been built up by the history of Soviet-U.S. relations, by the history both of distant and recent times, then one has to say that the most sensible thing is to seek ways that lead toward the straightening out of relations, to build a bridge of cooperation, but building it from both sides. In Washington, too, from time to time they now make vague statements about their readiness for a meeting at summit level and about the desire for peace. However, it is also evident that there is a very substantial difference between the approaches of Moscow and Washington to the question of building a bridge.

In Moscow they do not confine themselves to wordy appeals; they back them up with concrete deeds and initiatives. It is sufficient to recall that the Soviet Union has already proposed concretely and clearly that all nuclear powers should follow the Soviet Union's example and undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons; to freeze nuclear arsenals of all nuclear powers, beginning with the USSR and the United States, both as regards quantity and quality, in order to proceed further without delay toward the reduction of these armaments, going so far as to eliminate them completely; to conclude a treaty on the mutual nonuse of military force and the maintenance of relations of peace between member-states of the Warsaw Pact and the member-states of NATO and between all participants in the all-European conference; to reach agreement on a complete and universal ban on the testing of nuclear weapons; and finally, providing an example of goodwill and striving to promote the success of the Geneva talks on space and nuclear armaments, the Soviet Union has halted unilaterally the deployment of medium-range missiles and the implementation of other retaliatory measures in Europe. This moratorium was put into operation on 7 April.

#### Shultz-Gromyko Meeting

[Text] The question of what has to be done further in order to get the normalization of Soviet-American relations moving was also discussed at the meeting in Vienna on 14 May between Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and USSR minister of foreign affairs, and U.S. Secretary of State Shultz. During the discussion that took place then, the Soviet side stressed the need for energetic efforts with the object of halting the development of unfavorable tendencies in world affairs and bringing about a turn for the better in Soviet-U.S. relations.

In this connection, a critical appraisal was made of the general course of Washington's policy, primarily on the security issue, and concern was expressed about the unconstructive position of the U.S. side at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms. Comrade Gromyko stressed the need to strictly adhere to the understanding reached in January on the subject and purpose of the Geneva talks, which envisages interlinked examination and solution of questions on preventing an arms race in space and halting the arms race on earth.

Implementation of the proposal put forward by Comrade Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on the establishment of a mutual and all-embracing moratorium on the development and deployment of nuclear and space armaments might become an important first step at the Geneva talks. The U.S. side's attitude toward a moratorium of this kind will serve as an indicator of the direction of its policy and its intentions in the military field, Comrade Gromyko noted.

USSR'S ZIMYANIN ON FRG 'HASTE' TO PARTICIPATE IN SDI

LD191212 Hamburg DPA in German 0957 GMT 19 Apr 85

[Excerpts] Bonn, 19 Apr (DPA)--Soviet Central Committee secretary Mikhail Zimyanin has criticized the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] and expressed concern at the "haste" with which leading federal FRG politicians have shown their readiness to participate in them.

Before traveling on to Mainz, Zimyanin said at a news conference that the delegation has come on a "goodwill mission."

Zimyanin said that FRG participation in "star wars" would be of "significance" for relations with the Soviet Union. In reply to questions on this, he said that there is no reason, however, for letting the imagination run riot in this connection. The matter would be treated as "Bonn deserves." He described as illusory the argument that the Federal Republic can gain access to U.S. technology by participating in the U.S. SDI. On the contrary, there is a real possibility of even greater dependence.

It is incomprehensible that it cannot be seen that the militarization of space will have a destabilizing effect on the situation in Europe. Zimyanin declined to comment on Kohl's government statement, which the Soviet delegation listened to briefly yesterday during the visit to the Bundestag. It first must be thoroughly analyzed, he said.

President Reagan's SDI is also of special significance for the U.S.-Soviet negotiations in Geneva, he said. The militarization of space would not only lead to a halt to arms limitation and reduction but would also in itself lead to an acceleration of the arms race "in all directions." A qualitatively new phase would begin, in which processes are decisive which are beyond control.

The chairman of the Supreme Soviet Foreign Affairs Committee, Lenid Zamyatin, said that in Geneva arms in space and strategic and medium-range weapons are being negotiated together. If the United States presses ahead with the SDI the Soviet Union may possibly not be able to reduce its strategic weapons. If the United States is prepared for the nonmilitarization of space, however, the number of both strategic and of medium-range weapons could be reduced.

Zimyanin categorically denied that the Soviet Union possesses satellite weapons. "Our satellites have a peaceful purpose; we are in favor of peaceful space."



The radar installations in Krasnoyarsk, the inspection of which by Americans has been mentioned as a possibility by Moscow's ambassador in Washington, is in no way secret. It is a "simple satellite observation installation." The "entire commotion" that was raised about this matter was "pure provocation."

At the press conference Zimyanin urged that all means be used to help the peoples of the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic to draw closer to one another. The decisive factor here are questions of security. After the press conference the Soviet delegation traveled on to Mainz, where they are to meet Landtag representatives. Tomorrow they will be received there by Minister President Bernhard Vogel (CDU). The 1-week visit ends on Sunday [21 April]. Bundestag speaker Philipp Jenninger (CDU) has been invited to pay a return visit, which he wants to make as soon as possible.

CSO: 5200/2591

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

CZECHOSLOVAK PAPER EXAMINES PURPOSE OF TALKS

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 23 Apr 85 p 6

[Article by Ivan Hlivka: "In the Interest of Humanity"]

[Text] The Soviet-American negotiations which began recently in Geneva are attracting considerable attention from our own and the world public. This is no accident. These negotiations concern a complex of issues related to space and nuclear weapons (both strategic and medium range), and were preceded by a joint declaration of the two sides in January that they are prepared to reach some sort of mutually acceptable conclusion. The agenda for the negotiations includes the most pressing issues of the contemporary world, the resolution of which will determine to a large extent the principal future course of world development.

Who is Lacking in Seriousness

In this sense Geneva brings a new aspect to the struggle for peace, and offers humanity new possibilities. It opens the doors and creates certain preconditions for achieving positive results on the most pressing issues of the day. Possibilities, however, do not always lead directly to realities. Here too, unfortunately, certain negative signals have become evident that force one to be cautious.

The Soviet Union has joined the negotiations because it feels a responsibility to the present and the future of humanity, and because it is the true defender of peace and cooperation among peoples. This is why it proposed the negotiations and the USA accepted the proposal. This improved the chances for reaching a mutual understanding and resolving outstanding problems. However, while the Soviet Union wishes to conduct the negotiations honestly and seriously, hoping to reach an agreement on important, real reductions in strategic nuclear weapons and medium range weapons and to prevent the militarization of space, the American side, as comrade Gorbachev reminded some American congressmen, has held to its provocative intentions of taking the arms race into space. Comrade M. Gorbachev also pointed to the inconsistency between the declared intentions of the USA to negotiate reductions in the stocks of nuclear weapons and its frenzied daily accumulation of these weapons.

In an attempt to fulfill the wishes of those peoples who wanted the Geneva talks to show some early progress and to facilitate their success, the Soviet Union proposed an immediate freeze on increases in nuclear arsenals on Earth, an end to preparations for manufacturing weapons designed to be located in space and on this basis, in an atmosphere of increased mutual trust, immediate preparation of an agreement for reducing existing inventories of weapons. It demonstrated its sincerity and good will convincingly with the declaration that it will stop deploying its medium range missiles and suspend other retaliatory measures in Europe until November of this year.

These new peaceful initiatives of the Soviet Union are clear proof of the peaceloving and realistic approach of the USSR to the most pressing issues of our time. They were accepted as such by politicians, public figures and the world press. It has been emphasized that these Soviet initiatives are a significant contribution to the cause of reducing international tensions and a guarantee of the reliable security of people and that they are permeated with a sense of deep responsibility for the fate of humanity.

Meanwhile official Washington, which pays lip service to controlling armaments, continues its efforts to justify its negative response to this Soviet initiative using worn propaganda slogans. A significant part of world public opinion, however, recognizes these efforts as proof of an attempt by Washington to use the Geneva talks as camouflage for new militaristic programs.

Many are today asking the question: "How is it possible in this environment to believe in the sincerity of the USA at the Geneva talks when the American side does not even try to hide its lack of political will in adhering to the promises it made prior to the negotiations?"

As usual, now that the Soviet Union has demonstrated its desire to put an end to excessive stockpiling of arms and to improve international relations, and now that a desire for peace is being expressed in the USA and worldwide, anti-Soviet rhetoric is being activated by the ruling circles of the USA in the spirit of the cold war, and propaganda and disinformation is being fed in increasing amounts to the public in the form of vulgar lies and distortions of the facts of Soviet policy. The number of voices is also increasing, including US senators and congressmen, that are openly exhorting the administration to participate seriously in these international negotiations, and to give up on numerous ridiculous positions, such as an attempt at "star war", the propaganda that the Soviet Union is preparing to attack the West, and that the best path to peace is through increasing weapons stockpiles, the nuclear potential of the USA, etc. The path to disarmament must lead through disarmament not through further buildup of arms.

#### Trading Rather than Negotiating

The tactics of the American delegation in Geneva are well known. The American president himself informed the American people of them, the American press writes about them. Much, if not all, that one needs to know about them is contained in the fact that the chief of the American delegation was used to convince congressmen to approve Reagan's request for billions of dollars for

the MX intercontinental missile. After meeting with the president, Kampelman stated that the MX missiles "are necessary to assure the success of the Geneva talks". The American delegation is to agree to nothing that would restrict its armament plans, especially in the area of space weapons. This, even at the price of sending the talks up a dead end street. The delegation is to blackmail the Soviet side and to deceive public opinion with distorted facts.

One already is encountering in the media the planned lie that space weapons are defensive and that the Soviet Union is against them only because it wants to sabotage the negotiations. The public is being force-fed the assertion that Reagan's "strategic initiative" means a qualitative break in previous Soviet-American relations in the sense that while in the past these relations were based in the military area on "deterrent force", a situation can be brought about in which defensive systems located in space can eliminate nuclear weapons. Far from making a conflict impossible, space weapons can far more readily start one.

The USA is dreaming up many other no less fantastic, mutually inconsistent programs which are intended to paralyze the activity of the world peace movement and the opposition of other political forces.

The NEW YORK TIMES wrote, for instance, that the makeup of the American delegation gives rise to the thought that the objective is to strike a tough bargain, because not a single member of the delegation has a reputation of defending arms control." The paper writes that if the Soviet side does not make some concessions, or drags its feet, the American delegation "is prepared to place the responsibility for failure on Moscow's shoulders."

To make a deal, to place responsibility for failure on the other side, to force Moscow to make concessions - none of this indicates in the slightest that the American side came to the talks to negotiate. Have past experiences taught nothing to the White House?

Reagan once expressed his dissatisfaction with the term "star war" and asked that it be replaced with a term that was more appealing. He certainly knew what he was doing. There has however, been the slow but inexorable growth of a new stereotype to which others are giving in, including America's allies. The desired result has already been achieved. It is well known that the ruling circles of certain West European countries publicly criticized Reagan's "star war" plan, but then under pressure from Washington, combined with illusions and visions of large profits, came around to agree to the American proposal of participating in research on the program. This was their decision to "help" the Geneva negotiations.

#### A Doubtful "Defense"

However, in the West many people have noted the new character of a danger that can threaten the world. They are warning more and more that attempts by the White House to exclude the "star wars" program from the agenda in Geneva will inevitably torpedo Soviet-American dialog in the area of arms limitations. Most experts throughout the world are in agreement that this program can mark

the beginning of another spiral in the arms race that will result in a sharp destabilization of the world situation that in the final analysis can lead to a world conflict.

Certain American political figures have noted that if the American position at Geneva remains unchanged the chances for the success of the talks will be limited, to say the least. They have noted that the categorically stated wish of Reagan in refusing to limit research in space weapons dooms in advance any hope for a positive outcome.

Revolutionary and democratic forces point to the fact that the efforts of the American government are intended to change the existing balance of forces between the imperialist and socialist countries in the military realm and to achieve the potential to attack progressive countries, without fear of retaliation, from both space and the Earth. War from space is a true threat for all humanity. Imperialist circles and their diplomats want to make it impossible for humanity to object to this, at whatever cost. Washington, by signing up Japan and its NATO allies, even if only for the research phase of "star wars" had made a poor alliance. The government of the USA, by evoking the "solidarity" of the entire western world, wants to make its task easier in dealing with opposition at home.

American propaganda tends to utilize primitive falsification of the policy of the Soviet Union by accusing the enemy of doing what in fact it is doing. It lies in accusing the Soviet Union of also preparing for "star wars" even though it has no proof. It is not impossible that the propaganda tricks of Washington are making an impression. One thing is clear, however, that the unseemly maneuvers and outright lies, the speculation, pressure, and rude attacks which are normal parts of the current defensive program for "star wars", only tend to confirm its untenability and show how dangerous these plans are and the extent to which they are at variance with the wishes of the people of the world.

#### What Now?

The question logically arises: what will be the near term and future results of the so-called defensive initiative of the West for its relationship with the socialist world and for the entire international environment?

There is no doubt that there will be a further decline in the level of understanding between the peoples of both worlds, that international tension will increase, and that the prospects are very good for a slide into cold war. Even now it is possible to predict how world politics and public opinion will be traumatized. Further steps will have still more dramatic results. Military competition will increase, psychological warfare will intensify.

Mountains of weapons have still not assured anyone of reliable security. If increased numbers of nuclear weapons in the armories of the world actually bring something new it is only new danger for the existence of peoples and of life on Earth. There is, however, another path, which corresponds to the basic interest of humanity. It has already been tested and confirmed by history.



Forty postwar years have shown clearly: peaceful coexistence and cooperation promotes the advance of humanity, peace and social progress, while the opposite, a reliance on force, on the achievement of military superiority brings intercountry relations to a dead end, and does not facilitate the sensible resolution of problems.

The principled and consistent policy of the USSR opens the way to constructive agreements. But the USSR is only one side. Negotiations and the entire matter of peaceful coexistence and international cooperation would be helped substantially if Washington conducted its affairs with good sense and realism. This position acquires particular importance when the agenda concerned includes questions of great importance for humanity. For thousands of years the human world view was based on a belief that while individuals were mortal, mankind was immortal. There was a certain guaranteed law governing the course of life. The danger of nuclear war has cast doubt on this guarantee, and placed before humanity the question of living or not living.

History teaches us that as long as humanity sets ambitious targets for itself it is successful. This has been true in every age. The current international situation requires that all people of good will set as their main objective the achievement of a return to political detente, the stopping of the arms race and the establishment of positive relations between peoples. The dangerous policy of imperialism must be met with resolute opposition. We believe that if this is the case, humanity will continue to advance in peace.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

PRC REPRESENTATIVE TO UN ON SPACE WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT

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[Text] United Nations, 9 May (XINHUA)--China appealed to the two superpowers at the current session of the UN Disarmament Commission "to demonstrate genuine political will" and reach agreement at their Geneva negotiations.

The appeal was made in a speech by Qian Jiadong, China's ambassador in charge of disarmament affairs, at the commission's general debate on 8 May. The session began 6 May and will end 31 May.

The commission is scheduled to review the achievements of the so-called second disarmament decade. The UN General Assembly declared at its 35th session in 1980 that the '80's would be the second disarmament decade.

In the first five years on the decade, said Ambassador Qian, the governments and peoples of many countries have made unremitting efforts in opposing war and safeguarding peace.

"Today, while the danger of war still exists, the forces checking war are growing," said the ambassador. "In the final analysis, the awakening of the people and their actions are the real motive force for the progress in disarmament. In this case, the second disarmament decade has already made remarkable achievements."

However the ambassador pointed out, it is "both disappointing and disquieting" that the arms race between the two superpowers with the largest arsenals has further intensified instead of being halted.

"It is imperative that the two major powers undertaken their special responsibilities" and "take the lead in halting the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and in drastically cutting down their nuclear stockpiles," he stressed.

On the question of the militarization of outer space, he reiterated China's position. It supports the prohibition of research, development, testing, production, deployment and use of any kind of space weaponry and the thorough destruction of all such weapons.

On China's efforts in disarmament, he told the commission that his government, apart from actively participating in the endeavours for disarmament at the international level, had in recent years taken a series of measures to cut its military expenditures and reduce its armaments.

"Since 1979, China has been tightening its military spending, and the percentage it occupies in the total budget of the government has been dwindling. The size of the Chinese military forces has been cut and will continue to be cut drastically," he said.

"China is determined to work for world peace and international security. This is the course we will firmly stay on and never depart from," he said in conclusion.

CSO: 5200/4039



SPACE ARMS

USSR: U.S. IGNORES CALLS TO AVOID SPACE MILITARIZATION

Moscow MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN' in Russian No 4, Apr 85 pp 107-115

[Article by A. Kozyrev under rubric "Disarmament -- The Real Path to Peace":  
"For Peace in Space"]

[Text] Concern on the part of the peace-loving public as a whole is evoked by the dangerous plans of the Washington administration to extend the arms race into space, because the militarization of outer space, if no reliable obstacle is erected in its path, will threaten everything that has been successfully achieved so far in the field of arms limitation, will sharply intensify the danger of nuclear war, will devour truly astronomical amounts of money, and will create insurmountable obstacles for international cooperation in the peaceful mastery of space.

The Soviet Union is a decisive opponent to a contest in a race involving any weapons, including space weapons. The efforts being undertaken at the present time by our country to prevent the militarization of outer space are a continuation of the consistent, purposeful policy of guaranteeing the peaceful use of space. After opening up the Space Age in 1957 by launching the world's first artificial earth satellite, the USSR by 1958, at the United Nations, made a proposal that stipulated the banning of the use of outer space for military purposes. Although it was impossible to achieve a radical resolution of that problem because of the stubborn resistance of the militaristic circles of the United States and a number of other NATO countries, the Soviet initiative contributed to mobilizing the efforts of the peace-loving countries and the international public in the struggle against converting space into a source of military danger.

In the United States, on the other hand, the prospects for the mastery of space, from the very beginning, have been linked with the use of inner space as an area for testing, and subsequently for deploying, nuclear and other weapons. It was planned to put into orbit, as it were, bomber-satellites capable at any moment of hurling nuclear bombs onto the earth, as well as mine-satellites and interceptor-satellites with a nuclear warhead for striking spacecraft.

Those sinister plans of American imperialism were, however, disrupted. As a result of the energetic efforts of the Soviet Union, supported by all the

peace-loving forces, as well as a definite amount of realism displayed on the part of certain of the leading U.S. figures at that time in evaluating the fatal threat that would result from the militarization of space, in the 1960's important treaties were concluded. Those treaties erected rather stable obstacles on the path to converting space into a source of a nuclear threat. We have in mind the 1963 Treaty to Ban Tests of Nuclear Weapons in the Atmosphere, Space, and Under the Water, as well as the 1967 Treaty Governing the Principles of Activity by States in Researching and Using Outer Space.

The signing of these documents created favorable conditions for the peaceful mastery of space, and the broad, mutually advantageous cooperation among the countries in inner space. During the years that have elapsed, scientific and applied research has been successfully carried out, and is being carried out, within the framework of Interkosmos [Interspace], the program of the socialist countries. Emissaries from many countries worked harmoniously in Soviet Salyut manned stations -- peaceful scientific laboratories. The docking in orbit of the Soviet Soyuz spacecraft and the U.S. Apollo spacecraft, the flight of a French cosmonaut on a Soviet spacecraft, and many other things have all demonstrated the real possibility of the carrying out joint space research by countries with different social systems. There exist broad prospects for fruitful international cooperation in space, which cooperation will help to resolve global problems -- the more efficient use of the planet's natural resources, the protection of the environment, the elimination of disease, and the raising of the population's standard of living.

Today it is important to realize the scope of the problem that is confronting mankind as a whole, to understand the great responsibility of resolving that problem. We are discussing a turning point in the development of civilization: either the beginning of a new era of the large-scale mastery and use of space for the good of mankind, or the conversion of space into a source of mortal danger.

In the Pentagon and in the boards of directors of the corporations that specialize in the production of air, missile, and space technology, unfortunately, everything is already prepared for translating into the language of concrete decisions and measures the ideas of achieving, with the aid of weapons that are deployed in space, the military supremacy that the American military circles have been unable to achieve in the nuclear area.

It is proposed to deploy in inner space antimissile and antisatellite means, as well as the latest types of weapons that are intended to strike blows at targets on the land, in the air, and at sea. We are discussing, first of all, laser and beam weapons. In addition, in the United States a special command element for space has been formed, a combined space center for controlling military actions in space is being created, and the United States is building a space center for shuttle spacecraft, the entire program for using which, practically speaking, is under the management of the Pentagon.

The scope of Washington's military plans for space is also attested to by the astronomic amounts of money which have been allocated and which it is proposed to allocate to implement the dangerous plans for militarizing space. The first generation of laser-weapon systems alone, according to computations made

by specialists, will cost no less than \$100 billion. A space-deployed antimissile defense system, in the evaluation of former U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown, can become the first military program whose expenses will exceed a trillion dollars. And, as the American press mentions, the corporations that are counting on receiving the lion's share of all these amounts of money are California concerns with which many of the highly placed figures in the present Washington administration have close ties.

Space weapons, in the minds of those who have given themselves the task of achieving military supremacy, have been called upon to play the role of the key element in the first-strike potential, because we are dealing with the development and creation of a system of strike means primarily for destroying an enemy's missiles, in order to deprive him of his capabilities or to undermine substantially his ability to deliver a counter strike. One is also led to this conclusion, in particular, by the fact that the plans for setting up a widescale PRO [antimissile defense] system with elements of deployment in space are accompanied by the acceleration of the programs for developing the aggressive strategic forces of the United States.

It is obvious that the striving to provide oneself with a space "shield," by covering oneself with which it would be possible, as the Washington strategists assert, to guarantee the invulnerability of the United States, attests to the fact that in the United States there are those who are thinking a bit about the possibility of delivering the first nuclear strike. Characterizing the plans for the creation of a widescale antimissile defense system, A. A. Gromyko emphasized, "These weapons are aggressive, and this entire plan, if one can speak frankly, is aggressive... It agrees with the U.S. administration's line which is aimed at obtaining a dominant position in the world, a position that would enable the United States to dictate its conditions"<sup>1</sup>.

At the same time it is well known that a system of means for intercepting missiles cannot be completely impenetrable<sup>2</sup>. Even according to the most optimistic forecasts of the Pentagon experts, such a system would guarantee the interception of, at the maximum, 90-95 percent of the ballistic missiles in the event of their mass launch. The 5-10 percent of missile that would be able to get through would still deliver a sufficient number of nuclear warheads to cause the "disintegration" of the society that would prove to be their target<sup>3</sup>.

But nevertheless, the Pentagon feels, a widescale antimissile defense system with elements of deployment in space could serve as an instrument for weakening the power, if not of neutralizing a counter strike, inasmuch as most of the enemy's ballistic missiles would be destroyed while still in their silos as a result of the so-called preventive attack. But such computations completely cancel out all the assertions by the official representatives in Washington that the new program for the deployment of space arms is allegedly of a "defensive" nature. The use of the term "defense" is nothing more than a game of words which is intended to mislead people.

The arguments of the present American administration are being criticized in the United States itself, and those critics include many previously prominent

political figures. The antimissile defense system, according to U.S. Ex-President R. Nixon, "would provide a shield, presenting the opportunity to use the sword," and therefore would destabilize the strategic situation<sup>4</sup>. And in an article by M. Bundy, a former special assistant to the president on questions of national security, R. McNamara, former U.S. Secretary of Defense, G. Smith, chief of the American delegation to the SALT-1 negotiations, and G. Kenn, former U.S. ambassador to the USSR, which article was recently published in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, it was pointed out that there are no justifications for agreeing with the assertions of the American administration that the creation of the antimissile defense system can make nuclear arms obsolete and unnecessary. And the crux of the matter is not only in that any such means will not be able to guarantee 100-percent defense against missiles, the American specialists note, and not in the fact that, in addition to ballistic missiles, there also exist cruise missiles and other missiles, as well as aircraft that are capable of delivering nuclear weapons to the target and which are invulnerable to an antimissile defense system. The main thing is that the very course aimed at the deployment of space arms cannot be perceived by the other side other than as the attempt to violate the strategic balance, as a provocation that requires retaliatory measures. The attempts to implement this course, the writers of the article state, will inevitably evoke the most energetic measures to bring about the further buildup and improvement of nuclear-missile arms, that is, those very means that the antimissile system with elements of deployment in space would be intended to destroy. Thus, the plans for deploying a widescale antimissile defense system contradict the goals of achieving agreements to limit and reduce nuclear arms. Moreover, the program announced by Washington for preparing for "Star Wars," the authors state with complete definiteness, will undermine the 1972 Treaty between the USSR and the United States, which is already in existence and contains no time limitation -- the Treaty to limit missile-defense systems, which banned the creation of missile-defense systems on the territory of either of the two countries<sup>5</sup>.

That agreement was, and continues to be, of tremendous fundamental importance for restraining the nuclear arms race, for reinforcing strategic stability, and reducing the military danger. In the firm conviction of the Soviet Union, the Treaty Limiting Missile-Defense Systems -- and, incidentally, other treaties -- must be observed scrupulously. But the militarization of space would overthrow that treaty, as well as many other currently existing international agreements. Seeing in them a hindrance on the path of implementing those dangerous plans, the proponents of the arms race, including the race in space weapons, have been attempting to undermine them, particularly with the aid of slanderous campaigns concerning the "violation" by the Soviet Union of the Treaty Limiting Missile-Defense Systems and other pledges to limit arms.

Another question that must be resolved immediately is the question of banning antisatellite weapons. The deployment of weapons of this kind would lead to an increase in the threat of sudden attack, and would undermine the efforts of guaranteeing trust among the nuclear states.

In the West there prevails the opinion that antisatellite weapons would scarcely represent any threat to international security, inasmuch as the



situation being considered would be a kind of duel that would be waged in distant space, and would have nothing to do with any danger that a nuclear war could occur. However, that opinion is fundamentally erroneous. "Antisatellite weapons," the Executive Director of the Union of Concerned U.S. Scientists, Howard Reese, warns, "are capable to destroying satellites that are intended for early warning of attack and for communications, as well as those that carry out other important functions that are of vital importance for guaranteeing the security both of the USSR and the United States"<sup>6</sup>. The use of these weapons would make it possible for the attacking side to reduce substantially the effectiveness of the systems for giving warning of a nuclear strike, would "blind" the enemy," would catch him unaware, and weaken his capability for vengeance in the event of nuclear aggression. An attack against a satellite would be an act that could be entirely viewed as the preparation for the first nuclear strike.

H. Reese, in essence, admits that both antimissile and antisatellite systems that are deployed in space can be employed to strike both missiles and satellites. And that means that they pertain to the same class of space arms. Therefore he points out the insolvency of the attempts on the part of certain representatives of the American administration to assert that it is necessary to conduct negotiations relative only to certain types of space weapons, for example, antisatellite weapons, rather than to the entire series of these arms. In actuality, H. Reese points out, all the systems that are capable of destroying objects in space represent danger and must be banned.

The rightness of this posing of the question is attested to by the facts. One of them is cited by Reese himself, who remarks that the creation of laser weapons in space would make it possible to hit with a beam of aimed energy both the satellites, whether they are in low or high orbits, and the ballistic missiles. Another example is provided by a Pentagon program that is already being carried out: the creation, on the basis of an F-15 aircraft with multiple-target SREM-ALTAIR space-strike means, of the ASAT system. This weapon could be used both as an antisatellite and an antimissile weapon.

In essence, the ideas proposed by certain individuals in Washington concerning the beginning of negotiations only for individual systems of space weapons would require their authors to withdraw from the understanding, leaving themselves free hands to accelerate the programs for the militarization of space in a number of directions. Therein lie the real reasons why the United States is rejecting so stubbornly the Soviet Union's proposal to establish a reciprocal moratorium on the testing and deployment of space weapons.

The problem of space arms cannot be resolved by only one-half or one-quarter. One cannot, for example, ban one type of antisatellite arms, and authorize another type; or ban only antisatellite weapons, but, as the expression goes, give the green light to other types of space weapons. In both instances we are talking about the same space-weapons race.

Even a brief and by no means exhaustive analysis of the systems of space-strike weapons that may be created in the near future leads to the conclusion that it is necessary to carry out urgent measures to prevent the militarization of space before that process has taken on an irreversible



nature. Otherwise it may be too late. And the crux of the matter is not only that it is considerably more difficult to withdraw a weapon from the arsenals after it has become a reality, than it is to prevent its creation. It is completely obvious that the militarization of space would not only mean, factually speaking, the end of the process of the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms, but would become a catalyst for the uncontrolled arms race along all directions.

The Soviet Union speaks out, in the most decisive manner, in favor of preventing the space-weapons race. At the same time it is obvious that, in the event that the United States deploys any space systems, our country will be forced to take steps to assure the reliable guaranteeing of its security, as well as the security of its allies and friends. The Soviet Union will be able to give the proper response to the challenge thrown to it. The balance, of course, will be restored, but, true, at a higher level of arms. It is precisely for that reason that the USSR feels that it is necessary to prevent this development of events. This would correspond to the interests of absolutely all states.

Washington's plans to deploy the latest space-weapons systems are currently being compared in the West, politically speaking, with the carrying out in the United States in the early 1970's of a program for replacing the single-unit warheads in ballistic missiles with multiple-charge warheads capable of individual guidance and capable of guaranteeing the deliveries to targets not of a single nuclear charge, but several of them at one. At that time the Pentagon also was planning to make a decisive leap forward, to gain the strategic advantage as a result of the new technical capabilities, erroneously assuming that the USSR would prove to be behind. As everyone knows, that did not happen. After receiving from the United States its refusal to accept the most persistent proposals of the Soviet Union to prevent the re-equipping of the warheads of the ballistic missiles, the Soviet Union was finally forced itself to carry out a similar program, in order to prevent the violation of the parity.

The realistically-minded figures in the West, including those in the United States, recognize the lack of prospects for the current plans of leaving the USSR without a weapon in the face of the American space-strike systems. Today, when the carrying out of the plans to militarize space is only beginning, there continues to be a favorable opportunity to prevent the testing and deployment of such systems in space, an opportunity to ban them and, naturally, to refuse to engage in scientific-research work in this area. The USSR is in favor of the most rapid implementation of this capability, following the example of what was done in the 1960's with respect to the deployment of nuclear weapons in space.

Guided by the high and noble goals of eliminating the threat of a nuclear war, stopping the arms race, and preventing the extension of that race into outer space, the Soviet Union proposed in 1981 the conclusion of an international treaty to ban the deployment of any kind of weapons in space. After considering that initiative, the United Nations General Assembly welcomed it and spoke out in favor of implementing it. However, because of the opposition put up by the United States and its closest allies, the negotiations on that

question did not even begin. Moreover, Washington announced its intention to begin to carry out large-scale programs for the militarization of space.

Under these conditions the USSR came forward with new, far-reaching initiatives that were aimed at preventing the proliferation of the arms race to inner space, and proposed coming to an understanding about completely precluding the possibility of converting space into an arena for military actions and the application of weapons. With that purpose the Soviet Union in 1983 submitted to the United Nations a draft of the Treaty to Ban the Use of Force in Outer Space or From Space With Respect to the Earth. That treaty stipulated pledges of a legal-political and material nature. That measure would also have proposed, in particular, the complete refusal to use antisatellite weapons, including the destruction of such systems that were already in existence. In order to facilitate the achievement of the understanding, the USSR on a unilateral basis declared a moratorium on putting any antisatellite weapons into space so long as the United States and other countries would act in the same manner.

The Soviet initiative received broad support throughout the world. The United Nations General Assembly persistently recommended the beginning, at a Conference on Disarmament, negotiations to elaborate the agreements concerning the cessation of the arms race in space. The implementation of that decision was blocked at the conference by the American representatives. Moreover, a number of countries that were allies of the United States and that had voted "yes" in the Conference on Disarmament stated that they were in favor only of "studying" the question, rather than achieving its practical resolution by means of negotiations.

As the representative of India, (Dyubey) emphasized when speaking at the 39th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, "the basic reason why the Conference on Disarmament could not begin negotiations on the question of preventing the arms race in outer space was that a number of countries which had voted at the General Assembly for the beginning of negotiations with the purpose of achieving an agreement or agreements decided to renunciate their pledge when that question came up at the Conference on Disarmament"<sup>7</sup>.

In June 1984, in a declaration by the Soviet government, a new, major initiative was advanced for carrying out Soviet-American negotiations to prevent the militarization of outer space. In the declaration the topic of discussion was the prevention of putting into space or deploying there, whether it be on manned or unmanned systems, any kind of strike weapons -- conventional, nuclear, laser, ray, or anything else. Space weapons with any operating principle or with any kind of deployment should not be created, tested, or deployed either for any purposes -- antimissile defense, as antisatellite means, or use against targets on the earth, whether they be on land, the sea, or in the air. Such systems that were already created were to be destroyed. This radical resolution would not only prevent an arms race in space, but also, and no less importantly, would promote the resolution of the problems of limiting and reducing the other strategic arms.

In proposing the beginning of negotiations to prevent the militarization of outer space, the Soviet Union proceeded from the conviction that the USSR and

the United States, as the leading powers in the space field, should do everything to assure that space would remain peaceful, and, in particular, to establish among the purposes of the resolution of that task a basis for multilateral understanding. The responsibility for the fact that the negotiations did not occur in 1984 is borne entirely and completely by the American side, which immediately rejected any measures that might hinder the military plans of the Pentagon in space.

In the autumn of 1984 the USSR decided once again to use the positive political potential of the United Nations, and proposed a decision in favor of placing a ban, once and for all, on the use of force in outer space or from space with respect to the earth, and also from the earth with respect to objects in space. In other words, the USSR proposed to the United Nations that it come forward in favor of the achievement of an understanding concerning the radical resolution of the problem of preventing the militarization of space -- the banning and elimination of the entire class of space-strike arms, including antisatellite and antimissile systems that were deployed in space, including any means that were deployed on land, in the air, or at sea and intended to strike objects in space.

The initiatory steps taken by the USSR in this area met broad support throughout the world and received the approval of the absolute majority of the countries that were members of the United Nations. They found a response in statements made at a session of the representatives of many of the developing countries, who commented that the militarization of space would result in the unprecedented growth of military expenditures, sharply limiting the possibility of allocating funds to meet socioeconomic needs. The arms race in space would make impossible the effective international cooperation in the area of the peaceful use of outer space. It would turn the achievements of scientific-technical progress toward achieving the goals of war and destruction. Currently, as was justly noted by Burmese Minister of Foreign Affairs Chit Hlaing in his statement at the 39th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, the question takes this form: "either the international community will derive benefit from the rapid development of space technology, or will be threatened by it"<sup>8</sup>.

The attempt to hinder the plans for the militarization of space was reflected in the draft version of the resolution "The Prevention of the Arms Race in Space," which was prepared jointly with the socialist states by a group of nonaligned states. The results of the vote at the session on this draft of the resolution illuminated with sufficient clarity the positions of the overwhelming majority of the states that were members of the United Nations: the General Assembly at first demanded that the mastery of outer space be carried out exclusively without the application of force or the threat of force. One hundred and fifty countries voted for that resolution. That decision was not supported by only one country -- the United States, which thus, as it were, signed its name certifying that it is precisely that country that is the source of the threat to peace that is linked with the militarization of space.

The statements made by many delegations at the session had an objectively critical tone with respect to the plans for the militarization of space that



had been announced by Washington. Representatives of a number of countries, including India, Sri Lanka, Mali, Nigeria, and also Greece and France, subjected to criticism the programs for creating antimissile defense systems with elements deployed in space. They characterized those programs as ones that could result in a threat of the destabilization of the strategic situation, although they avoided at such time from mentioning the United States outright. The Indian representative, for example, emphasized, "The very process of working out these systems of arms can lead to the beginning of a nuclear war. A power that has developed a defensive system might decide that it is capable of putting out of commission the missiles of another side after a first strike, defending its own forces from a retaliatory strike... The approximate expenditures for the creation of such a system -- approximately a trillion U.S. dollars for the development of such a weapon on the part of one power alone -- can inflict a heavy blow on the world economic, which already is in a state of crisis. And, finally, the development of such arms systems will almost certainly lead to total buildup, including a buildup both of offensive weapons and of defensive weapons, on land, at sea, and in outer space"<sup>9</sup>.

It is also important to note that all the American allies voted in favor of the session's draft resolution concerning the prevention of the arms race in space, which draft the United States had refused to support. Thus, those allies openly disassociated themselves from Washington's militaristic course with respect to space. That reflected the definite friction among the countries of the West within the NATO bloc, which friction was the result of the Pentagon's program of rushing ahead in space arms, because in that program the West European allies could not fail to sense the attempt of the United States to achieve superiority not only over the socialist countries, but also over all the other states, to provide itself with complete freedom to carry out military adventures, while protecting itself against any possible retaliatory strike in the event that a "limited" nuclear war should break out in Europe.

It is for reason, for example, that in official Paris the American broad-scale antimissile defense system was called a "Maginot Line" in space, thus, as it were, emphasizing that, in the event that a war broke out, that "defense" would threaten France with national tragedy. The representatives of the U.S. State Department themselves openly admitted that there exists "a concern, expressed by the West Europeans," with regard to the fact that the plans being developed by the United States for setting up a broad-scale antimissile defense system with elements deployed in space might lead to "an arms race in space."

Washington, of course, is exerting a large amount of pressure upon its allies, in order to lessen that concern, and to break the resistance on the part of the West European public opinion to its plans. But nevertheless the American ruling circles are forced to take into consideration the broad opposition throughout the world to their adventuristic strivings.

The mobilization of all the forces for the struggle against the militarization of space is being promoted, to a decisive degree, by the Soviet peace initiatives. Something that has become a result primarily of the persistent

efforts of the USSR, supported by the other socialist countries and all the peace-loving countries, is the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States of America on 12 March 1985 began negotiations, the beginning of which was greeted throughout the world, which evaluates them as step on the difficult but surmountable path to the consolidation of the peace. It is important to emphasize that we are discussing completely new negotiations, the object of which is a series of questions that pertain to space and nuclear arms -- strategic and medium-range -- and that all these questions must be considered and resolved in their interrelationship. This kind of combined approach is dictated by the fact that at the present time one cannot limit, much less reduce, the nuclear arms without taking effective steps to prevent the militarization of space. Therein lies the reality of the nuclear space age: the making of nuclear weapons unnecessary and a thing of the past is possible not by means of the acquisition of new types of weapons, including space weapons, but only by means of negotiations on the basis of equality and identical security with the purpose of working out effective understandings that are aimed at preventing the arms race in space and the cessation of that race on earth, aimed at the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms, and at the reinforcement of the strategic stability. The USSR and the United States have agreed that the negotiations that have begun between them, like the efforts in general to limit and reduce arms, must lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons completely and everywhere. The Soviet Union is ready to work in this direction with all seriousness and in a purposeful manner. It is also important for the American side to demonstrate its constructive efforts.

The USSR will continue persistently to speak out in favor of preventing the militarization of space. By virtue of objective reasons, this is of key importance for resolving the entire series of problems of arms limitation. As the first country to blaze a trail into space, the Country of Soviets today is doing everything possible to assure that it is a path that leads to scientific-technical achievements and cooperation for the good of all mankind, rather than to the death of civilization.

Characterizing the present-day international situation, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev said, "Never before has mankind had such a terrible threat hanging over it as it has today. The only intelligent way out of the situation that has been created is to achieve an understanding between the opposing forces concerning the immediate cessation of the arms race -- primarily the race in nuclear arms -- in the West and the prevention of that race in space"<sup>10</sup>.

The Soviet Union is ready to make the most radical decisions that would make it possible to move ahead along the routes that lead to the cessation of the arms race. It is especially important to prevent the spreading of that race to outer space. It is specifically this question that is the subject of the sharpest confrontation today, and that constitutes the principal watershed between realism and adventurism in the approach to resolving the key questions of world policy.



#### FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 14 January 1985.
2. In this regard most of the American specialists agree. See, for example, "Ballistic Missile Defense," ed. by A. Carter and D. Schwartz, Washington, 1984, p 11.
3. See THE NEW YORK TIMES, September 18, November 16, 1984.
4. THE NEW YORK TIMES, November 30, 1984.
5. See FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter, 1984-1985.
6. THE NEW YORK TIMES, November 30, 1984.
7. United Nations Document A/C, 1/39/PV, 11.
8. United Nations Documents A/39/PV, 19.
9. United Nations Document A/C, 1/39/PV, 11.
10. PRAVDA, 12 March 1985.

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**SPACE ARMS**

**SOVIET CHIEF OF STAFF SAYS SDI VIOLATES ABM TREATY**

**PN031906 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Jun 85 First Edition p 4**

[Article by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Akhromeyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister: "The ABM Treaty Is an Obstacle in the Path of the Strategic Arms Race" -- capitalized words originally published in boldface]

[Text] The international situation remains tense and dangerous as a result of the arms race developed in recent years by the U.S. Administration and certain of its allies in the NATO bloc. American imperialism is clearly intending to further crank up the arms race and increase the military threat. This U.S. policy will lead to an increase in the military threat to all peoples.

However, in present conditions, if the forces struggling for peace act in a united front, it is perfectly possible to curb the aggressive forces and ensure a more lasting and stable peace.

The aims of preserving and strengthening peace are served by the talks that the Soviet Union is holding with the United States on nuclear and space arms. The accords between the USSR and the United States based on equality and identical security are an important contribution to lowering the military threat. The attainment of more reliable international security depends to a considerable extent on whether it proves possible to strengthen the international treaty basis of arms limitation -- to preserve and not destroy what already exists in this sphere and to conclude new agreements. The preservation from destruction of the treaty between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems is of tremendous importance here.

I.

The road to achieving mutually acceptable solutions at the Geneva talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on nuclear and space arms is not easy, of course, but the Soviet Union, and this has been said at the highest level, is ready to travel its part of the way at these talks. However, as yet, the U.S. side is showing no intention of reaching agreement on the whole complex of problems at the talks and is refusing to work toward preventing the militarization of space.

The limitation, still more the reduction, of nuclear arms is inconceivable in conditions of the militarization of space. The creation and deployment in space of strike arms will inevitably lead to an increase in the quantity of and to the qualitative improvement of strategic nuclear arms. A close interconnection objectively exists between

offensive and defensive strategic systems. That is the logic of nuclear confrontation. The creation of the large-scale space ABM system contemplated in the United States has a clear aggressive point: This system is a most important element in the integrated offensive potential of the side that has created it, undermines strategic equilibrium, and provides the opportunity for the United States to deliver a first strike in the hope that the retaliatory strike against U.S. territory can be averted.

How is the other side, the Soviet Union, supposed to behave under these conditions? It is left with no choice; it will be forced to ensure the restoration of the strategic balance and to build up its own strategic offensive forces, supplementing them with means of defense. Therefore, any attempts to limit strategic offensive armaments while creating strike space means are futile.

The militarization of outer space is transformed into a means of uncontrolled arms race in all spheres and leads to a new and still more dangerous round in that race and the sharp weakening of strategic stability. It looks as though this is precisely what the United States is seeking today, having chosen as its means the creation and deployment in space of what it claims are ABM means, but are in fact strike weapons for strikes against targets belonging to the probable enemy in all spheres.

The U.S. leaders understood all this clearly long ago. Back in 1967 R. McNamara, at that time U.S. defense secretary, said that in response to the creation of an ABM system in the United States the Soviet Union "will have no option but to increase the potential capabilities of its offensive forces." Pursuing the same idea, Senator Kennedy noted: "As a result of the deployment of an ABM system, we will find ourselves involved in an arms race whose like the history of weaponry has never seen." The futility of this race was also recognized: According to the statement of former President R. Nixon, the most powerful ABM system that the United States could create would be unable to prevent catastrophic damage to the United States resulting from a missile strike.

The recognition of the objective interconnection between offensive and defensive strategic systems, of the role of large-scale ABM systems in provoking an arms race, and of the impossibility of securing advantages over the other side in that race had the result that as far back as during the first Soviet-U.S. talks on the limitation of strategic arms, which began in 1969 (SALT I), the sides arrived at the unanimous opinion that efforts must be focused primarily on the preparation of an accord on the limitation of ABM systems. This enabled the USSR and the United States to simultaneously conclude two important agreements in May 1972: the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms. Thus, principled and fundamental restrictions on ABM systems were accepted by the sides virtually from the very start of the strategic arms limitation talks and were an integral part of the relations and talks between the USSR and the United States as a whole.

The military-political significance of the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty is extremely great. This treaty is one of the foundations on which relations between the sides are based. By signing it the Soviet Union and the United States recognized that in the nuclear age only mutual restraint in the sphere of ABM systems will make it possible to advance along the path of limiting and reducing nuclear arms, that is, to curb the strategic arms race as a whole. This was reflected even in the preamble to the treaty, which openly points out that "effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons."

In the treaty itself this approach is implemented in a number of specific and clearly formulated provisions. Thus, the treaty forbids the deployment of an ABM system for the

defense of the territory of the United States and the USSR (that is, a large-scale ABM system) and the creation of a basis for a defense. Each side is authorized to have only a limited ABM system for a single area (the capital or an ICBM base), as part of which it can deploy up to 100 ABM launchers, no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and no more than a certain limited number of ABM radars.

To safeguard this, the main provision of the treaty, it is also forbidden to create, test, and deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-, air-, space-, or mobile land-based.

The two aforementioned provisions, which are fundamental to limiting the sides' activity in the ABM sphere, are supplemented in the treaty by a number of other provisions obliging the sides not to give missiles, launchers, and radars that are not ABM means capabilities to resolve tasks of combating strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory and not to test them in an ABM mode; not to deploy large-scale phased-array radars except those provided for by the treaty or those installed to track targets in space; not to deploy radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of the sides' national territory and oriented outward. The treaty forbids the development, testing, and deployment of MIRVed interceptor missiles, and also means for the rapid reloading of ABM launchers. Moreover, the sides pledged not to transfer to other states and not to deploy outside their national territory ABM systems or their components limited by the treaty.

The Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems is the principled basis for further talks on limiting and reducing nuclear arms. Its mere existence opened up the prospect of further steps in this sphere. The interconnection between strategic defensive and offensive arms confirmed by its signing is enduring an objective in nature, irrespective of the technical level the development of those arms has reached. Moreover, the more sophisticated large-scale ABM systems were, the more they would influence the correlation between the sides' strategic potentials, would make it extremely unstable, and would destabilize the entire strategic situation.

The ABM Treaty has been force for over 10 years now; in this time the sides have examined it twice — in 1977 and 1982 — and agreed that it continues to accord with their interests and does not need changes or amendments. In the joint communique on the results of this examination the sides noted that the treaty is effective, thereby demonstrating the mutual commitment of the USSR and the United States to the aims of nuclear arms limitation and to the principle of identical security; it serves the interests of both sides' security, lessens the danger of outbreak of nuclear war, and is conducive to progress in further limiting and reducing strategic offensive arms.

If the treaty between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of ABM systems were to lapse [poteryat silu] for any reason, the foundation on which talks between the sides on nuclear arms limitation could be based and conducted would disappear. This would effectively mean the collapse of talks and an uncontrolled arms race for decades.

Washington knows all this, of course. The U.S. side is also naturally well aware of the stabilizing role of the ABM Treaty. Moreover, representatives of the American Administration miss no opportunity of speaking of the need to "strengthen the regime" of this treaty. However, in fact the United States has been malevolently undermining the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems for a long time now.

## II.

The U.S. Administration's actions in creating a new class of weapons — space strike means — are incompatible with the principles forming the foundation of the ABM Treaty. By proclaiming the "Strategic Defense Initiative" and embarking on the practical implementation of a large-scale anti-ballistic missile system with space-based elements, Washington is effectively working directly to undermine the treaty.

Certain U.S. leaders, especially Pentagon figures (for instance, R. Perle and others), making no secret of the United States' ambitious intentions with regard to space, are openly calling for the rejection of the ABM Treaty.

The U.S. Administration denies that the "star wars" plans are incompatible with the demands of this most important document. It is maneuvering and seeking loopholes in the formulas of the treaty itself in order to justify in the eyes of the public its actions to militarize space. This is being done in a whole series of directions.

**THE FIRST DIRECTION.** The Washington leaders are arguing at length and even directly asserting that the work on a large-scale space ABM system implemented within the framework of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" is merely harmless technological research, the conduct of which, they claim, the ABM Treaty does not prevent. This thesis is widely propagandized by the U.S. mass media.

In reality, however, everything is different. The ABM Treaty (Article V) forbids the creation and testing of space-based ABM systems or components, that is, precisely the objective of the U.S. "harmless research." In practice the creation of specific models of strike space weapons and even the testing of some of them are in full swing in the United States. Lasers of various types, electromagnetic guns, interceptor missiles, and antisatellite systems are being developed in laboratories and at proving grounds. All this so-called "research work" is in contravention of the ABM Treaty.

**THE SECOND DIRECTION.** Representatives of the U.S. Administration, counting on the uninformed nature of the public at large, are claiming that the provisions of the ABM Treaty relate only to those ABM systems and components that existed at the time the treaty was signed. The means now being created and tested within the framework of the "Strategic Defense Initiative," they say, cannot be ranked as "ABM components" since they are not mentioned in Article II of the treaty.

The provisions of the treaty apply to any systems intended, as defined in Article II of the treaty, to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory. Since the ABM components being created within the framework of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" are intended for precisely this purpose, that is, they are designed to replace the interceptor missiles mentioned in the treaty, all the provisions of the treaty fully apply to them, above all the ban on the creation, testing, and deployment of space-based ABM systems or components.

**THE THIRD DIRECTION.** The American authors of the "star wars" program are particularly zealous in propagandizing the thesis that the development of "exotic" anti-ballistic missile means (laser and beam weapons, and so forth) is not only not forbidden by the ABM Treaty but is even virtually encouraged by it. Thus P. Nitze, adviser to the President and the secretary of state on the Geneva talks, openly presents the creation of space-based ABM components based on other [inoy] physical principles as an action permitted by the ABM Treaty. For greater cogency references are made



to the agreed statement accompanying the treaty (Paragraph E) [as published], which says that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and containing components capable of substituting, in particular, for interceptor missiles are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion and agreement between the sides.

We are faced with a clear juggling of the facts. The aforementioned agreed statement regarding the treaty indeed does not rule out the possibility of the sides' acquiring anti-ballistic missile means "based on other physical principles," but only within the framework of the limitations envisaged by the treaty as a whole, in other words in the single authorized area. The large-scale ABM system with space-based elements that the United States is planning cannot be restricted to a single area. It is a territorial and even a global ABM system that is totally prohibited by the treaty. Therefore, the creation of laser, beam, and other such destructive components for that system is a direct violation of the treaty.

**THE FOURTH DIRECTION.** Having embarked on a path leading to the destruction of the ABM Treaty, the U.S. leaders are trying to exploit the fact that the treaty itself envisages in principle the introduction of appropriate amendments to its text (Article XIV). Therefore, they are saying that the U.S. actions running counter to the treaty can somehow be legitimized, for instance, by revising this document and making amendments to it agreed with the Soviet side. They are making out that the Soviet Union too is no less interested in such amendments.

All this is merely an unworthy ploy aimed at reassuring public opinion. The U.S. side is well aware that by its actions it is not working toward making some additional clarifications to the sides' actions in the situations envisaged by the treaty, which, in fact, is what Article XIV is referring to. The United States is working toward changing the meaning of the treaty itself and emasculating it of its main content -- the ban on the deployment of an ABM defense of the country's territory.

The Soviet Union, of course, will not countenance the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems being transformed into a cover for U.S. policy aimed at ensuring an arms race in the sphere of space anti-ballistic missile systems.

**THE FIFTH DIRECTION.** Charges that the Soviet Union is violating the provisions of the treaty are malevolently interwoven in the U.S. Administration's general line of undermining the ABM Treaty. Washington wants to make out that the USSR is taking some actions running counter to the ABM Treaty, and if that is so, then the Soviet Union, it says, must reconcile itself to what the United States is doing in this sphere.

More often than not in this connection the U.S. side speculates on the question of the Soviet radar station under construction in the Krasnoyarsk region. The farfetched argument that is adduced is that this radar is a station for early warning of missile attack and therefore should, or so it is claimed, be sited not in the Krasnoyarsk region but on the periphery of the USSR's territory and oriented outward, as Article VI of the treaty, which relates to early warning radars, demands.

However, the point is that the radar under construction in the Krasnoyarsk region does not fall within the restrictions of Article VI of the ABM Treaty. It has nothing to do with a system for early warning of missile attack. This station is intended for tracking of targets in space and the U.S. side has been told this. The U.S. side's attempt to continue to lay this "charge" against the USSR signifies only one thing --

justifying the course of undermining the ABM Treaty adopted by the United States itself.

The "accusations" leveled at the USSR, to wit, that it is testing air defense means for ABM purposes and, in this regard, that it is allegedly preparing to create an ABM system for the entire territory of the USSR, which is prohibited under the treaty, obviously serve the same purpose.

No preparation is taking place in the USSR for the creation of a territorial ABM system, and that also goes for one based on air defense means. No work is being done on air defense systems that would contravene the ABM Treaty.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly declared that the so-called "accusations" being made against it by the United States concerning noncompliance with the ABM Treaty are far fetched and at variance with reality. We advocate strict and absolute observance of this treaty and we consider it inadmissible to work toward its erosion, and still more to call into question the very prospect of its existence, as is being done by the United States, which has embarked on the path of the militarization of space.

Washington's maneuvering around the ABM Treaty, attempts to transfer the blame for undermining it to the USSR, and even to pose in the public eye as virtually the custodian of the provisions which it contains confirm that the ABM Treaty retains all its importance and significance and, as before, it is an obstacle on the path of the nuclear arms race, an obstacle which those militarist circles in the West who are trying to smash the existing strategic equilibrium in the world and achieve military superiority over the USSR, would like to eliminate.

The USSR, and the Soviet leadership has stated this most definitely on several occasions, does not seek military superiority, but it will not permit such superiority over it either on the earth or via space. The initiators of "star wars" should not forget, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov, USSR defense minister, stressed in his replies to a TASS correspondent's questions, that "the creation of space strike weapons will turn out, and will inevitably turn out, to mean a reduction in security both of the United States itself and of its allies."

The Soviet Union consistently and persistently advocates the ending of the arms race, and above all, the nuclear arms race. The straightforward way to this goal is to renounce provocative schemes of carrying the arms race over into space. If space strike arms are banned, and preparations for their creation are halted at the stage of scientific research work, broad opportunities will be opened up for a radical reduction of nuclear arms. The Soviet Union has already proposed a reduction of strategic offensive arms by one-fourth. Given the nonmilitarization of space, it is able to carry out even more profound reductions. There is no other way of solving this issue. The sides' full implementation of all the provisions of the ABM Treaty is required to play an important role here.

The preservation and absolute implementation of the ABM Treaty is a guarantee for successful progression toward accords at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space armaments. As Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has stressed, the arms race and disarmament talks are incompatible. The Soviet Union will not promote such a course. For its part, the Soviet Union will persistently seek in Geneva specific, mutually acceptable agreements that would make it possible to put an end to the arms race and carry forward the cause of disarmament.

CSO: 5200/1183

SPACE ARMS

MOSCOW RADIO HITS NAKASONE COMMENTS ON SDI IN BONN

LD041009 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0630 GMT 4 May 85

[Nikolay Lutsenko commentary]

[Text] Japan is being drawn deeper and deeper into dangerous U.S. militarist preparations. At the conference in Bonn of leaders of the seven foremost capitalist powers, in essence, Prime Minister Nakasone backed the U.S. "star wars" plans. At the microphone is Nikolay Lutsenko:

The Japanese prime minister has taken yet another step on the way to all-round support for the U.S. so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative." This is how the press is appraising the statements made by Nakasone in the FRG capital. Indeed, the Japanese leader's slide, under Washington's pressure, onto the dangerous path of complicity in the "star wars" program is not difficult to trace chronologically.

As recently as during a 2 January meeting with President Reagan in Los Angeles, Nakasone merely stated his understanding of the advisability of research in the field of antimissile defense with space-based elements, since this project supposedly was of a purely defensive nature and would lead to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Bound by Washington's geopolitical plan and a so-called "security treaty," Japan long since became one of the central links in the U.S. global military-bloc system and lost even the outward trappings of independence. On 27 March, the Japanese Government received an ultimatum from U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger in which Japan was given 60 days to indicate which areas of the program it could help in developing. I would like to remind you that in fact Japan was already effectively engaged in the "star wars" plans. For more than a year now, the Japanese-U.S. agreement has been in effect on passing the latest in Japanese technology to the Pentagon.

Practical participation in U.S. militarist preparations and the evasive replies of Japanese state leaders should, in Nakasone's view, have established the balance that would save the face of Japanese diplomacy. However, Washington does little to spare the pride of its junior partner. In conditions of growing criticism for the "star wars" program in the United States itself and among a number of its West European NATO partners, Tokyo has been allotted the role of chief assistant in pushing this idea through.

On 1 May in Bonn, Nakasone, with FRG Chancellor Kohl, declared that research leading to the militarization of space is morally justified, and the next day, at a meeting with Reagan, said that solidarity and guarantees of the security of the free world are indivisible. This, KYODO TSUSHIN reports, was received by the President and Secretary of State Shultz as approval for the "star wars" program.

It is apparent that if the Japanese prime minister previously proposed to obligingly turn the Japanese islands into an unsinkable aircraft carrier for the United States, now Japanese technology is to be the missile carrier that will raise military confrontation to new heights.

SPACE ARMS

SOVIET ARMY PAPER ON MX, SDI IMPLICATION

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Mar 85 p 3

[Article by V. Chernyshev, TASS reviewer for military matters: "They are Ready for a Nuclear First Strike"]

[Text] "We'll cover all America with a reliable antimissile shield," declare representatives of the U.S. administration in persuading Americans to put out many, many billions of dollars for the "star wars" program. "The antimissile defense system with space-based elements also will protect you," Washington says to soothe its allies as it attempts to hitch them to its "star chariot." "We will make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete," declares the American president in an attempt to calm the entire alarmed world.

But a check shows that all such promises and mottos are the most genuine bluff. Washington would like to make its own (specifically its own) strategic nuclear weapons not "impotent" or "obsolete" but more powerful such that no defense of the other side "deters." In pursuing this objective, the United States does not restrict itself to developing systems which would provide it with an "antimissile shield," but simultaneously and in deep secrecy it is conducting intensive work to develop means for overcoming the PRO (antimissile defense) of a potential enemy.

According to the British newspaper OBSERVER, maneuvering warheads for strategic missiles, chaff and light-reflecting aerosols which are to be dispersed along the missiles' path of movement and confuse detection and tracking sensors of the antimissile system, devices which puzzle the enemy defense with a multitude of decoys, radar countermeasures equipment and the like are being developed within the framework of the secret "advanced strategic missile systems" program.

All this is intended to assure American missiles the opportunity to "penetrate" the antimissile "shield" if it were created in the Soviet Union. The work is not just being done in the laboratories. During recent testing of the MX missile over the Pacific, two of its ten warheads, which flew along a path different from the rest, were released within the framework of the aforementioned program. In the future it is planned to install maneuvering warheads not only on the MX, but also on the new Midgetman missiles. In the Pentagon's draft budget for FY 1986 appropriations for the program have been doubled in comparison with the current year--from \$98 million to \$174 million. In 1987 appropriations will reach \$216 million.



According to statements by western military experts, the very existence of such a program indicates that the "impressions of President Reagan about an ideal system which would reduce the effectiveness of nuclear weapons to naught are an illusion." But we must look truth in the eye and call things for what they are. This is not an illusion, but a deliberate deception.

While advertising and embellishing his "dream" about "star wars," the White House chief once stated heatedly that he would be ready to "share" the anti-missile defense system technology with the Soviet Union. Now, however, the president prefers not to recall this. People in Western Europe now say frankly that since the United States is working to develop means for overcoming an antimissile defense, that means Washington never had that intent. Again they are only empty words.

In practice, however, the affairs of the U.S. administration indicate one thing--preparation of an opportunity for delivering a nuclear first strike. While talking profusely about "defense," official Washington is carrying out a qualitative and quantitative build-up in strategic nuclear arms, carrying on work in the area of a wide-scale antimissile defense system, and developing means for overcoming a similar antimissile defense of a potential enemy. The desires and hopes are clear--after overcoming the other side's defense, to inflict a disarming nuclear strike on it and win a nuclear war by at least partially repelling an already weakened retaliatory strike against its own territory.

These hopes are really illusory. Development of an antimissile defense will lead only to an expansion of the arms race according to the law that "action generates reaction," to an abrupt disturbance of strategic stability, to an increase in the threat of nuclear war, and to a decrease in security both of the United States and of its allies.

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CSO: 1801/192



SPACE ARMS

MOSCOW BROADCAST TO BRITAIN CRITICIZING SDI

LD182308 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 1900 GMT 18 May 85

[Excerpts] Our next program is entitled "Which Way for Europe?" In this program Nikolay Borin and Vladimir Mikheyev are discussing the substance of the West European participation in the United States' star wars project:

[Borin] Now that Western European leaders are facing the Weinberger ultimatum-- 60 days to decide whether to join the project of star wars or not to join it-- have they finally worked out any common approach?

[Mikheyev] As the British weekly NEW STATESMAN put it, envoys from Washington seem genuinely surprised that everyone else is not enthusiastically behind the project.

[Borin] While analyzing the arguments of Western European officials who expressed the skepticism of the SDI, you can't get away from the feeling that they are trying hard to be as discreet as it is only possible. Now, could you spell out the hidden fears behind the poker faces, and as a starting point would you comment on the statement that the SDI will deal a deadly blow on the concept of deterrence, which is the pillar of the defense of Britain and France? (Pierre le Luc), the director of the French Institute of International Affairs, expressly points out: Both countries receive most of the benefits from the treaty on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems between the United States and the Soviet Union. So, your answer?

[Mikheyev] Well, as long as the treaty provides limits to strategic defense systems of both superpowers, the British and French deterrence forces preserve-- as they say--its credibility. Now that the SDI threatens to trigger off massive efforts to build up a sophisticated space defense shield, and as a consequence massive efforts to improve the penetrability of such shields by offensive armaments, the British and French nuclear arsenals would be inevitably devalued. It makes sense to quote the NEW YORK TIMES defining the alternative facing the citizens of Western Europe: In case the space defense system becomes workable, says the paper, it will separate Fortress America from Europe. In case it turns out to be inefficient there will be the acceleration of the arms race in all spheres and the general situation will be more destabilizing. So, either way the star wars program will interfere with the delicate balance which exists between the United States and the Soviet Union on the global and on the regional level, and with the parity between NATO and Warsaw Pact in Europe.

[Borin] Do you think that the prospects of a European war have increased now?

[Mikheyev] Well, Washington may soon regard the risk of such a confrontation as quite acceptable, provided of course the Americans will have already a space shield at their disposal. This is a real threat.

[Borin] At present the American negotiators in Geneva keep insisting that the SDI has entered the initial stage, namely research and investigation, so it is not liable to an agreement. The implication of this position is simple: The Soviet Union should reduce the number of its missiles while the United States will proceed with making a missile-destroying defensive shield. Experts believe that first elements of a space-based strategic defense would undergo tests in 1989 or even in 1988. We know the Americans to be shrewd negotiators, but they are very sensitive to what other nations, including their allies, think of them. What makes them so rigid and inflexible when it comes to discussing the star wars?

[Mikheyev] From the days of the victory over fascist Germany the United States never ceased trying to attain an absolute military supremacy. [passage omitted quoting from "The Nuclear Delusion: "Soviet-American Relations in the Atomic Age," by George Kenan, reminding Americans that they took the lead in developing nuclear weapons] The present Strategic Defense Initiative sets the same ideological doctrine of the Reagan administration. One of the top brass hats in the Pentagon was (?fair) enough explaining the policy behind the SDI: He who controls the space controls the world. It should not be forgotten that, along with the program of militarizing space, Washington keeps piling purely offensive weapons and developing new types of them.

The American space weapons are designed to form the centerpiece of its first strike capability; combined with the strategic triad, the new ASAT and ABM technology would enable the United States to launch an attack against the Soviet Union according to the following scenario: At the very beginning, space based x-ray lasers and antisatellite missiles launched from F-15 aircraft would destroy Soviet early warning and communication satellites. Pershing-II's and land, sea, and air launched cruise missiles would destroy command communication and political centers in the Soviet Union and nearby socialist countries. Missiles launched from Trident submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles based in the United States would destroy Soviet missiles in their silos. Space-based antiballistic missiles would destroy surviving Soviet missiles at different points in their trajectories. Those systems possessing laser weapons would also destroy select ground targets. That is the possible sequence of attacks by the more-militant-than-ever America. The facts about the tremendous military build-up in the United States, which became known to the public, make this scenario sound true.

[Mikheyev continues] So, from the military point of view, as the Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Sokolov has put it, the U.S. star wars plan is fraught with an even greater threat to mankind. If the United States begins to

militarize space and thereby to undermine the present strategic parity the USSR will have no other choice but to take retaliatory measures to restore the situation. Marshal Sokolov underlined that the Soviet Union is not seeking any unilateral advantage over the United States or NATO. It would be appropriate to remind that in 1981 the Soviet Union declared a unilateral moratorium on antisatellite launchers and called on other nations to join it. The United States refused. In August 1983 the Soviet Government presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations a draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the earth. The U.S. Administration did not care to respond. No wonder the U.S. blocks the way to the creation of special committee to discuss nonmilitarization of space within the framework of the Geneva conference on disarmament.

All in all it shows Washington to be reluctant to make a serious contribution to the process of disarmament. Nevertheless, the strong commitment to the issue of peace and security of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, as well as the position taken by the governments of the nonaligned movement forced Washington to go back to the negotiating table and to discuss, among other things, the space crusade under the name of Strategic Defense Initiative.

[Borin] Now, judging from the first stage of the Geneva talks, are there any positive signals in that respect?

[Mikheyev] American representatives so far evinced no wish to reach agreement. What is evident is that the United States is continuing its unbridled arms build-up and is vigorously trying to extend it to outer space. Success in Geneva, as Mikhail Gorbachev has pointed out, requires political goodwill on both sides for reaching agreements on the basis of strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security. We hope that our partners will hear the voices of the peoples, who want peace and end to the arms race.

CSO: 5200/1167

SPACE ARMS

MITTERRAND DISCUSSES SDI

AU091523 Paris AFP in English 1504 GMT 9 May 85

[Excerpts]

Speaking to reporters at the Elysee Palace, Mr Mitterrand also explained that French opposition to the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative was mainly because France feared being subordinated to Washington's orders.

He said summits were "useful", but had become "an imitation institution without any rules, a bureaucracy and a vacuum where partners spar." He also added that procedure at summits had to be changed.

Asked about Franco-German relations which appeared to come under strain at the summit because of West German support for the U.S. space-based anti-missile system known as "star wars," Mr Mitterrand noted that Bonn had not "formally subscribed" to the project. "I think the Germans are still in a period of reflection" and did not want to upset the Americans, he said.

The French are sponsoring a parallel programme for European cooperation on high technology known as Eureka, although Mr Mitterrand noted that SDI (Strategic Defence Initiative) was military and Eureka's aims were essentially civil. He said that France objected to SDI because of the risk of a brain drain to the United States and saw Europe being reduced to playing the role of "sub-contractor" to the United States.

But the main reason for French opposition to SDI was because Paris did not want to see itself involved in a system "in which it would not be on an equal footing" with Washington. Mr Mitterrand refused to comment on how he would respond if French companies wanted to join the SDI research. But he noted that current French participation in U.S. technological ventures had been arranged under contracts prior to the 1983 launch of SDI.

CSO: 5200/2613



SPACE ARMS

FRANCE'S CHEYSSON CRITICIZES SDI; VIEWS EUROPEAN DEFENSE

Paris LIBERATION in French 3 May 85 p 21

[Interview with Claude Cheysson, former minister of foreign affairs, currently European commissioner, by Carlos de Sa Rego; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Before taking up your post as European commissioner, you were minister of foreign relations. When the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was launched by President Reagan, what was France's first reaction?

[Answer] We were immediately very reserved and somewhat irritated that the Americans should reveal a matter of considerable importance to the public without first speaking with their allies. Our reservations have now been confirmed. The first effect of the SDI obviously is the resumption of the arms race. The Americans have never had such a large offensive ballistics nuclear program.

The second effect is the long-term challenge to the ABM treaty (signed in 1972 and limiting the deployment of antimissile weapons, Ed.), meaning a defense philosophy that France considers absolutely basic, to wit, nuclear deterrence.

This nuclear challenge can also have serious political consequences. We have made a considerable effort to convince the Germans that Pershing missiles have to be deployed to face the Soviet SS-20's. Scarcely had a few months gone by when they were told that at any rate, the missiles are outdated and would rapidly become useless. In other words, we are encouraging neutralist feelings and those in Germany who say: "Above all, no nuclear weapons in our country."

[Question] Why is the United States so attached to its plan?

[Answer] There are three kinds of motivations and they correspond to different circles in the United States. First of all, you have the military. The SDI? It is very useful, they say, in protecting specific zones. No one knows whether or not the nuclear submarines will be locatable in 10 or 15 years. The idea is to make our intercontinental missile bases on land invulnerable by that time. The SDI would therefore be the confirmation of nuclear arms!

The second motivation is quite different but important -- some even say decisive -- in the eyes of the most important person in the United States. We

are speaking about the moral purpose of the program. It is not acceptable that the defense of the Free World should be based on evil and nuclear weapons are evil. Moreover, we sinned at Hiroshima and it is high time that we cleanse ourselves of that horrible stain. Being the president who helped put an end to nuclear weapons is tempting.

The third motivation is in my opinion the most important one. On behalf of the threat that supposedly hangs over the United States and Europe, one can inject substantial sums into scientific and technical research. The Americans will thus regain their leadership in certain fields of the advanced technology of the future: optronics, particle beams, communications, data processing in real time.

In the United States, however, one cannot allocate such a sum of capital to industry through a mere government decision. It is contrary to the sacred rules of the market economy. One therefore has to have a "justification": We are facing a threat, safeguarding the Free World, and so on. Promoting advanced research is a convincing argument, but I certainly do not see why one has to justify it by that cold war hysteria.

[Question] The Americans nevertheless affirm that the SDI will serve to protect Europe.

[Answer] It is an argument that no one now believes.

[Question] Let us accept the fact that Ronald Reagan might propose an effective defense to the Europeans. Why would this be bad?

[Answer] Based on what I have read and heard, I cannot imagine a shield that would protect an entire continent, but let us assume that such a thing is possible. The most serious thing then is that we are leaving a period in which we have killed war (made impossible by deterrence) and entering another where it is again possible, not nuclear war, but conventional war. We are changing philosophies, which is extremely serious.

[Question] But if a totally effective shield is impossible, France can be content to maintain its strike force to ensure its own security.

[Answer] The SDI changes nothing, in fact, for a France that would simply like to be protected in an armed neutrality. But that is not the French defense policy. Some of our vital interests are outside our borders and we belong to an alliance. We are not simply a nuclearized Switzerland. If one of the consequences of the SDI is to demobilize, to demotivate some of our allies.... Why do you think that Francois Mitterrand gave the Bundestag speech? We want our allies to want to defend themselves, that they still feel patriotism. On the day they lose it, how will it be possible to build Europe?

[Question] The Americans do not seem ready to give up their proposal. Is France therefore doomed to the status of a nuclearized Switzerland?

[Answer] It is totally premature to envisage modifications in our defense setup and furthermore, the Americans are themselves strengthening their nuclear arsenal. Today's problem is not to let ourselves be out-tripped with respect to the promising technologies of the future. We must therefore make a research effort comparable to that of the United States. But in addition, we have to be the foremen and not workmen, subcontractors.

Our industrialists are not stupid; they know very well that if the project foreman is American, he will define the strategy in the United States, will decide where the profit will come and will save the promising markets. But in order to avoid being a subcontractor, Europe must develop its own research program which offers our manufacturers at least something that would be comparable to what their participation in the American effort would amount to.

[Question] The difficulties of European cooperation regarding weapons are not promising for such a vast program. How can one reconcile German, French and British industrial interests?

[Answer] Let us reconcile those who are willing. If some hesitate, then let us do without them. In many cases, they will come along. That is what we did with Ariane and the Airbus.

[Question] But does Europe have the means for such a project?

[Answer] We obviously have our problems. The Keynesian approach is possible only for the Americans, who fuel their budget deficit with European savings. But a certain number of billions a year is not an insurmountable effort for the Europeans.

[Question] Nevertheless, we have to take them somewhere, especially in a period of low economic growth.

[Answer] It is a formidable thing to note that at the present time, there is one country whose decisions influence the economy, politics and society of all other friendly, adversarial or neutral countries. We cannot choose our research priorities: the United States has chosen them for us.

I would say to you that there are issues that seem to me to be more urgent. The world economic disorder actually worries me much more than the Soviet threat. I am sorry; I am perhaps too thick-skinned, but I do not feel that threat. But when an American decision is made, the rest of the world is forced, not only to take it into account, but to take inspiration from it.

[Question] You therefore propose that Europe should also get involved in an SDI race?

[Answer] Not at all! I propose that it plunge into a research race in the technological sectors related to the SDI and without the hysterical justifications of the cold war.

On the other hand, I would like Europe to proceed as France has since July and proclaim *urbi et orbi* that space must not be militarized and that we want real negotiations on disarmament between the United States and the USSR. The American moves at the present time either tend to break the equilibrium or to raise the level of forces with a new arms race.

[Question] Do you support a European defense?

[Answer] One should rather say a "European conception" of defense. One can no longer speak of a European defense when the central backbone of our defense policy is nuclear and when Germany cannot participate in nuclear arms, making it dependent on American protection. The strategic talks between the Germans and the French have nevertheless revealed a remarkable agreement on the rejection of conventional war. Therefore, a European conception of defense, yes, as well as common means.

A good example is the French-German observation satellite. The Germans could use it where they are, in the overall NATO system, in order to have their own information. And we would do the same where we are, outside of the integrated system.

[Question] Facing the American power, are you pessimistic or optimistic about the future of Europe?

[Answer] A certain sluggishness of reactions and thought in Europe tend to make me pessimistic. The French quite often have the feeling that too much is asked of them, but what makes me more optimistic -- and this is not a paradox -- is the ever more "American" nature of American reasoning. The United States cares less and less about the concerns and characteristics (whether liable to criticism or praise) of their neighbors in Latin America and their European allies.

Given this ignorance or refusal to see the true situation of others, one notes a certain regrouping of those neighbors or allies. Every time the Americans go a little too far, every time they demonstrate what some call their "arrogance," you can see the Europeans grouping together to find an agreement. Let us just think of the matter of the American embargo on equipment going to the construction of the European-Siberian gas pipeline.

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SPACE ARMS

FRENCH POLITICIANS, FRG'S BRANDT COMMENT ON EUREKA

Dumas on Increased UK Interest

AU211742 Paris AFP in English 1738 GMT 21 May 85

[Text] Paris, May 21 (AFP) -- Britain is warming up to Eureka, France's proposed European and civilian alternative to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or "star wars" program, French officials said here today. London's "interest (in Eureka) is increasing," French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas told correspondents after meeting here with British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe.

A British official here during the foreign secretary's one day visit said Britain was giving increased attention to Eureka. There was an evolution of the British attitude towards Eureka and London would be happy to have a multilateral group of experts discuss it, the official added. British scientific advisor Sir Robert Nicholson is expected in Paris in June to study the Eureka proposal. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had earlier expressed interest in the SDI project, a 26 billion dollar program for which Washington is seeking support among Allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

France, which fears that SDI would give a further boost to the arms race, has proposed that Europeans coordinate their efforts in developing their own advanced technology program.

Socialists To Discuss Project

AU211404 Paris AFP in English 1359 GMT 21 May 85

[Text] Paris, May 21 (AFP) -- Europe's Socialist Parties will meet here next Tuesday to discuss the French-launched European high-technology project Eureka. French Socialist Party First Secretary Lionel Jospin and Willy Brandt, head of the West German Socialist Democratic Party, said here today. The two men also said that in a bid to develop a common European disarmament initiative, they would organize a meeting of Socialist Parties within the Atlantic Alliance next autumn in Bonn to discuss European security problems.

Mr. Brandt said he was to travel to Moscow next week at the invitation of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, where he would try to glean as much information as possible on the Soviet position in security matters.

In a joint statement after their talks today, Mr. Brandt and Mr. Jospin condemned what they called "destabilizing technology" and urged "an end to the arms race in space." Mr Jospin said they both had reservations concerning the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which has been endorsed by West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl although President Francois Mitterrand has rejected a U.S. offer to participate in research. He said the Eureka project, which would concentrate on optic, electronic, laser and other high technology, was not a strategic or military response to SDI, but could provide a European alternative to develop scientific research for civilian purposes.

CSO: 5200/2626

SPACE ARMS

CONSEQUENCES OF FRG COMMITMENT TO SDI RESEARCH ANALYZED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 6 May 85 pp 22-32

[Unattributed cover story: "Now the Germans Stand at Attention"]

[Text] Chancellor Kohl is plunging into a reckless adventure: the Bonn government will take part in the U.S. space arms program all by itself if need be. In doing so, the FRG is tying its fortunes, for better or worse, to those of the United States and is becoming an enemy frontline state in Soviet eyes in the process. The price is high: though Europe can hardly expect to profit from U.S. technology, it must sit by and watch the collapse of the policy of detente.

A solemn mood has took hold of the 1,000 CDU supporters assembled at Recklinghausen's Vestland Hall. In a keynote address to mark the beginning of the CDU election drive in the Ruhr, Helmut Kohl opens up vistas full of what he considers to be historic substance and profound symbolism. "Two images within the space of 2 months," the chancellor said in early April as he waxed lyrical, give proof of the repute and influence of German policies.

Image No 1 was his long handshake with French President Francois Mitterrand on the soldiers' cemetery at Verdun. That was proof, he said, "that the old blood feud with France has given way to amity among peoples." And then, presto, here came image No 2.

"When the American President, our more than welcome guest, will have arrived in the FRG in a few days, ladies and gentlemen, and we will have paid tribute to the memory of the dead of World War II on a German soldiers' cemetery, to the deeds inside our country, to those who were the victims of the barbaric crimes of the Nazis in the concentration camps and when all the world will then see that the wartime enemies of yesterday are the friends of today, then that, ladies and gentlemen, is a symbol of German peace policy which is a possibility here and now."

Such was the neat plan he had conceived; but then the Bitburg debacle put a crimp into the German-American relationship.

It almost seems like a joke that this very chancellor who wishes to move the FRG closer than ever toward the United States should be sharing with the American President the responsibility for the worst crisis in German-American relations since the war.

It was Kohl's purpose to provide those Germans who yearn to lay the darkest chapter of their past to rest with a new sense of history. It was his intention to portray

himself as a historic figure of reconciliation above and beyond the graves and as a symbol of the final end of the postwar era.

But by devising the Bitburg scenario, Kohl ran afoul of his own distressingly superficial understanding of history which is obsessed by the value of symbolism. Following the storm of resentment on both sides of the Atlantic, the profoundly shaken chancellor tried to salvage whatever he could once U.S. President Ronald Reagan finally had arrived last week.

In exchange for saddling his friend "Ron" and the Americans as such with an enervating dispute about the world war and the SS graves, Kohl now has to pay very dearly in political coin. Already some of the other allies are predicting Kohl's early demise, e.g. the French during closed-door meetings at their Bonn embassy. Kohl, they say, has so humbled the American nation that the U.S. embassy in Bonn will start dismantling the German head of government as soon as Reagan leaves.

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The first blow caught Kohl right after Reagan landed. Without coordinating his statement with the FRG, the U.S. President announced on German soil from which "war should never originate again but only peace," according to Kohl, the start of a trade war against Nicaragua — which amounts to an unparalleled insult to the Bonn government.

But in his talks with Reagan last Thursday and Friday, Kohl did not dare raise the issue with the President. In the aftermath of the dispute over Reagan's visit to Bitburg, the chancellor is ready to make restitution. He now wants to offer himself up as an indispensable friend to the American by supporting [his] ambitious plans for an armaments in space.

Earlier, Kohl had let it be known that his publicly stated preconditions for FRG participation in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the space-based missile defense system, should not be taken too seriously. To be sure, the Bonn government was making an effort to develop a common plan with its European partners; but this was not a precondition for German agreement to SDI.

Then, in his first private conversation with his guest last Thursday, Kohl said yes to SDI "without any reservations," according to government spokesman Peter Boenisch. The chancellor made but one request: in his publicity campaign in support of the space arms program Reagan should not stray too far from the existing strategy of the threat of mutual nuclear destruction. Otherwise, the chancellor said, his government's moral credibility would suffer. After all, it justified the arms modernization program by referring to this doctrine.

Without checking into the matter any further, Kohl was content to accept Reagan's simple statement that the Americans were interested in "real cooperation" with the Europeans on the SDI program. The chancellor failed to ask for any further clarification of this statement.

In his zeal to oblige his White House visitor, Kohl angered another of the allies. Mitterrand complained to the chancellor that he was jeopardizing the projected European space arms program by his overzealous acceptance of the Reagan SDI scheme. Kohl tried vainly to put the Frenchman in a conciliatory mood by pledging his allegiance.

Standing side by side with the most powerful man of the Western world, shaking hands with Ronald Reagan and closing ranks -- these were the TV and photo angles for which



the chancellor posed. They were images to capture a historic moment: the final end of the detente hokum and the lukewarm balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Kohl slogan is "go West."

Acting as though the FRG had not been firmly rooted in the Western alliance for decades, the chancellor was playing the part of the harbinger of a new era. The CDU chancellor is making a strong effort to link the destiny of the West Germans ever so closely to the policies of the superpower that one is hard put not to look upon the FRG as the 51st state of the United States of America.

In an interview with the American news magazine TIME, Kohl gave free rein to his emotions: "When I look over the past 30 years since Adenauer," he said, "I consider it my most important task to make a contribution to making the ties of the FRG to the West -- the common values of the West -- irreversible; making them part of our reason of state. This, if you will, amounts to a declaration of love for the Americans."

Kohl is making a show of standing right behind Reagan whereas the other medium-sized European nations are trying to stay out of the duel between the superpowers. He is adopting an unreservedly pro-American policy at the very moment when Washington is provoking confrontation with Moscow from a position of strength.

The German [chancellor] was already running up the American flag when the new round of arms control negotiations began in Geneva -- even though provoking the East can hardly be said to be in Bonn's interest. After all, the Geneva talks are also supposed to deal with a reduction of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe -- including those of the Soviets.

All claims of an independent policy by the Bonn government are passe. "If ever the phrase 'setting the course' had any meaning, then now is the time," says Peter Radunski, the CDU's national executive director, with reference to Kohl's resolve to forge an unswerving brotherly alliance with the United States.

The course is this: like the American President, Helmut Kohl is dreaming of a protective umbrella in space which will keep a nuclear war from occurring once and for all.

As Reagan said in March 1983, this vision has nothing to do with war but with peace; nothing to do with reprisals but with prevention; nothing with fear but all the more with hope.

In the Bundestag 2 weeks ago, Kohl raved about Reagan's love for peace: "With a vision reaching far into the future, he has juxtaposed the existing strategy of deterrence through the capability of mutual destruction with a new model of an assured defensive capability employing non-nuclear weapons."

Even before Reagan reached German soil the chancellor was already explaining to the parliament what the meaning of his handshake with the U.S. President was to be: it was to seal an SDI pact between the Americans and the Germans. Kohl, acting the part of page, was pledging his allegiance to Reagan, the knight errant in space, to follow him on a mystery trip.

It may take him into the horrors of a new arms race; into a battle for world domination from outer space. Under the best of circumstances, Europe could be faced with the prospect of a second cold war.

After weeks of hesitation, even while Christian Democrats, Christian Socialists and liberals were at odds among themselves concerning the new strategy and even before the Cabinet had made a decision, the chancellor had already pledged his word.

In the Bundestag, on 18 April, Kohl voiced his agreement to the "star wars" project: "As far as I am concerned," he said, "the resolve and the moral pretensions of the American President are totally above suspicion. In our view, therefore, the American research program is justified, politically necessary and of concern to the security of the West as a whole. The government of the FRG therefore supports the American strategic defense program in principle."

Despite all the objections raised by the government camp itself, the positive decision by Chancellor and party Chairman Kohl is irreversible. CDU General Secretary Heiner Geissler underscores this point, saying: "Of course the government is taking part. To act differently would be idiotic. And even if no other European country participates, we will participate." Party executive director Radunski makes much the same point: "Our policy is directed toward saying yes to SDI. We would rather be dependent on the United States than on the Soviet Union."

The CDU strategists are willing to accept the fact that SDI may cause one more split among the European NATO allies. The French Government, with President Mitterrand leading the way, is warning of going along with the Washington adventure. Norway's conservative government has already indicated its unwillingness. Only Margaret Thatcher -- like Kohl -- seems to be resolved to follow Reagan on his SDI trip. But her foreign minister, Geoffrey Howe, feels differently about the right course for Great Britain.

The propaganda chief at the Konrad Adenauer Building is taking advantage of Reagan's state visit to help ring in the 1987 Bundestag election campaign. SDI is just what the doctor ordered to lay the groundwork for all-out polarization in the FRG.

The SPD is opposed to German participation in the "star wars" project because Geissler is trying to characterize the SDI dispute as a battle between good and evil and to take advantage of it -- with the CDU/CSU arrayed on the side of morality and freedom and the Social Democrats on the side of the evil empire, as Reagan says.

Geissler's goal is to secure "opinion leadership" for the CDU/CSU in the SDI dispute. He is hoping that an ideological crusade against the Reds in Moscow and in Bonn will divert attention from the difficulties the government is having with unemployment, pensions and new-style poverty.

The old slogan of "freedom or socialism" is coming through again loud and clear. "This is our message," Geissler says. "The socialists and the Soviet Union are working hand in glove." The entire CDU executive committee agrees with him: "The SPD has by now become a risk to peace and security for Germany as well as for Europe."

Kohl, the statesman, like his spiritual grandparent Konrad Adenauer, means to use the CDU election campaign ("All the ways of the SPD lead to Moscow") to fight and to attack. "It was not the Americans who pounced on Afghanistan," he told the voters in Recklinghausen, "and they did not kill hundreds of thousands of people there in the war over the past 4 years; they did not commit genocide. It was the Soviet Union which invaded a small country." Not a word, of course, about the dirty war in Vietnam, about the invasion of Grenada or the machinations of the Americans in Central America.

This is what he says instead: "The malicious attacks by leading Social Democrats against the American President and the anti-American campaigns -- when these things are perpetrated over and over again, one must make it crystal clear that this type of policy is of exclusive benefit to the Soviet Union and no other power in the world."

Arrayed alongside the United States, the CDU/CSU's self-image is that of the most important, if not the sole protector of freedom; of a crusader against socialism and dictatorship. It vouches for allegiance to the alliance, i.e. for military security and supports technological progress, i.e. business. "Those who resist participation in SDI research today," says Bernhard Worms, the CDU standardbearer in the North Rhine-Westphalia election campaign, "will be saddled with the jobless of the nineties."

The CDU's Radunski has carefully studied Reagan's most recent election campaign. He thinks he can feel the new spirit of the age drifting across the waters from the United States. "Somehow or other, mankind is lifting off the earth," he says. "We want to be a part of that, as the party of the future. We are talking here about a philosophical-conceptual process."

Anyone flying so high is apt to lose touch with the ground after a while. Kohl and Geissler are blindly plunging into a reckless adventure. For the first time ever, the FRG, a medium-sized power, is about to enter a field previously restricted to the superpowers and to share responsibility for a strategic weapons system -- without, however, having any say concerning its deployment or supervision.

If the FRG, situated as it is along the borders to the east, does become an SDI nation, then the Soviet Union will make it fully responsible for the consequences. West Germany could then become a football of the superpowers. "This is the most grotesque example of dillentantism we have had in our entire postwar history," says Egon Bahr, the director of the Hamburg Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy.

Such warnings strike on deaf ears among those in power in Bonn. They were miffed when Soviet Central Committee Secretary Mikhail Zymyanin brusquely told them in mid-April: "If the FRG assumes responsibility for SDI, it will also have to take the consequences."

Zymyanin dispensed with diplomatic courtesies. As he expressly remarked, he had come on an official mission on behalf of Kremlin boss Mikhail Gorbachev -- which was to inform the German chancellor that the warnings against support for the American SDI program were meant very seriously.

In March, at the funeral of Konstantin Chernenko, his predecessor, the Soviet party chief had already read the riot act to the chancellor. When Kohl started to plead in longwinded fashion for a Gorbachev-Reagan summit, the Russian cut him off. He raised the rhetorical question, according to the minutes taken by Joerg Kastl, Bonn's ambassador to Moscow, as to "what was real and what was propaganda and what was genuinely responsible in the long list of statements made by President Reagan and his advisers on the subject of the ongoing Geneva negotiations."

According to Kastl's telegram to the Bonn Foreign Office Gorbachev then went on to say:

The United States is not going there to reach agreements but is taking advantage of the talks, using them as a smokescreen for increased armaments and muscle power. The arms budget has reached an absolute maximum; Congress has approved an additional 21 MX

missiles; substantial sums have been set aside for space arms and energetic measures have been introduced to develop qualitatively new weapons in space. For another thing, Washington is taking advantage of the Geneva talks to better discipline its allies. In the past, there used to be a variety of opinions within the Western alliance.

According to Kastl, Gorbachev then concluded: "Now they are standing at attention."

The ambassador's report goes on to say that the Soviet Union is viewing the non-nuclear arms buildup in the FRG with some suspicion anyway. Bonn's "readiness to take part in the American plans for military research in space only serves to heighten this concern." Gorbachev is said to have asked for clarification as to the chancellor's policies: "Where is the chancellor's policy drifting?"

Dilettante foreign policy expert Kohl hardly has any room left to maneuver. The FRG has become an American weapons platform -- all the more so since the modernization program. On its soil -- and that is unique among NATO countries -- there are at least 63 and there will soon be 108 Pershing II missiles ready for launch against the Soviet Union. Support for Reagan's SDI program will totally relegate Bonn to the role of American vassal.

Kohl has to deny that the FRG is dependent [on the United States] to such an extent. It is precisely his voters who are most unhappy about the idea of being in bondage to America. "The chancellor of the allies" is what socialist Kurt Schumacher called Adenauer in 1949 -- and that has remained a dirty word for the conservatives.

The chancellor might yet earn a reputation as a statesman capable of protecting Germany's own interests -- by turning thumbs down on SDI and refusing to let the FRG be drawn into the madness of a big power arms race. The Europeans would have to quit this big power struggle for world domination which is no longer any concern of theirs.

No one could then accuse the chancellor of violating our treaty obligations. What is at stake is a principle of vital importance for the people of Western and Eastern Europe, i.e., the divisibility of detente.

To this day, we still have a policy in reasonably good working order which does not allow every strain on Soviet-American relations to affect relations between East and West Europeans. Whatever the superpowers are up to in Afghanistan or in Central America -- it has not posed a serious threat to detente in Europe thus far.

In 1980, after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing did not permit U.S. President Jimmy Carter to draw them into adopting punitive measures against the Soviet Union. In the final analysis, they kept the controversy from spreading to Europe -- and in exchange for this advantage, Schmidt joined the boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games.

Bonn also refused to join a propaganda crusade against Poland as desired by Washington as a response to the imposition of martial law by Gen Wojciech Jaruzelski. This type of independent action is likely to be a thing of the past once Bonn has signed the SDI pact with the United States.

Officials of the Bonn Foreign Ministry have done an analysis of why the Soviet leadership's reaction to the "star wars" plans has been so irritable:



— A new attempt by the United States to revert to a policy of containment vis-a-vis the Soviet Union is causing justifiable concern in Moscow that the Soviet Union is being downgraded to a second-rate world power;

— The Soviet Union is aware of its weaknesses in high-tech development; it is also aware that the gap between it and the West would grow as a result of the SDI program;

— Moscow is afraid that Western advances in civilian technology would make the development of new weapons systems possible in the course of a second stage the nature and impact of which cannot even be imagined at this time.

Eastern and Western experts believe that from a certain stage of development onward the space arms program might lead to the creation of offensive weapons. Laser attacks at the speed of light directed against so-called soft targets, e.g. oil tanks, grain fields, forests, factories and cities, would cause immense firestorms and do irreparable damage to industrialized nations.

If the Germans should join in the American attempt to force the Soviet Union to relinquish its position as a superpower of equal strength, then the FRG will be viewed by Moscow as a frontline enemy state. The consequences are easy to imagine: an end to detente in Europe; new confrontations; crisis situations once again. The division of Europe would become deeper and the fortunes of the FRG would be tied for better or worse to those of the United States.

This is the price the Europeans would have to pay -- even if they would gain nothing from it themselves. Even if the United States was to acquire an SDI umbrella to go along with the nuclear sword, the FRG would get no protection from it at all. Reagan is thinking primarily of the North American continent; the security needs of the Europeans are none of his concern.

This was plain to see when he announced his vision of the future marked by "peace through strength" in his TV address from the White House in 1983 and launched the "star wars" project. The Heritage Foundation, a well-endowed, archconservative think tank in Washington, suggested the basic idea to the President: America must close all "windows of vulnerability" and defeat "Moscow in the war of ideas."

But the chancellor is making it appear as though SDI also were a good thing for Europe -- if only there was success in getting the Americans to agree to certain demands.

But how is a German head of government to set conditions to the United States once he has given his approval in principle and has already submitted to the wishes of the premier NATO power once before in the matter of the deployment of the Pershing II?

Horst Teltschik, Kohl's security adviser, can see the connection quite clearly. "If the FRG had not carried out deployment, no one would have," he says. "In the Strategic Defense Initiative issue, too, the FRG has a key role to play."

In his address to the Bundestag, to be sure, the chancellor coupled his agreement in principle to SDI with the demand that the security of Europe must not be unlinked from that of the United States. "We must not have any zones of variable security within the NATO area," he said.

But this is exactly what would happen, if SDI became a reality. The SDI umbrella would protect the United States from intercontinental missiles while leaving Europe unprotected.

Even if we should succeed one day in building defensive weapons to protect against the USSR's ballistic SS-20's, they would still be of no avail against the short-range Soviet nuclear missiles which reach their targets in only 100 seconds of flying time without so much as entering outer space. Responsibility for the defense against these missiles the government would have to assign entirely to computers -- with all the risks of technical error which that involves. But that course would amount to a capitulation to the robots on the part of the politicians.

Volker Ruehe, the deputy chief of the parliamentary fraction, described the peculiarly dangerous situation in Europe to the executive committee of the CDU/CSU Bundestag fraction in vivid terms. He had his doubts concerning Reagan's sense of reality, Ruehe said, in the face of the President's desire of protecting his population against nuclear missiles from outer space.

The Russian nuclear explosives would not have to come from outer space at all, Ruehe said. They could be brought to their targets "in hand luggage." It has long since become feasible to transport atom bombs having the combined explosive force of those used in "Hiroshima and Nagasaki" to Chicago as part of tourist luggage. Even if SDI does become a reality, there will be no protection for American cities. "In my view," Ruehe said, "it is a dream for one side to believe that it can recover its invulnerability."

The Kohl line of argument becomes totally hollow when he starts to swear by a NATO doctrine the Americans have long since discarded. Up to the time the new space defense system is built, the chancellor told the Bundestag, "NATO's flexible response strategy must continue to apply unchanged." The truth, however, is that the Americans have not been prepared for some time to expose their country to the risk of an attack by Soviet long-range missiles.

As long ago as 1979, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told a conference of experts in Brussels with disarming candor: "The allies should not constantly call on the United States to assume strategic responsibility which we are unable to assume; which, if we were to assume them, we would be unwilling to carry out and which, if we carried them out, would incur the risk of destroying civilization."

Speaking to the Bundeswehr Academy in Hamburg in 1983, former Chancellor Schmidt concurred with the Kissinger statement. "I would be willing to predict," he said, "that the idea of the first use of nuclear weapons to counter a conventional attack will increasingly be viewed as inappropriate and even as unacceptable in the course of the eighties."

Even with SDI, the flexible response philosophy of deterrence could not be revived. The reason for it is, as most scientists agree, that even SDI cannot afford 100 percent protection for American cities against a Soviet counterstrike. The more likely logical consequence would be a massive increase in Soviet offensive weapons which Gorbachev has already threatened.

Apocalypse would move one step closer. A halfway functioning defensive system would offer a temptation for both of the superpowers. The one which has it first would be in

a position to fire first and not necessarily to die second — because he could count on intercepting the counterstrike of an enemy that had already been disarmed to a large extent.

A nuclear first strike, the London Institute for Strategic Studies warns in its just released annual report, would be "more thinkable" once a space defense system was deployed. In addition, it would increase the danger of accidental attack because the systems would have to be programmed for an extremely short time span. All in all, these experts who are otherwise so very highly regarded by our government contend, the threat of nuclear war is growing.

But the United States, Bonn Foreign Ministry experts say, feels that even an umbrella full of holes would help improve its security — even if the system's effectiveness were just over 50 percent. Under those conditions, surprise attacks on the U.S. nuclear arsenal and on key military targets would become incalculable. The U.S. strategists are said to believe that a "watertight system" is unattainable but at the same time not really necessary.

As compared with this, all of Kohl's other arguments in favor of German participation in the SDI program are not weighty enough. It is a non-nuclear defensive system, the chancellor argues, adding that SDI will even lead to success at the Geneva arms control negotiations.

It is more likely that the opposite will happen — because SDI erodes another agreement with the Soviets, the so-called ABM treaty concluded during the era of detente in 1972, which limits anti-missile defense systems.

While the treaty does not prohibit research on individual components of ABM weapons, it does prohibit testing and deploying such systems — aside from agreed upon exceptions. In a document submitted to the Congress 2 weeks ago, however, the Pentagon claimed the right to conduct extensive tests with space weapons.

Once again, the Reagan administration is about to follow up on the Heritage Foundation's ideological recommendations. "The President should order the development and deployment of strategic U.S. weapons as rapidly as possible," the [foundation's] Reagan "Mandate II" scenario states, "and should inform the Soviet Union at the appropriate time that American security interests do not allow the continuation of a defenseless situation such as prescribed by the 1972 ABM treaty."

As for Kohl's request that the United States should permit the Germans to take part in SDI research, this also runs the risk of violating the ABM treaty provisions which prohibit the "development" even of partial components, e.g. special computers or lasers, as well as the exchange of blueprints with one's allies.

But the chancellor is making light of the German participation in the "star wars" project. "There will not be, nor must there be an automatic sequence of research, development and deployment of the strategic defense systems," he said. "All decisions above and beyond the research program will only be reached on the basis of firm research findings."

In the case of the space project there cannot be any clean separation between research on the one hand and testing and development on the other, such as Kohl is trying to make it appear. Even if the Germans were to limit their activities to research, their

American partners have already started work on developing the components of the system designed to intercept incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles and on the preparation of tests -- in violation of the ABM treaty which only permits testing in the laboratory.

It was in February 1984 that Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger already spelled out his plans for an extensive program of developing and testing SDI-relevant technologies. It provides for ground tests in the mid-eighties of chemical lasers and large-size optical equipment. And, as early as 1987, the schedule calls for carrying and testing a target location system on board the space shuttle and the precise alignment of lasers in space.

Once billions of dollars have been spent on research, SDI critics rightly fear, even a German chancellor such as Kohl will be unable to put a stop to the project any longer. There is good reason to believe that the contention that we are merely dealing with research is meant to silence fears -- as was done once before when NATO coupled its modernization resolution with an offer of negotiations to the Soviets.

Just as the Americans had long decided then to deploy their cruise missiles and Pershing II in Europe, the Reagan administration now appears ready to take military advantage of space in any event -- no matter what the Soviets do to counter the move.

That it is Ronald Reagan of all people -- who looks upon communism as the embodiment of evil as such -- who is selling SDI in form of a peace initiative does not serve to reduce suspicion.

Reagan linked his vision of a strategic defense in space to a startling idea: he would share the know-how to be developed with the Soviets in order to avoid any destabilizing consequences.

This very simply is in contrast to those who are increasingly having their way in proposing to block any free exchange of technical information on security grounds. This not only concerns the export of know-how to the East; already now the Americans are blocking high technology transfer to Western nations, including the NATO member countries.

As a tool serving its disguised protectionism, the United States is not only turning to Cocom, the Paris organization which, under American pressure, is constantly expanding the list of allegedly militarily sensitive goods which may not be exported to the East bloc. On the basis of an executive order signed by the President, Weinberger may now veto any export license issued by the Commerce Department within 15 days.

Going one step further, the Americans are asking for direct control over the re-exports of foreign firms. Previously, export restrictions only applied to weapons parts; but now Washington holds any product which can be used in connection with weapons technology to be security-sensitive.

This applies to all computer and microelectronics technologies whether designed for missiles or toasters, as well as telecommunications equipment, new materials, robot technology, gene technology and aerospace equipment.

In mid-March, the U.S. State Department's Under Secretary William Schneider protested to Guenther van Wall, the German ambassador to the United States, concerning the delivery of special machinery to the Soviet Union by the Wuppertal-based firm of Thielenhaus.



The machinery, destined for use in the motor and anti-friction bearing industry, could also be used, Schneider argued, for the production of high-performance turbines for Soviet fighter aircraft. The Thielenhaus products were not part of the Cocom list as yet, he said, but the United States would be raising the issue in that body.

The truth of the matter is that Thielenhaus supplies the U.S. armament industry with machinery. The types of machinery exported to the Soviet Union were harmless, the firm's management declared, assuming that some of its American competitors were behind the accusation.

At an Atlantic Bridge symposium in Dallas this February, Gerhard Zeidler, a member of the board of directors of Standard Elektrik Lorenz (SEL), a Stuttgart technology company, denounced the rude methods being employed by the Americans.

The FRG's annual export trade with the Warsaw Pact countries and the PRC amounts to DM23 billion, Zeidler said, which is more than the United States and France put together. "We are therefore more seriously affected than others," he said, which is why there must be "a clearer definition than at present" as to which technologies are subject to the American embargo.

"We need to know," he added. "Under no circumstances is it sufficient to operate with criteria such as 'possible military use.'" All of today's relevant information technologies, for example, can also be used for military purposes. This means, Zeidler said, that "all of our products during the past 5 years, i.e. more than 50 percent of our entire output, would have been affected."

In November 1984, the FRG Ministry for Research came out with an "analysis of U.S. technology transfer policy" which states that "it is to be expected that U.S. Department of Defense contract allocations will help American industry gain advantages in competition -- even if unintentionally -- while the transfer of technology will be subjected to increasingly tighter restrictions."

According to the ministry report, there are some surprising things going on in the so-called free world:

- "Export applications for Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and the FRG, among others, undergo particularly close scrutiny";
- Approval of "an application to export" goods to an allied nation is made dependent by Washington on "the extent to which the receiving nation supports American goals in the Cocom committee";
- On instructions from Washington, foreign firms are excluded from development of "future technologies in the computer and microelectronics field."

There is a danger, the study concludes, "of the defense sector possibly securing for itself a quasi-monopoly even over technologies which are of substantial civilian use. Prompt transfer of technical progress to the civilian sector as well as to industry in other Western countries could be prevented on national security grounds."

Participation in SDI would surely make the situation of the German high technology industry even worse. SDI critics are afraid that the United States would take advan-



tage of its political preponderance and its military secrecy provisions in order to channel the transfer of technology in only one direction: from Europe to America.

"If Europe does not watch out," former Minister for Research Andreas von Vuelow (SPD) warns, "it will turn into an adjunct of the military-industrial complex of the United States."

While Helmut Kohl is still giving assurances that he will see to it that German-American cooperation on SDI "is characterized by fair partnership and the free exchange of information; that it will not be a technological one-way street," the United States is already moving in a different direction. The Americans are already trying to buy up the things they want from the Germans in the FRG directly -- without letting them partake of any American laboratory secrets or blueprints.

Thus far, the Americans have not stated clearly what their ideas with regard to German participation in SDI are. Following a visit to the United States in early April, Heinz Riesenhuber, the German minister for research, said that he was as yet unaware of "a clear line" in the Pentagon's thinking.

Fred Ikle, Weinberger's under secretary, made short shrift of the German official, stating that SDI was "a purely American matter." If the Germans wished to take part in the project, they could send their scientists and engineers across the Atlantic and interested German firms could be rewarded with "subcontracts."

Riesenhuber got an entirely different message from General James Abrahamson, the SDI project manager at the Pentagon. The West Germans, he said, would join consortiums and joint teams. SDI, after all, was an "alliance matter."

Later this month, the government will be sending 23 business experts along with officials from the Foreign and Defense Ministries, the Chancellor's Office and the Ministry of Research to Washington to find out exactly what his brother's plans are.

In early April, Lionel Olmer and William Schneider, under secretaries in the Commerce and State Departments respectively, met with top managers of SEL, Siemens, MTU, German Babcock, MBB, Dornier, Wacker-Chemie -- all of them German technology corporations -- at Neu-Isenburg near Frankfurt to obtain their "direct cooperation" in the SDI project.

Schneider brushed aside all arguments that such business deals might be in violation of the ABM treaty. The treaty was no obstacle to collaboration in research, he said.

Officials of the Bonn Foreign Ministry who attended the Neu-Isenburg meeting were dismayed, reporting to their chief that the U.S. Government was intent on pursuing its goal of securing the research potential of foreign firms on behalf of SDI. But in this it was showing no consideration for the fact that the NATO members had not even accepted the invitation to participate in SDI as yet.

The Foreign Ministry also was skeptical about the prospects of technology transfer, as demanded by Kohl. At Neu-Isenburg, the Americans had clearly been trying to win the German businessmen over with the promise that they would be able to take commercial advantage of the joint research findings. But the subsequent explanations were so general in nature that there was no way of telling how the research findings would really be applied to benefit technological progress in the participating countries.

Just how the Americans prevent their Western partners from looking over their shoulder has long been recognized by German scientists, the Bonn Ministry for Research found. For some time now, non-Americans have not been permitted to attend American professional meetings.

As a result of Pentagon pressure, the organizers of a symposium of the Society for Photooptical Instrumentation Engineers, for example, which was held in Arlington, Virginia in early April, asked all participants to present proof of American citizenship. Foreign nationals were required to obtain passes from their embassy and the U.S. Department of Defense, and some documents were kept under lock and key.

There were other events which were "open to U.S. citizens only" such as a meeting of the Society of Manufacturing Engineers at the Disneyland Hotel in Anaheim, California in January, as well as meetings on ceramic materials and high technology last year.

Even for meetings at universities, e.g. in Los Angeles and in Maryland, Washington has ordered a quota system. "It turns out," said Robert L. Parks, a professor of physics at the University of Maryland, "that American participants at these limited-access conferences are deprived of the opportunity to learn from their foreign colleagues who have already solved problems with which Americans may still be grappling."

Exactly how Helmut Kohl hopes to commit the United States to "fair partnership" and a "free exchange of information" must remain his own secret. All he can really hope to do is to appeal to the sense of fairness of his friend Ronald -- but that may not help him very much. It will take a long time before Reagan will forget, if he does, that the German chancellor made him slip into the worst crisis of his Presidency with the Bitburg affair.

But Kohl seems deaf to all arguments against the outer space adventure. Almost all non-industry American scientists as well as political and economic experts, i.e. 99 percent, are opposed to SDI, according to a statement by MIT Professor Suzanne Berger in Rome.

And not only SPD Chairman Willy Brandt is saying that "there are justified doubts concerning the long-term -- and at times even the medium-term-predictability of American policy." Wolfgang Mischnick, the head of the FDP parliamentary delegation, also does not think that SDI is the "philosopher's stone which will make war less likely." But the chancellor could not care less. He is hoping that SDI will be the big issue in the 1987 Bundestag election campaign; but he might just possibly be completely wrong about that.

Hans-Dietrich Genscher, his coalition partner, warns that Kohl's policy no longer commands a majority. The CDU must take care [he says] that its capability to preserve the peace is not questioned -- as it was in the heyday of detente and Ostpolitik. The foreign minister is beginning to keep his distance. "I have my hands full preserving the continuity of German foreign policy," he says.

The mean-spirited slogan coined by the CDU executive committee, accusing the SPD of being a security risk, might boomerang. If it really applies to anyone, the chancellor -- Helmut Kohl -- would be the one.

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SPACE ARMS

TEXT OF KOHL STATEMENT TO BUNDESTAG ON SDI

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[Speech by Chancellor Helmut Kohl to the Bundestag in Bonn--live]

[Text] Mr President, esteemed ladies and gentlemen, the Strategic Defense Initiative, SDI, of President Reagan will be the main issue in security policy in the years before us and influence most decisively East-West relations and also in a special way the relations between the United States and Europe.

In his 23 March 1983 speech, the U.S. President proposed to investigate whether it would be possible with the help of modern technology to become more independent from nuclear offensive weapons without endangering security. In a vision directed into the future, he countered the currently valid strategy of deterrence through the mutual ability to destroy one another with nuclear weapons with a model to ensure defense ability with nonnuclear weapons.

Ladies and gentlemen, anyone who seriously desires a comprehensive reduction of nuclear weapons in the world and who harbors reservations against the strategy of nuclear deterrence should most carefully consider preventing war. [applause] Every option for getting away from using the menace of a nuclear holocaust as the final means to prevent war deserves conscientious examination.

Even today, no one can judge with certainty whether the U.S. President's SDI will prove to be the way to drastically reduce and ultimately ban nuclear weapons. However, ladies and gentlemen, if this course proves to be practicable, then historical merit will have to be accorded to Ronald Reagan. [applause]

Despite all debates on daily politics and the understandable differences of opinion that characterize democracy, all of us should seriously and farsightedly consider political visions if these visions can possibly bring us closer to the vital objectives of our policy.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is not particularly a sign of political farsightedness, but, as far as I am concerned, a sign of a lack of an awareness of responsibility on the part of the opposition when the SPD flatly rejects the U.S. initiative even before the necessary grounds for a decision are available and even before the U.S. Government has concluded its own contemplations of the research program. [applause]

Ladies and gentlemen, in contrast, it is also not surprising to me or the Federal Government and the alliance that from the outset the Soviet Union has attacked and characterized as diabolical the U.S. defense initiative. The utter lack of truth and moral justification of these Soviet attacks is illustrated by the fact that for more than a decade now, the Soviet Union has itself been conducting, at considerable expense, comparable research on a widespread antimissile system. This is demonstrated by the fact that it is the only one of the two superpowers that has installed and continuously modernizes an operational antimissile system around its capital of Moscow.

In addition, the Soviet Union is the only country in the world that has operational antisatellite weapons, that is, the so-called killer satellites. We are aware, and I want to recall this fact once again, that the Soviet Union carried out a test of such systems in space over Munich in the summer of 1983, and by building a large radar facility near Krasnoyarsk, it proves its determination -- possibly in violation of the ABM treaty -- to hold open for itself the option of a strategic defense.

The continuation of unilateral Soviet armament in space would mean not only making the ABM treaty have no substance, but also letting dangerous instabilities emerge. Ladies and gentlemen, this also belongs in this debate. The Soviet leadership has never denied such research and development, and yet I have heard few critical words about this kind of research from our opponents in this country. [applause]

It is quite noteworthy, and I am certainly not the only one who has observed this in the past few weeks, that essentially the same forces that are now raising their voices in 1983 vehemently attacked the implementation of the two-track decision, and both times convincingly in perfect harmony with Soviet propaganda. [applause]

The U.S. SDI is a long-term research program that will extend far into the nineties. Even the U.S. side, I stress this again, even the U.S. side does not expect that there will be any decisions on development and deployment before the next decade. Research on space systems is compatible with the ABM treaty. There will not and cannot be automatic transition from research to development and deployment in connection with strategic defense systems. All decisions that go beyond the research program will be made only on the basis of proven research results.

Ladies and gentlemen, I do not doubt the integrity of the U.S. President's determination and moral attitude in this matter. Therefore, the U.S. research program is from our point of view justified, politically necessary, and serving the security interests of the West as a whole. [applause] Consequently, the Federal Government supports the principle of the U.S. SDI program.

On 9 February 1985, at the Munich military science meeting, I outlined for the first time the significant elements of our position toward the U.S. project. I made it perfectly clear at that time that the decisive criterion of our assessment of the U.S. defense initiative is the question of whether this initiative can make peace in freedom more secure for us. Despite all of the sometimes very complicated individual problems of a political, strategic, and technological nature, in the future the answer to this question will continue to determine our assessment and action.

In its 27 March 1985 decision, the Federal Security Council stressed this central point in particular by placing the U.S. SDI program in the general context of East-West relations, including the arms control dialogue.



Our aim to create peace with increasingly fewer weapons and to develop more stability in East-West relations is naturally valid and unchanged. This is also the guideline for our policy toward the U.S. SDI project. [applause]

The interests of the FRG and of the West European allies are involved in the U.S. SDI project in many very complex ways. We will be most deeply involved in possible political-strategic effects. These will have direct consequences for our most vital political interest, namely our external security. From the very beginning we must make a number of strategic demands, based not least of all on our geostrategic position.

In my speech in Munich, I pointed out very clearly that Europe's security must not be detached from that of the United States. There must be no zones of differing security levels within NATO. NATO's strategy of flexible response must continue to be valid in an unchanged way as long as no alternative is found that would promise to prevent war. We must avoid instability during any transitional phase from a strategy of pure deterrence to a new form of strategic stability based more firmly on defensive systems. Disparities must be removed and the development of new areas of threats below the nuclear level must be avoided.

I can state with satisfaction that our U.S. allies are becoming increasingly aware of these vital FRG and European strategic requirements, and that they will take them into consideration.

Ladies and gentlemen, the connection between the political-strategic and arms control points of view is of special significance for us in assessing SDI. From a short- and medium-range point of view, adherence to the ABM treaty must have priority. In the Federal Government's view, it is imperative that, prior to decisions going beyond research, cooperative solutions must be sought that will guarantee that strategic stability will be preserved and, if possible, improved that nuclear offensive weapons will be drastically reduced and that the ratio between offensive and defensive systems will be defined in a way that will guarantee as much stability as possible with as small a number of weapons as possible.

Ladies and gentlemen, we are convinced that the U.S. SDI program has already given an important impetus to today's arms control dialogue. It has also quite definitely contributed to the resumption of the Geneva talks, and also will possibly continue to have a positive influence on the development of the negotiations. It is in our interests for the superpowers to negotiate in Geneva on strategic defense systems in connection with offensive nuclear weapons, without obstructing or hindering any promising possibilities for a solution by making one-sided or irrelevant linkages. In connection with the need to concretely define the ratio of offensive and defensive weapons, a ratio that will guarantee maximum stability in the lowest level of armament, every possibility for a solution must be examined without any reservations.

In my speech at the CDU congress in Essen, I noted this when I said that a drastic reduction of nuclear offensive weapons would influence the need for and the size of necessary defensive systems in space. Ladies and gentlemen, in this connection, I appeal to the Soviet Union to use the Geneva negotiations constructively and not to turn the U.S. SDI program into a pretext for a lack of flexibility on the subject of reducing the number of nuclear offensive weapons.



The U.S. SDI program creates an opportunity as well as a risk for the North Atlantic alliance. Through cohesion and solidarity the allies must from the start prevent the Soviet Union from using SDI to split the alliance and sow discord among the Western public. [applause] The United States has started consulting with its allies on its new project. We welcome the offer to continue consultations on a bilateral basis as well as within the alliance. We will actively take advantage of this opportunity. These consultations are indispensable for us. They are particularly necessary because the possible adjustment of the alliance's valid defense strategy to new realities in the future requires a continuous dialogue in this very area. A discussion of the U.S. project by the alliance partners on the basis of solidarity also provides an opportunity to strengthen the alliance's cohesion and the transatlantic dialogue.

Together with its closest European allies, the Federal Government will energetically undertake efforts to develop a common stance on the U.S. SDI project. [applause] This is also recommendable because together with our European partners we can better represent our specific European interests to the United States.

Ladies and gentlemen, in this connection, the Federal Government welcomes the French proposal conveyed by Foreign Minister Dumas early this week to Minister Genscher that closer European cooperation in the field of future technologies be immediately initiated. [applause] I share the French Government's assessment that Europe's reply to the U.S. SDI program cannot consist of a policy of surrender or a premeditated rejection.

I am happy that in our basic assessment of the U.S. SDI we are in agreement with Italian Prime Minister Craxi, British Prime Minister Thatcher, and other European partners. [applause]

We are open to the U.S. proposal to jointly study possibilities for participation in the research project. Participation of the European countries would be a historic opportunity for Europe to bring its political, strategic, and technological interests to bear as a community.

[Interjection] What does that mean?

[Kohl] That means the original goal of your policy -- European political integration. However, you are also isolated in this area. [applause]

Ladies and gentlemen, in this manner the U.S. SDI program could provide a real opportunity for the NATO alliance and for Europe, and could essentially contribute to strengthening the integration of the two. In view of the magnitude of funding -- about DM80 billion -- with which the U.S. Government plans to support its research program, it is quite evident to everyone even now that important and far-reaching results will be achieved -- results whose significance, including the economic importance, will go far beyond the sphere of strategic defense. In this connection, the remark about the promotion of technological innovation on a broad basis is definitely no exaggeration.

Ladies and gentlemen, we will and must also be interested in utilizing research results in our industry that will have revolutionary civilian applications. Let me add, however, that it is not this economic-technological interest alone that will determine our decision on participating in the research program, but we must ensure that the FRG and West Europe are not outdistanced technologically and thus become second rate. As expressed in the alliance commitments, shared security between the United States and Europe also requires a comparable level of economic and technological developments in the United States and Europe.

Our economic system of a free and social market economy enables and favors cooperation among companies, even beyond national borders. German and European companies and research institutes are leading in important fields. Viewed against this background, it is all the more necessary for us to discuss with the U.S. side the criteria and conditions for potential cooperation so as to understand the framework for potential cooperation so as to understand the framework for potential cooperation. In this process, we will attach special importance to ensuring that any future cooperation will guarantee fair partnership and free exchange of research results, [applause] will not remain a technological one-way street, and will guarantee as far as possible that research will be integrated, thus allowing us to exert influence on the entire project.

Technological cooperation in the U.S. research project would make it easier for the FRG and our European allies to retain, and even increase, our influence on and importance in the major questions concerning the further development of alliance strategy. In the foreseeable future, the Federal Government will have to make a decision on participation in the research project. In making this decision, it will not tolerate being put under time pressure by anyone and will gather all the necessary information to make its decision.

To this end, essentially three measures have been envisaged: the Federal Government will discuss with the German economic sector its interest in and possibilities for participation in research, and, in so doing, also examine beginnings of cooperation among European companies. It will enter into consultations with interested European allies -- particularly France, Great Britain, and Italy, but also with the other interested European partners -- on a common definition of a stance and, if the occasion arises, on participation. The Federal Government will send a group of experts to the United States to ascertain the conditions and areas for participation in research. It goes without saying that I will discuss this subject with President Reagan a few days from now when he visits the Federal Republic.

Ladies and gentlemen, let me sum up. The U.S. research program triggered by SDI is justified and is in the interests of the West as a whole. The U.S. SDI program constitutes an opportunity to further develop on a long-term basis the currently absolutely necessary deterrence with the threat of mutual annihilation through a strategy that rests more strongly on defensive elements and that would allow a comprehensive reduction of nuclear weapons. Nobody knows at this time whether this hope can come true, yet a no to this project at this time--and I am addressing this remark not least of all to you, ladies and gentlemen of the SPD--would not be in keeping with the responsibility that we also bear for our country's future. [applause]

The strategic stability between East and West and the unity of the alliance in the political and strategic respect must be guaranteed. The NATO strategy of flexible response remains valid and unchanged as long as there is no alternative that would better serve the objective of preventing war. The arms control function of SDI is of central importance to us. We will persistently advocate this approach to our U.S. allies. A drastic reduction of the nuclear offensive systems on both sides remains our prime objective. [applause]

The assessment of the U.S. initiative from the viewpoint of alliance policy makes evident the task of averting risks and purposefully utilizing existing opportunities

through the cohesion of the alliance and through intensified exertion of influence by the European allies. Ladies and gentlemen, whoever says no today will not remove the risk for the alliance and will be unable to take advantage of existing opportunities. [applause]

We will follow the U.S. proposal and examine possibilities of cooperation in the research program. In doing this, we will closely cooperate with our industrial sector and with our European friends.

I regret that the SPD has decided to reject the program before studying it. I ask you how you intend to bring such an attitude into line with the interests of one of the leading industrial nations of the world. [applause]

Ladies and gentlemen, our considerations about the SDI program fit into the general concept of our peace policy. We continue to be interested in improving East-West relations, and we expect the Geneva arms control negotiations to provide a distinct impetus for the East-West dialogue in general.

In my opinion, nothing must happen that could restrict East-West relations on defense or arms policy issues or even on an individual issue such as the pros and cons of strategic defense.

Only improved relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as between the NATO states and the Warsaw Pact on a broad basis, can lead to effective progress in disarmament and arms control. The Federal Government will continue unswervingly its policy of understanding and balance, while simultaneously fully maintaining FRG interests. [prolonged applause]

CSO: 5200/2591

SPACE ARMS

TEXT OF FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER'S BUNDESTAG ADDRESS ON SDI

DW181109 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 0858 GMT 18 Apr 85

[Speech by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in Bundestag debate following Chancellor Kohl's government statement on the SDI--live]

[Text] Mr President, esteemed ladies and gentlemen: research by the United States and the Soviet Union on new defense systems to be based in space or on the ground provoke fundamentally significant questions about the future. The interrelationship of the political and strategic problems involved in the SDI and the corresponding Soviet efforts must be seen, and these problems placed into the framework of East-West relations and our policy on security and arms control. This is the premise from which the Federal Government proceeds in defining its basic attitude as adopted by the Federal Security Council on 27 March 1985.

The opening of U.S.-Soviet negotiations in Geneva on 12 March this year created new opportunities for East-West relations. These negotiations provide the opportunity to improve relations between the United States and the Soviet Union so that more stable and more lasting comprehensive relations can develop in Europe as well. The negotiations on strategic weapons, intermediate-range weapons, and space systems intersect essential areas of the power ratio between the superpowers, the security situation in Europe, and future interrelated developments. All this affects us Europeans directly.

The problems involving outer space and the research on whether new technological developments can be defensively used introduce a new dimension into the East-West relations, security policy, and disarmament policy. Many questions raised in this connection cannot be answered today. For this reason we should be wary of simplified and rash judgments, but we would be neglecting our duty if Europe were to impose on itself a ban on thinking about new ways to achieve more strategic stability and to better prevent war. The effect of such a ban would be found to lead us into isolation in security policy. Together with our allies we must develop ideas about how new technological developments can contribute to greater security, including ours.

The alliance's strategy aimed at preventing war must in no case be called into question in this process. As long as there is no better option for preventing the war than the strategy of flexible response, this strategy must remain valid and unchanged. Even if this strategy is not considered to be the ultimate answer to the question about permanently ensuring peace, it nevertheless has proved its worth as an instrument for preventing war. Ladies and gentlemen, a strategy that prevents war is neither obsolete nor immoral. [applause]



The agreement concluded by the United States and the Soviet Union on 8 January 1985, to open the Geneva negotiations is a document of outstanding political significance. An early meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev could contribute to making the objectives agreed upon more concrete, just as it could contribute toward the promotion of the political relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

[Addressing a Bundestag member of the Greens] Colleague from the Greens -- I do not know your name yet -- when you say that a meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev would be of no help, then we counter with the argument that whoever does not want to shoot must negotiate. [applause] I think this is the decisive argument. [applause]

There is far-reaching agreement about the substance and the goals of the negotiations. Ladies and gentlemen, there is agreement not only about the subject, but also about the substance and the objectives of the negotiations. To begin with, there is the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons, specifically strategic and intermediate-range weapons. We have waited so long for negotiations on the reduction of intermediate-range weapons, and now they have begun. Second, there is the prevention of an arms race in space and the discontinuation of the one on earth, and third, the strengthening of strategic stability.

All three objectives of the negotiation are in keeping with our own German and European security interests. [applause] It would be an important result of today's debate if all caucuses in the Bundestag would unreservedly say yes to these goals of the Geneva negotiations.

Ladies and gentlemen, strategic stability is the key concept of the U.S.-Soviet agreement of 8 January. This objective makes these negotiations something new.

It is not just specific weapons systems that are the subject of negotiations. Rather -- and this is the great opportunity offered by Geneva -- a way to ensuring lasting peace is being negotiated. This corresponds to the realization that reliable security in the age of nuclear weapons cannot be based just on unilateral decisions by one side or the other, but that cooperation in security policy is necessary. This is a realistic idea and is part of the Harmel concept of the alliance that links deterrence and defensive capability with the readiness for dialogue and cooperation. This concept does not deny the political controversies between the East and West. It does not deny the different values in life, but it is based on the common interest that to the degree possible we must remove the risk of all war -- of nuclear war and conventional war. This presupposes the preparedness to consider the legitimate security interests of all involved.

Important conclusions are possible based on the U.S.-Soviet agreement. Strategic stability must be jointly defined and specified in Geneva. Here is a chance that goes beyond arms control and permits a new basis to be found for East-West relations as a whole. The Europeans must make their contribution in taking advantage of this chance. Increased strategic stability is to be achieved with fewer nuclear weapons. The main goal of the Geneva negotiations must be a drastic reduction of the number of existing nuclear weapons. The reduction of intercontinental and intermediate-range weapons is involved. [applause]

Ladies and gentlemen, nuclear weapons with a shorter range must also be the subject of negotiations. They also -- not only the strategic and intermediate-range weapons -- give the people no chance to survive. No new gray zones must develop. Elementary problems of European security are involved here.

Strategic stability requires that all problems involving the weapons systems being negotiated in Geneva must be considered and solved, as envisaged by the communique of 8 January 1985. The connection between offensive and defensive weapons will be a central issue of these negotiations.

However, this does not mean that individual agreements on the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons must be postponed until a comprehensive agreement is possible. Strategic stability can exist only if the security of the U.S. alliance partners is included. European security is not a regional problem. The alliance is politically and strategically unified, and must remain so in the future. [applause]

Ladies and gentlemen, strategic stability also presupposes that Soviet superiority will also be removed in the conventional field. Preventing war means preventing all wars, including conventional wars. A war in Europe, even without nuclear weapons, would today be a thousand times more terrible than World War II. Strategic stability is possible only on the basis of equal rights. It means equal rights between the two superpowers, as outlined in the U.S.-Soviet statement of 1972, together with the principles of moderation, renunciation of force, and mutual recognition of legitimate security interests. It also means equal rights in connection with security for all medium and small states in Europe.

Only renunciation of superiority by both sides can lead to stability and the lasting strengthening of peace. That is a contribution necessary to the building of confidence on which political understanding between East and West must be based.

The solution of security problems must be imbedded in a broad strategy of cooperation in which everyone must participate and from which no one must be excluded. All states -- large, medium, and small -- must try to improve East-West relations. In doing this, we can facilitate the solution of the problems being discussed in Geneva. Here lies the special significance of the CSCE process that must remain a central instrument in East-West relations. The medium and small states that during difficult times have helped to maintain the network of international relations must also make their contribution. This applies to the development of political relations, to economic and cultural cooperation, and to the solution of humanitarian problems.

The two German states have a special responsibility in this respect -- a responsibility that was accepted anew by Chancellor Kohl and General Secretary Honecker on 12 March 1985 in Moscow.

Ladies and gentlemen, in this difficult discussion on space issues and new defensive systems, we must be careful not to be emotional. Regarding the militarization of space, it is an indisputable fact that outer space is already today being militarily utilized. Observation satellites of both sides, supplying information about what is going on on the other side, serve strategic stability. They are indispensable for verifying arms control agreements. Their protection is in everyone's interests.

It also is a reality that both superpowers are doing research on new defensive systems. Under the ABM treaty, U.S. research is permissible and, in view of many years of Soviet efforts, also justified. It will take a long time until reliable answers can be given to the numerous difficult strategic and technological questions posed by the U.S. program. France and the other European states share our view.

In his remarkable speech of 15 March 1985, the British foreign secretary brought up questions which are equally important for all of us in Europe and which must be reasonably discussed and responsibly answered. The discussion in the United States also proves that the possibilities and effects of new defensive systems can today not yet be definitely assessed. For this reason too, it is neither necessary, nor possible at this point to definitely answer the question about new defensive systems.

We do have to answer the question about the technological aspect. In this connection, we must be careful not to consider the technological aspect to be the most important problem resulting for us from SDI. Nonetheless, the fact is correct that in view of the U.S. funds earmarked for the project, the SDI research phase will lead to a substantial technological thrust, irrespective of its results. The technologies relevant to SDI are of crucial importance for all future developments.

It has never before been more urgently necessary for the Europeans to closely and energetically cooperate in the field of technology. Therefore, the Europeans must pool their capabilities in the technological area, in particular by effectively coordinating their state and private research potential.

We are in agreement with France that German-French cooperation is a guide in this respect. [applause] In recent days, the French Government proposed a common initiative of cooperation in highly technological areas on a European level, which will be open to all interested states. Together with France, we want to make this great European opportunity become reality. We want a technological Europe which is more than just a subcontractor or licensee. Briefly, we want a Europe which can cooperate with the United States and Japan on an equal footing.

Obviously the technological consequences of the SDI program have made many people here aware only now of what has existed for a long time -- the technological challenge Europe is facing, with or without SDI, ladies and gentlemen. It is hardly possible for unequal partners to successfully cooperate over a long period of time. Our experience of the last few decades and the more recent past has shown the difficulties of a balanced technological transatlantic exchange.

Ladies and gentlemen, the invitation to participate in SDI research also requires an answer that we must give together with our most important European allies. [applause] Haste, panic, or surrender are as inappropriate as uncoordinated reactions by the Europeans. The Europeans must define their interests, requirements, and goals and then talk and act in a body.

The chancellor today repeated the prerequisites for cooperation in the research program. We Europeans must take care not to lose what we need, or, to formulate it more clearly; harm would be done to European interests if European researchers and results of research, as well as capital and enterprises, were directly attracted by the U.S. program, without the governments having secured the promise of technological transfer and possibility to influence. [applause]

The significance of the European pillar in the alliance, the effects on the East-West relations and on arms control, and the technological cooperation of the Europeans make the closest cooperation with France and other European partners a political necessity for us. Lone action, whatever the direction, would be bound to entail serious consequences for our own interests. This is also true, of course, for a lone no, ladies and gentlemen. [applause]

Ladies and gentlemen, the invitation to participate in the SDI program relates to research. Under the ABM treaty a distinction must be made between the research on and development of new technologies on this subject.

As for the theory, I would like to tell you that NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington justly stressed that it is necessary to put up an unassailable wall, as he called it, between SDI research and SDI development. True, there must be neither automatic nor fluent transitions which might lead to phases of instability.

The British Government justly pointed out that neither the technical development, nor rash attempts at predicting this technological development must preclude political decisions. The United States has said that it wishes to carry out, in cooperative solutions with the Soviet Union, a transition to new defensive systems, in keeping with the ABM treaty. As long as such agreements have not been achieved it is necessary as a contribution toward stability in the phase ahead of us, to reaffirm and strictly observe the ABM treaty. On the spot verifications for the purpose of eliminating doubts about the observance of the ABM treaty would be tantamount to great progress. It is just as important, for the sake of avoiding instability, to convince the Soviet leadership that we are serious about our objective of creating strategic stability with essentially fewer nuclear weapons.

[Answering interjection by unidentified deputy] If you consider disarmament a contribution to instability, then we are worlds apart. We believe that disarmament of the offensive weapons is an important contribution toward stability. [applause]

Ladies and gentlemen, various options of future cooperative solutions are conceivable, solutions which take into account the interrelations between offensive and defense weapons systems and the requirements of strategic stability. The chancellor's statement that a drastic reduction of nuclear offensive weapons could exert influence on the need for and the volume of required defensive systems in space underlines the interrelation between offensive and defensive weapons. Whoever proposes to deny this connection fails to recognize the content and significance of what the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on 8 January.

Ladies and gentlemen, if it is correct -- and I am convinced that it is -- that the SDI has enhanced the Soviet Union's interest in returning to the negotiating table, then it is likewise correct and appropriate that we must utilize the SDI for purposes of arms control policy. In connection with this program the U.S. Government also spoke justly of cooperative, just, and verifiable arms control. For this reason it proposed tangible reductions of the strategic weapons. Owing to the interrelation involved, the readiness of the Soviet Union to come to an understanding soon about the reduction of the nuclear missiles would be an important contribution toward the success of the Geneva negotiations as a whole.

We expect from the Geneva negotiations the serious search for common solutions which will lead to the lasting safeguarding of peace with fewer weapons through comprehensive cooperation. We are aware how difficult this is, and for this reason we warn against unwarranted expectations of early successes. Yet it is incontestable that we must utilize the chance to achieve true disarmament and even more effective prevention of war. We must utilize the chance for comprehensive cooperation between East and West. This is what matters, ladies and gentlemen, and not rash judgments. What is at stake ultimately is to create stable and durable peace through a new, comprehensive plan for the cooperative arrangement of the East-West relations. This can be done only through negotiations and not through the refusal of negotiations. [applause]



SPACE ARMS

PRESS DISCUSSES KOHL, GENSCHER SDI STATEMENTS

Press Review

DW191005 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0505 GMT 19 Apr 85

[From the press review]

[Text] The main issues of editorials today are the statements by Federal Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher on the U.S. SDI.

KOELNISCHE RUNDschau has the following to say: Anyone with mixed feelings prior to yesterday's statement of the chancellor found that his skepticism was justified. Helmut Kohl was expected to say something definite and binding on the issue, although it was not necessary to do so. His declaration does not say much. The basic statement is that he wants to support the U.S. SDI, but he is uncertain whether such plans would really make peace more secure, says the paper.

STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG maintains: Helmut Kohl's short government statement should have clarified that nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated. Keeping quiet about it, or even indicating that it might be possible comes close to being a political illusion, particularly for the younger generation. As long as the incompatible social systems in the East and in the West need weapons for security reasons, nothing can change. Ronald Reagan's SDI plans do not help much either. Understanding this is not a matter of party policy, it is the result of plain logic. However, the chancellor, does not want to subject himself to it.

DIE WELT points out: In contrast to the chancellor, Foreign Minister Genscher uttered mainly reservations with regard to the American project to replace the strategy of mutual destruction with the SDI.

Genscher, unlike the chancellor, did not say that the research program is justified, politically necessary, and serving the security interests of the West. Genscher, like the opposition, even voiced reservations with regard to FRG participation in SDI research work. He can, if at all, only visualize only European participation, if even that. The minister, who is a trained lawyer, could not have been more clear in presenting reservations with regard to a program that his chancellor had basically approved 30 minutes earlier, half an hour, stresses the paper.

Frankfurt Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE notes: The chancellor did not miss the opportunity to pressure the SPD because of its hasty rejection. The SPD speakers created the impression that they were sometimes hiding their undecidedness behind polemics, which they had to expound in the name of a party that does not know exactly what it wants. The paper concludes: More shocking for the German future, however, was the SPD's inability -- in view of its many statements on the action of the U.S. which fanned anti-American feelings -- to utter one single critical word about the Soviet Union, as if no reason for criticism existed.

# TV Commentary

DW190327 Hamburg ARD Television Network in German 2030 GMT 18 Apr 85

[Thilo Schneider commentary]

[Text] What we do not have is exact information about the U.S. space-based anti-missile system called SDI and its definitely significant effects. This, ladies and gentlemen, was the main impression conveyed by today's Bundestag debate on FRG or European participation in a defense project whose magnitude by far exceeds the development of the atom bomb.

The ignorance that can be encountered everywhere is not in proportion to the decision-making compulsion that may come up rather soon. The dimensions and risks of this project with respect to the Geneva disarmament talks, the Atlantic partnership, and with respect to its innovative advantages and disadvantages therefore could not appropriately be judged by the Bundestag deputies. Because ignorance still is so common about the SDI, all the government and the opposition were able to give were more or less clear signals of approval or disapproval. There was a yes with some buts from the coalition and a no with some overtones from the SPD. In the middle of it all stood the foreign minister as a child of the world, torn between detente effort and solidarity with the most important NATO partner, the United States, and claimed as their own, while also chided by the Social Democrats.

Despite a great deal of polemics there was one common premise: The U.S. SDI research was accepted as legitimate because of the Soviet research that has been underway for quite a while; it was accepted, at any rate, within the framework of the arms control agreements.

The conditions cited by Chancellor Kohl for his support of the U.S. SDI no doubt express his concern about a fair partnership and thus cooperation in technological progress. Examples of the past few days give cause for anxieties in that respect. President Reagan could help dispel them during his Bonn visit.

The reservations of the FDP and the demands of the SPD and the Greens for a ban of all tests with space weapons, but also the chancellor's statement that today nobody can really judge whether SDI will really prove to be a way of reducing nuclear threat, on the whole describe the insecurity of the situation. As long as a political solution is not yet possible, the oft-denounced philosophy of deterrence appears to me to be somewhat able to secure peace. Deterrence should not be scrapped unless absolutely necessary.

CSO: 5200/2591

SPACE ARMS

EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO SDI RESEARCH COOPERATION COMMENTED

France Seeks European Coordination

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 26 Apr 85 p 4

[Article by Roger de Weck: "Paris Throws a Wrench in the Works"]

[Text] Today one can argue exquisitely not only with words but also with abbreviations. Heretofore, the Europeans had nothing to oppose the American SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative), that favorite project of Ronald Reagan popularly called Star Wars. This shortcoming had to bother especially the eloquent French. "For reasons of political optics alone," therefore, it appeared to them advisable to respond to SDI with an abbreviation of their own. As was once the case with Archimedes in the bathtub, they thus found a formula that is easily remembered: EURECA (European Research Coordination Agency) is the name of the project launched last week by France.

The plan for a "European Research Coordination Agency" concocted by the resourceful heads at the Elysee and in the foreign ministry on the Quai d'Orsay is just as subtle as the abbreviation. Whereas SDI pursues a military goal, EURECA is presented as a civilian enterprise, which, to be sure, will benefit "the military area as well." That was written by French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas in a letter to his "dear friend" Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

The other foreign ministers of the EEC countries--including the Spaniard and the Portuguese in anticipation of their joining--also received mail from Paris last week. Without ever directly mentioning SDI and the \$26 billion appropriated for it, Dumas called the attention of his colleagues to the "spectacular acceleration" of research and development activity. Europe has "no future" if it remains idle there. Europeans must thereby "proceed from their own needs, their own interests and their own envisioned goals." As though the warning against a participation of the European countries in SDI were not emphatic enough for him, the French foreign minister continued: "A Europe as a subcontractor and a Europe that only worked under license would no longer be Europe."

Thus Roland Dumas called for "a large-scale German-French initiative that "should be open to all interested European countries" beyond the EEC. The core is EURECA, the research agency: a flexible instrument that is to be financed half by public funding and half by trade and industry. The agency is nominally to coordinate European research in six high-tech areas. It is no

coincidence that the fields named by Dumas--optoelectronics, new materials, the high-performance laser, the high-capacity computer, artificial intelligence, high-speed microelectronics and, of course, space operations as well--correspond precisely to the main efforts of the SDI research.

In Paris, they are now of the opinion that it may have been a tactical error to take over the American SDI program so crudely with this enumeration. There is talk of including additional areas such as biotechnology or robotics, for example. For EURECA should not be permitted to appear so obviously as an independent European Star Wars project, even though President Francois Mitterrand and his close confidant Roland Dumas may dream of such a thing. Therein lies the contradictoriness of the French position, which is based upon other preconditions than that of the FRG. On the one hand, as a nuclear power France is against SDI for good reason. On the other hand, it would like to compete somehow--whatever the cost may be.

Although Paris has great doubts about the success of the American project, it sees in it a military and psychological as well as an economic threat:

--If, some distant day, the two superpowers were better able to defend themselves against nuclear attacks, then the force de frappe would become less effective as a deterrent. France would thereby fall back to the same level as the FRG.

--French experts fear that SDI will spur the arms race. France will know how to improve and multiply its missiles so that in an emergency perhaps a few will be able to break through the enemy's nuclear shield. It would, however, be difficult for the economically weakened country to handle additional large defense expenditures, especially since it is already horribly neglecting the conventional armed forces for the sake of the force de frappe.

--The undermining of the deterrence doctrine will inspire the pacifists and make more difficult the deployment of new offensive weapons, fears Hubert Vedrine, Mitterrand's foreign policy adviser.

--The French see the new "American challenge" in the economic area as more acute or at least as more immediate. Mitterrand's experts are convinced that SDI will make Europe fall even farther behind technologically but that a participation in SDI will by no means help the European countries to reach the top.

In Paris, they do not believe in the possibility of fair cooperation with the United States. They are convinced that the Reagan plan will not benefit the national economies of the Europeans, although microeconomically individual enterprises would profit from the dollar windfall: interestingly, the nationalized concerns Thomson and Matra in particular. Thomson is considered to be the leader in the area of laser-mirror technology and is already heavily involved in the United States.

If one firm after the other now falls victim to the beckoning calls from abroad, the French economy will become fully dependent upon the Americans,



fears Defense Minister Hernu. He sees the danger that France will thus be drawn "into a sort of economic super-NATO," whereby the United States would appropriate to itself the best European scientists and European know-how.

The boorish action of the Americans and the snubbing of the Europeans by "Monsieur Weinburger" and "Monsieur Burt" have strengthened the opinion of the proud French that there can be no equal and fruitful cooperation with Washington.

This, then, is the reason for EUREKA, a move that contains all of the characteristics of Mitterrand's policies: the European orientation; the rather diffuse political creativity; improvisation and opportunism; and the inclination toward grand actions and theatrical successes with the hope of profiting politically.

Mitterrand and his advisers have used the European uncertainty about SDI to rehash their old demand for a "Europe of technologies." They skillfully combined the necessity of a common European stance on SDI with this intent, which had already been advocated by Laurent Fabius in a detailed memorandum in October 1983 and vehemently by Foreign Minister Dumas in a report before the Krupp Foundation in September 1984. The experts of the Quai d'Orsay believe that the fact that Europe spends more money on research than Japan but achieves less with it can be attributed entirely to inadequate coordination.

In addition, Dumas' letter again recalls the necessity of that "reciprocal opening of the public markets" and of further steps in harmonizing technical norms. Here as well, EUREKA brings nothing new. But all of the proposals are being tied together at a politically explosive point in time and presented in a new garb. One thing that is new is the desire to move forward outside of the bureaucratic EEC framework: because EUREKA touches the military area and because countries like the veto-happy Greece are not necessarily desired--a ticklish point for the FRG, as is the eternal question of the financing.

Initially, however, the Paris proposal is nothing more than an idea. "EUREKA is like a red cloth with which the torero diverts the bull," says a French officer. In other words: Mitterrand formulated an answer to SDI that is not an answer, so as to gain time for himself and other Europeans. The Americans see it the same way. It is to be desired that Mitterrand's coup will advance the technological cooperation in Europe. But he is not freeing the Europeans from their task of jointly defining their position on SDI.

#### Spin-Off Gains Said Doubtful

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 26 Apr 85 p 4

[Article by Christoph Bertram: "A Peckoning From Abroad: What Will Participation in the American Program Bring?"]

[Text] Lt Gen James Abrahamson, chief of the American Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), otherwise a coolly calculating and circumspect man, was almost raving with enthusiasm: "The computer, communications, propulsion and laser

technologies of SDI present enticing and important spin-off opportunities for the civilian area."

Spin-off, the evaluation of military technological knowledge for the civilian or commercial area of the economy, is indeed the most important enticement of SDI. "We must be interested in making research results that will have revolutionary effects in civilian applications useful for our economy as well," said Federal Chancellor Kohl in a government statement last week. To be sure, the chancellor added: "It will...be important for us that a possible future cooperation (with the United States) guarantees fair partnership and the free exchange of knowledge, does not remain a one-way street, secures for us a self-contained research area and thus allows us to influence the overall project."

But the expectations and conditions that are formulated with so much emphasis here are still by no means on solid ground but may be built on sand. That begins with the hope for the tempting spin-off. Skepticism prevails in the case of the large technology enterprises. Siemens did not even send a representative to the briefing that was recently given in Bonn by General Abrahamson. Even in the United States, it was not the technology giants but above all the enterprises that are already dependent upon the arms business that have competed for contracts for the SDI program.

To be sure, a completely new research area can often be successfully stimulated by massive funding from the defense budget. But as subsequent research steps are more and more specifically oriented toward military needs, there is less spin-off. The decisive reason: research with a military connection aims precisely at military and not civilian projects. Even in the analysis of the spin-off from the military to the civilian American space program, a 1981 study of the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress comes to a sobering result: because of the usual and understandable secrecy in the military area, the priority of military applications, and the limited incentive to pass on the results that have been achieved, the exchange of technology between the Pentagon and NASA has been slow in coming about--even though both are public organizations!

Although for 20 years the Pentagon's share of public expenditures for research and development has been rising rapidly--from an average of 38 percent in the period 1960 through 1973 to almost 70 percent today--the great technology dividend for the American economy was rather modest: in the competition for market shares, the high-tech industry has continually had to accept losses to Japanese and European firms.

Ten to one--that is the sober rule of thumb in Bonn's Ministry for Research and Technology for the commercial spin-off from military programs: only one-tenth of the expenditure benefits civilian applications--not even half as much as Lothar Spaeth richly suggests. In the case of SDI, research in super-fast computers would certainly be interesting for the FRG. But there is no civilian demand and no market for the highly developed systems that are to make possible the defense against missiles over thousands of kilometers in a matter of seconds. The expectation of these "revolutionary effects in civilian use" that the SDI research program is supposed to bring is based not upon cool analysis but upon vague hopes.

So far, it has been no different with the second requirement for German participation in the American research program: "fair partnership and free exchange of knowledge" with the United States. It is already certain that one can speak of a true "two-way street" only when the Americans do a 180-degree turn around.

The experience with Spacelab, the German addition to American space operations, is not exactly encouraging. The Europeans originally wanted to enter into the U.S. Shuttle Program much more ambitiously through the construction of the liaison vehicle Spacetack, a main element of the project. But the American side soon turned thumbs down. Spacelab, on the other hand, is only an appendix that is not decisive for the overall success of the program. In exchange, the Europeans did not get to see the overall research results of their partner but only the data needed for their portion.

And neither does the new Columbus Project involve an integral component of the planned American space station; its functioning will not depend upon the success of the European operation. To be sure, NASA has approved a general technology transfer but only to the extent that American laws allow it. That means, however, that every single transfer, even of research concepts, requires the approval of the Pentagon.

The American position is not incomprehensible. The more financing the Pentagon gives to research, the more it wants to control it as well. And can the Europeans blame the Americans if they, who are bearing the financial lion's share, also want to reserve the technological benefit for themselves?

Something else is probably even more important: America has absolutely no tradition of joint research projects with other countries. There is a lack of fundamental inclination toward the give and take of a partnership.

Will America now change its position with respect to SDI of all things so as to make participation palatable to the Europeans? Will President Reagan really make his favorite project dependent, for better or worse, upon the performance capability of European technology? It is more likely that Bonn's conditions will remain unfulfilled. The question is then whether the Federal Government will allow itself to be pushed back onto the familiar one-way street of transfer. Heiner Geissler has already prepared the retreat: a refusal to participate in the American research program is, according to the CDU general secretary, "morally unallowable." EURECA!

9746

CSO: 200 2600

SPACE ARMS

AUSTRIA'S KREISKY DISCUSSES REAGAN'S 'STAR WAR'

AU151249 Vienna Domestic Service in German 1050 GMT 15 Apr 85

[Edgar Sterbenz report on 15 April Vienna press conference by former Chancellor Bruno Kreisky]

[Text] Former Chancellor Bruno Kreisky today reviewed the international political situation, from "star wars" -- and thus in his opinion the imminent danger of war, -- through the State Treaty anniversary, to an analysis of international crisis. In the former chancellor's opinion the world is on the brink of a space war because, he said, it is inconceivable -- and U.S. scientists had assured him so -- that the United States could obtain an irrecoverable lead in the development of an antimissile system in space because the Soviets would keep up with "star wars." Without specifically mentioning President Reagan, Kreisky said he greatly distrusted a certain politician's ability to make decisions and judgments. Against this background, he said, he had decided to become active for peace.

[Begin Kreisky recording] The famous saying about wars being such a serious thing that they should not be left to the generals alone, has been generally accepted, and it has also been accepted among politicians that wars must not be left to the politicians alone. There must be many endeavors which remind the politicians of their political mortality, if they do not employ a measure of caution in their utterances. Indeed one becomes most undependable when he says, as he did a half year ago, that the Soviet Union is the evil empire, that is, if he tries to provide an ideological motivation for his policy. Then, a few months later, on the occasion of the death of one chief of the dictatorship and the taking over of power by another, he uses language that is completely unrelated to reality. To believe one can change the mind of the new man in the Kremlin by such talk, that he would be flattered by this would be downright naive; if he were indeed such a man, he would certainly not have been picked for this office, that is quite clear. The lack of experience existing in this respect is downright disastrous, because one simply fails to see the reality properly, makes mistakes, and completely overlooks the fact that an economic policy aimed at a boycott proved unsuccessful as long as 50 years ago. [end recording]

Why are peace research and peace education important in Bruno Kreisky's opinion?

[Begin Kreisky recording] People working for peace must be supplied with appropriate arguments. There is such a lot of lying going on: For example, the biggest lie in this whole campaign is that of the military inferiority of the United States. It is incomprehensible, this assertion on which the whole system is built. This assertion can be refuted by a report of the CIA about the arms situation in the world -- I will gladly place it at your disposal -- in which the CIA declares that there is U.S.



superiority in all fields with the exception of three or four sectors which, however, are not very important. Thus, it is necessary to provide such information to the public to refute the main argument: What can we do, we certainly need a balance. I am for the balance [of forces] too, but it must be a correct balance. I certainly do know that in international politics one cannot arithmetically determine a military balance -- but there are other criteria to judge it, and it is necessary to be well-informed. And he who wants to work for peace must show interest and seek to obtain arguments he can use. [end recording]

In conclusion, some brief quotations from Kreisky statements: The Lebanon war is Israel's Vietnam; terror never justifies counterterror; the European peace movement deserves credit for having destabilized the European democracies; and he, Kreisky, welcomes everything that brings some movement into rigid conditions.

CSO: 5200/2606

SPACE ARMS

FRG MINISTRY OFFICIAL: EUROPE NEEDS 'CLEARLY DEFINED' SDI ROLE

LD291117 Hamburg DPA in German 1013 GMT 29 Apr 85

[Text] Bonn, 29 Apr (DPA) -- Research and Technology Minister Heinz Riesenhuber (CDU) believes that the Europeans should take on an independent, clearly defined task in the U.S. research program for the Strategic Defense Initiative. A Research and Technology Ministry spokesman said today that a relevant article in the latest edition of DER SPIEGEL is "correct in its slant."

However, it is not true that the Federal Cabinet has already adopted concrete resolutions. The subject was merely discussed by the Cabinet in connection with the new Defense White Paper.

For research reasons Riesenhuber is against the Washington Defense Department's considerations to involve individual European firms by placing orders for the research program directly with them. The research minister fears that such a procedure will lead to a 1-sided technology transfer favoring the United States.

However, if the European countries are to take on a clearly defined task then the findings on new technological developments could also be made available to the Europeans. Riesenhuber considers the independently developed European Spacelab as the most successful example of this. Another similar example is the planned European contribution to the U.S. Columbus space station which, manned permanently, is to be launched into space in the early nineties. The Research and Technology Ministry spokesman underlined, however, that first of all a politico-military decision on participation must be taken. Until now the ministry and its minister have been very restrained in their comments on the controversial SDI participation since it is not within their jurisdiction.

CS0: 5200/2606

SPACE ARMS

FRG TV COMMENTARY ON AIRCRAFT ID SYSTEM, SDI

DW151105 Cologne ARD Television Network in German 2030 GMT 12 Apr 85

[Walter Frassmy commentary]

[Text] We Germans are apparently not successful with the radar technology which, invented under the designation "radio range finding" in Germany in the thirties, was intended to be used against allied bombers during World War II. It is generally known that the British quickly found out that the German radar could be neutralized by using strips of tinfoil.

They subsequently developed a system of their own that they called radar, that was more accurate and that was decisive in the war. The British secret was a shorter wavelength than that of German variety.

We are apparently out of luck again with the IFF (Identification friend/foe) system developed by Siemens, even though this system, named Capri, reportedly is technically superior to the U.S.-made Mark-15 system. Experts agree that the Capri system is a high tech product that refutes the accusation that German industry is lagging behind the United States and Japan in the field of electronics.

However, what is the use? The United States is calling the tune in NATO, and whenever money is involved, the Americans are unyielding businessmen. I am afraid that the U.S. arms industry will make their military people toe the line with the following argument: Why should we throw money into the Germans' hungry maw when our economy is right at hand? This was evident several years ago during the discussion on the Leopard tank and its possible introduction in the U.S. Army.

Defense Minister Manfred Woerner denies that he has committed himself, and we should believe him. Still, the question remains whether he has been too acquiescent in the face of both the European allies and the Americans. I am afraid that little can be salvaged when the defense committee meets in Bonn next week.

I do not believe in substituting U.S. products for German and European military equipment, as Manfred Woerner sees it. I even think that we must be cautious with respect to the development of the American SDI in which German and European scientists and engineers are supposed to cooperate. Much to my regret, I must say that I am afraid that unless we remain firm, later we will be allowed to supply only the mess hall furniture for the space stations and then buy back from the United States the fruits of high technology.

CSO: 5200/2606

SPACE ARMS

JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER, FRG'S KOHL HOLD DISCUSSIONS

SDI Issue

LD301739 Hamburg DPA in German 1530 GMT 30 Apr 85

[Excerpts] Bonn, 30 Apr (DPA) -- Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone consider the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] research program to be justified, but attach a number of conditions to the realization of the program.

This is the result of an exchange of views of about 2 hours at the start of the Japanese prime minister's official visit. He arrived in Bonn today as the first foreign participant in the economic summit.

After the talk, government spokesman Peter Boenisch said that Kohl and Nakasone had expressed the view that no unilateral predominance should be striven for in pursuing the research program. The concept of deterrence must also be maintained as long as there is no alternative to it. It is important for the research to take place only within the framework of the ABM treaty. Moreover, consultations with the Soviet Union prior to later development and production of the researched projects are indispensable.

In a speech at a dinner which he gave this evening at the Bad Godesberg Redoute, Kohl referred to these problems again: "We are in favor of any examination of alternatives to safeguard peace and prevent war, as long as there is the guarantee that through this, strategic stability between East and West is increased," he said. Linked with this also is the hope that security policy will become more independent from nuclear weapons. Forty years after the end of World War II the task has fallen to Japan and the Federal Republic to contribute their responsible share to world peace in their respective regions.

According to informed sources other topics were East-West relations, the situation in Asia and economic developments. Kohl and Nakasone expressed the view that at the Geneva disarmament negotiations everything must be done to achieve success. They were both in favor of a summit meeting between President Ronald Reagan and new Kremlin chief Mikhail Gorbachev. The intensification of cooperation in the Pacific region between Japan, the ASEAN countries, Australia, New Zealand and the United States was welcomed. China's policy of opening up was being attentively followed. Bonn and Tokyo were interested in further development of their relations with Beijing.

In the discussion of the economic situation, which was the focus of the talk, Kohl pointed to the need to deal with unemployment through the promotion of research,



investments and the founding of new companies. Nakasone touched on the subject of the Japanese export surplus, which amounted to \$40 billion, the greater part of which was with the United States. In view of this development, Kohl and Nakasone expressed concern at increasing protectionist trends and approved a further opening of markets. They stated their interest in the new GATT round.

In their dinner speeches this evening, Kohl and Nakasone also referred to the 40th anniversary of the end of the war. Kohl said that Germans and Japanese jointly mourned millions of victims of World War II. Both peoples had learned from their terrible experiences the lesson that war and violence could not longer be a means of policy; "for this reason our two countries pursue an active peace policy," Kohl said. Nakasone said that the Federal Republic and Japan had arisen anew from the ruins of war. In the awareness of the harm and misfortune that Japanese and Germans had caused to many people, their states had been rebuilt in accordance with the principles of liberty and democracy.

Kohl reaffirmed the intention to strengthen FRG-Japanese bonds even more. The European-Japanese component in the triangle among the U.S., Japan, and Europe is still too weak. The goal was stable political solidarity among all three partners. In the economic sector he called for still freer trade under equal conditions of competition. In scientific and technological developments they should both give up national egoism.

During his official visit, which will be punctuated by the economic summit which begins on Thursday, Nakasone will also be visiting Berlin and Düsseldorf. On Wednesday he will make a trip along the Rhine with Kohl, between Bingen and Boppard, passing the Lorelei. This afternoon, Nakasone signed the Golden Book of the City of Bonn.

#### INF Discussed

LD301744 Hamburg DPA in German 1629 GMT 30 Apr 85

[Text] Bonn 30 April (DPA) -- In his talks with Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Nakasone stressed the indispensable demand that the problem of disarmament with regard to medium-range missiles be tackled on a global basis, and under no circumstances at Asia's expense. The Federal Ministry spokesman Hiromoto Seki told newsmen.

Nakasone had explained in detail his views on the economic situation, which he considered would remain very uncertain until late 1986. In order to make possible a "soft landing" for the world economy, the efforts to open up the markets must also be fortified by a new GATT round. Japan believed that the preparations for the GATT negotiations should be completed by the end of this year at the latest.

#### Joint Research

LD011000 Hamburg DPA in German 0904 GMT 1 May 85

[Text] Bonn, 1 May (DPA) -- Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone have expressed their support for joint research projects at the end of the bilateral talks on 1 May in Bonn. In a statement released at a press conference in the federal chancellor's office both government leaders pledged their allegiance to the principles of freedom, democracy, and peace. The

already successful technological cooperation is to be guided even more strongly "toward joint concrete research projects."

Kohl and Nakasone agreed on the necessity of strengthening free trade and dismantling barriers. The federal chancellor particularly welcomed the construction of a Japanese-German center in Berlin, which Nakasone intends to start with a visit to the divided city on 5 May.

Kohl, Nakasone: SDI 'Justifiable'

OW011159 Tokyo KYODO in English 1131 GMT 1 May 85

[By Shiro Yoneyama]

[Text] Bonn, May 1 KYODO -- Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl said Wednesday they both regard the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program proposed by U.S. President Ronald Reagan as "justifiable."

Winding up two rounds of talks Tuesday and Wednesday, the two leaders also said they have agreed that there should be close consultations between the two countries over the U.S. space-based defense plan, known as the "star wars" program.

Nakasone and Kohl said in a joint statement that Japan and West Germany have also reached agreement on the creation of a working group to promote an exchange of students, researchers and artists. Kohl said his government has picked a senior Foreign Ministry official to map out such an exchange program with Japan. Japanese Government officials said Tokyo will choose a representative in the near future.

During Wednesday morning discussions which focused on cultural exchanges, educational reform of both countries and bilateral trade, the West Germans called on Japan to purchase airbus aircraft, nuclear reactors and weather satellites.

A Japanese official said the Japanese and West German leaders also discussed approval of product standards and certification systems, and ways to open up capital markets of both countries.

The joint statement agreed by Nakasone and Kohl pledged efforts by the two countries to promote the start of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). But West Germany stopped short of agreeing to specify a starting date because Kohl apparently wants a full-scale debate on the issue during the summit, which will be attended by leaders of West Germany, Japan, the United States, Canada, Britain, France, Italy and the European Community.

After concluding two days of talks, Kohl and Nakasone went on a cruise on the Rhine.

Appearing at a joint press conference at the chancellor's office, both Nakasone and Kohl asserted that the SDI will not become a key topic of discussion at the impending seven-nation economic summit which begins Thursday evening. "Both of us have agreed that the SDI research is legitimate," Kohl said through an interpreter. He also added that he and the Japanese premier agreed on the need to learn more from the United States about the SDI.

Asked by a West German reporter about Japan's official position on the SDI, Nakasone replied that he "understands" Reagan's January 2 explanation about the space-based anti-missile plan. Japan plans to make a formal decision on whether to participate in the SDI research after being fully briefed by American officials, the prime minister said. Nakasone went on to call for further strengthening of Western solidarity so that the West would not be undermined by a potential adversary, although it was not immediately clear if his statement was meant to encourage Western Europe's participation in the "star wars" research.

It would be meaningless to hold full discussions during the economic summit about details of the SDI research when West Germany, France, and other Western European countries have different opinions and interests, Kohl explained.

During the Nakasone-Kohl meeting, a senior West German official was critical of Japan's selective approach to opening up its markets to imports, alluding to Japan-U.S. trade talks via a "market-oriented sector selective (MOSS)" formula, a Japanese Government source revealed. The source quoted the West German official as warning that such bilateral trade talks would further intensify protectionism in Europe.

CS0: 5200/2606

## GERMAN RESPONSES TO EUROPEAN SDI INVOLVEMENT THROUGH WEU

## WEU Seeks SDI Position

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 24 Apr 85 pp 1, 2

[Article by "fy": "No Agreement on Technology Cooperation Proposed by Paris—'No Substitute for Deterrence'"]

[Text] Bonn, 23 April—The WEU is trying to develop a common position regarding the American SDI program and participation in it between now and its next ministerial meeting in October. This was announced at the 2-day ministerial meeting in Bonn on Monday and Tuesday which was attended by the foreign and defense ministers of the FRG, France, Great Britain, Italy and the Benelux countries. Attempts to draw up a more detailed statement—particularly one incorporating a positive decision on French President Mitterrand proposal for the creation of a European technology community—ran afoul of British reticence. According to French Foreign Minister Dumas, reaction to the French proposal was satisfactory as far as France was concerned. [FRG] Foreign Minister Genscher agreed to the French suggestion for an early meeting of experts to discuss the chances of establishing such a European technological community. Dumas explained Great Britain's guarded approach to the proposal by saying that they were unwilling even to talk about a European technological community at this time and that they had no desire to be tied down on the SDI issue. In response to a question whether he thought that England gave preference to a special relationship with America in the development of SDI over membership in a European technological community, Dumas said that this was a matter of terminology. But he was also unable to give a positive response to the question of whether the WEU members had agreed not to reach any unilateral decisions on the SDI issue with America between now and the next ministerial meeting in October. The WEU rules of conduct, Dumas said, were not those of allowing or disallowing things.

Earlier, Foreign Minister Genscher had given an account of the final communique. The meeting had indicated, he said, that all seven members were committed to a new beginning for the WEU. The members also recalled the decision to make better use of the WEU and to coordinate the positions of the member governments on the actual security situation. The ministers



emphasized that there is "no substitute" for deterrence. They hailed the resumption of Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva and voiced the hope that an arms race in outer space could be prevented. Regarding SDI, the communique contains three sentences: "The ministers also discussed questions in connection with the research efforts concerning strategic defense. They agreed to continue their joint consultations with the aim of reaching an as closely coordinated reaction as possible to the invitation by the United States to take part in the research program and gave the appropriate instructions to the Permanent Council. In this connection, they stressed the importance of continuing bilateral consultations with their partners in the Atlantic alliance, terming them a major component of Allied unity."

In order to support collaboration in armaments, the ministers instructed the Permanent Council of the WEU to submit suggestions to the next ministerial meeting with the aim of providing the necessary stimulus to the appropriate committees. The French proposal for the establishment of a European technological community was mentioned in the communique only in the form of rather circumspect language. The ministers reiterated their resolve, the communique states, to strengthen Europe's own technological potential and thereby to achieve the creation of a technology community.

In order to achieve progress in the matter of reorganizing WEU, the ministers agreed to a reorganization of the WEU permanent armaments committee and to create three "agencies"—one to be responsible for disarmament issues; one for defense issues and one for collaboration in the armaments sector. They also elected Alfred Cahen, a Belgian, the new general secretary of the WEU.

#### Strauss Presses European SDI

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 23 Apr 85 p 2

[Article by "Fin": "Idea Is Not to Compete But to Supplement"]

[Excerpt]—Munich 22 April—CSU chairman Strauss has called for a "European strategic defense initiative." After a meeting of the CSU executive committee, Strauss declared that he did not have an undertaking in mind which would "compete" with the American SDI but one that would merely "supplement" it. The American outer space project "does not take care of all our problems," Strauss said. The "neutralization of the SS-20s," for example, was not assigned "any priority" in the American plans because the SS-20s did not pose an immediate threat to the United States. It was therefore up to the Europeans to defend against the threat posed by Soviet short-range and medium-range missiles. Strauss said he was not prepared at this time to speculate on the organizational "umbrella" for such an European initiative. "Does the Airbus have an umbrella?" he said in the form of a rhetorical question.

In any event, whether the Europeans liked it or not, the Americans would carry out their outer space plans—with which he was in agreement. Strauss criticized those whose response to the initiative was "yes, but" instead of "yes, and." Strauss said he was in favor of the American initiative because it probably "pushes nuclear weapons to one side, if it does not make them superfluous." But mankind should not delude itself. Somehow or other, the risk that nuclear weapons will be used will always be there, Strauss said, "as long as there are human beings" and these might come up with foolish ideas. Strauss also displayed his linguistic capabilities, saying that he considered it "wrong from the point of view of semantics" to use the term "nuclear deterrence" because people were only aware of the words "nuclear" and "terror" in that phrase without realizing the positive implications. It was just as wrong to refer to "Star Wars," he added, because it was not the stars warring on one another.

#### Industry's SDI Response Sluggish

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 25 Apr 85 p 5

[Article by "K.B.": "Business Delegation to Collect Information"]

[Text] Bonn, 24 April—In Bonn, talks are now in the preparation stage between the political establishment and the business community concerning the strategic defense system (SDI) being planned by the United States. Thus far, there has hardly been any contact between the Bonn government and the business community on this matter. Although the government—as Chancellor Kohl declared in his government statement on SDI—intends to deal with this issue primarily from the defense, foreign policy and alliance point of view, there is a perceived need to analyze the economic and technology policy consequences of German participation in this project. On Wednesday, the heads of the CDU/CSU working groups for defense, foreign policy, economic matters and research, Wimmer, Klein, Wisemann and Lenzer met with deputy chairman Ruche of the parliamentary fraction for an wide-ranging discussion of these issues. They did not deal with the issue itself as yet but decided that a parliamentary group would be instructed to do so. Industry is thinking of forming a delegation which is to gather information on the American project in the United States—particularly in talks with industry there.

Those industries which might participate in the project are trying to counter the impression which has arisen among the public that they are already busy obtaining orders. It is being pointed out that the SDI debate is still in an early stage and that many questions are still unanswered. This is also why Prof Beuker's, the Siemens board of directors representative responsible for research and technology, offered guarded responses to SDI queries by journalists during a visit to Bonn. Siemens as well as other firms is by no means "wildly" pursuing orders for the

SDI project, Beckurts said, adding that it was not as if German industry were waiting with bated breath for a technological impetus from this military project in outer space. A firm such as Siemens is faced with great challenges in civilian research and development which must be met, he said.

It will be some time—once the political decision on the project has been made—before it will become clear in exactly what way the German economy could take part in the SDI. If the Bonn government—after such a decision was made—should approach Siemens, Beckurts said, the firm would be prepared to cooperate although it has thus far participated in armament projects only to a minimal extent.

Based on the information available at this time, German industry might successfully participate in the SDI project in the field of optics, in fusion research, magnetic suspension technology and communications technology, Beckurts said. Given such examples of performance capability, he added, the debate about the German technology gap might finally be laid to rest.

Beckurts considers it unlikely that German firms will be given a substantial number of orders directly by the Pentagon. Not even German firms operating in the United States were receiving such orders directly out of the defense budget. If an order were placed directly in connection with the SDI project, this would be the exception rather than the rule, Beckurts said. Earlier, the Dornier Co had denied allegations to the effect that it was already engaged in direct talks with the Pentagon regarding orders for the SDI project.

#### Cruise Missile Defense Urged

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 23 Apr 85 p 2

[Article by "fy": "Dregger Fears Brain Drain"]

[Text] Bonn, 22 April—The FRG should act to supplement the American SDI program and develop defense systems against all those threats from the air which will not be covered by SDI, Alfred Dregger, the chairman of the CDU Bundestag faction, told this newspaper. This applied particularly to short-range and medium-range missiles, cruise missiles and, under certain conditions also to aircraft. The Bonn government, Dregger said, should query its European partners as to whether they would be prepared to participate in such an undertaking. He was thinking of France, England and Italy in particular in this connection. Such a program, Dregger said, is the "only alternative with any prospect of success" to a trend, condi-

tioned by SDI, which poses the danger that the FRG will fall even further behind the United States in science and technology. What makes it dangerous, Dregger feels, is that the Americans are placing research contracts in connection with their SDI research program with these German firms that seem qualified to do the job. This is profitable for the firms and not something to which the Bonn government was in a position to object. ~~ex. te~~ act against. But if these research contracts resulted in positive findings, there was a likelihood that the Americans would make the appropriate attractive offers to those German scientists whose work was of importance for the latter stages of the project, inducing them to come to the United States to work on the second phase of the SDI program. That second phase of the project, involving development of a space-based missile defense system, will take place in the United States exclusively, Dregger believes. The FRG, he said, would not profit from the private participation by German scientists or even entire teams of scientists in the SDI program because the Americans would see no reason to make any research findings obtained at their expense available to third parties—much less the know-how on which such research work was based. The net loss to the FRG would be that the most qualified scientists in this field would probably leave the country to work in America for a long period of time, if not forever. This type of bloodletting would be a serious setback to science and technology in the FRG rather than the step ahead the FRG is hoping for by participating in SDI, which is required, in Dregger's view, to keep up or catch up with advanced technology.

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CSO: 5200/2597



SPACE ARMS

SECURITY INTERESTS, ECONOMICS AT ODDS IN NATO SDI DEBATE

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 18 Apr 85 p 4

[Article by Jan Reifenberg: "Missile Defense in Space and the Security Interests of Europe/Prospects and Consequences of SDI Are Debated in NATO/German-French Cooperation"]

[Text] Brussels, 17 April -- The Europeans do not have too much time to reply to President Reagan's "strategic defense initiative" [SDI]. They will have to decide whether it serves their security interests to develop their own non-nuclear defense weapons in space for the protection of Western Europe, or whether to become limited partners in the planned American system which in the relationship between the two superpowers is to replace "reciprocally assured destruction" with "mutual security." There is no turning back, since American research for a missile defense system in space is in full swing. Nor would the U.S., as General Rowny, one of Reagan's special advisors on arms limitation questions, recently confirmed, accept a European veto, either in their negotiations with the Soviet Union or in connection with research for the SDI program. Washington's offer to the European NATO partners to participate in the research is always repeated with the addendum that protection of the Old World against the threat posed by Soviet SS-20 missiles might be feasible soonest of all. European scientists could likewise develop means for strengthening the conventional defense of the Central Front together with America, and in addition there would be new developments in the field of civil technology and research.

Unanswered, however, is the question as to when American secrecy in SDI research stemming from national security interests would hinder the further exchange with the European partners. Experiences to date in these areas cause many NATO experts to be cautious and also skeptical.

Already there is a debate in progress in the political and military headquarters of the alliance over the prospects and consequences of SDI, which revolves around pivotal questions for the security of Europe. For Reagan's plan to replace the balance of terror based on offensive weapons with defensive weapons of necessity means a departure from the defense doctrine valid in the past, on which NATO based its planning. The timing of this changeover will, to be sure, become evident only when Washington goes from the research to the development phase of SDI,

but the basic decision to proceed and the actively pursued research are not subject to change. SDI is America's new credo, and the plan is being carried out with the same intensity as every change in politics and strategy of the U.S. NATO required considerable time to change over from the doctrine of "massive retaliation" to one of "flexible response," which basically amounted to [permitting] a pause before the employment of strategic U.S. weapons for the protection of Europe. Now, however, the European partners must decide in less time how they are to adapt to a fundamental change in American strategy.

If SDI is first of all an attempt to replace military destabilization--in view of the continuing development of Soviet offensive weapons--with a new stability between the superpowers, the question must still be asked, all American assurances notwithstanding, whether a balance based on the new concept would not render Europe unprotected to the extent that, without a defense of its own, it would no longer be able to rely on the automatic escalation up to the exchange of strategic weapons that is currently still in effect. The "primeval doubt" about this automatic sequence was the motive behind the development of the national French nuclear force, and probably also parts of the British nuclear forces. As to whether the development of SDI would make the key question (i.e., whether and at what point an American president would risk large areas of the U.S. in the protection of Europe) easier to answer, is a matter that is by no means settled for NATO experts.

The Europeans must therefore decide whether, for their part, with a large-scale research effort and applying their substantial knowledge in many areas, to develop a defense system of their own against the threat to Western Europe. Such contemplations are currently not being openly voiced, but it can be assumed that they are being considered, especially in France. Many European industries, to be sure--also prompted heavily by labor market considerations--are interested in participating in research relating to SDI and its civil offshoots. In view of American conduct in the past, however, there is also concern, shared by almost everyone in Brussels, that talented European researchers would be attracted in their work by the more promising environment of the U.S. Yet when one asks if this would not be the time to give Washington a joint European reply which would strengthen the alliance strategically and politically, the first response one gets in alliance circles is the statement that each partner must first reflect thoroughly on a national level how to answer America's invitation to take part in SDI research. No one goes so far as to state that a situation could easily arise in which Europe would be caught up between possible agreements of the superpowers, and would be still more vulnerable to pressure or extortion by the Soviet Union than in the past. With the tenacity which has become familiar from the decisionmaking process in an alliance of 16 sovereign states, taboos persist vis-a-vis deliberations which should really take place at this time.

The alliance is based on the American engagement for the protection of the Old Continent. In keeping with the formula once developed by Harmel, the objective is still to link a credible defense of Europe with the standing offer of arms limitation. But, many ask, is this still adequate in view of the new developments? During the next several months, the replies to America will take on concrete form, but only to the extent, to be sure, that Washington's own planning, theoretical at first, takes on clearer shape. It will be difficult to find answers not only because the link between defense and arms limitation

will be caught in the crossfire of Soviet propaganda and intimidation during the phase leading up to the first materialization of SDI components, but also because there is no truly joint European will. There is, to be sure, as can occasionally be heard in NATO circles, the sound German-French cooperation. And here the question is to what extent this can be utilized for the good of mutual research on modern defensive weapons, without France's abandoning its policy of retaining national control of nuclear weapons and without the FRG's violating its obligation to renounce the possession of nuclear weapons. That all this should take place in cooperation with America is likewise not disputed by those who are giving serious thought to a European form of modern defense.

12689

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## BONN GOVERNMENT GIVES CONDITIONAL SUPPORT TO SDI

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 19 Apr 85 p 6

[Article by C.G./fy: "Conditional "Yes" of the Federal Government to the Strategic Defense Initiative/The Opposition Sees Differences in the Position of the Coalition Parties/The Strategy Debate in the Bundestag"]

[Text] Bonn, 18 April 1985. "In the foreseeable future, the FRG will have to reach a decision whether to participate in the American research project for a space-based missile defense system," Federal Chancellor Kohl announced in the Bundestag on Thursday. "In making this decision, we will not permit ourselves to be put under pressure, timewise, but instead will create the basis necessary for reaching a decision." To this end, three steps were planned: The FRG government would discuss the possibilities of an involvement in the research with German industry and in the process also give particular attention to cooperative European efforts. In addition, the government would confer with interested European allies--particularly with France, England and Italy--about a common stand and "possible participation." And lastly, the Federal government would send a group of experts to Washington to investigate the conditions and sectors for research involvement. "In addition, I will discuss this topic with President Reagan during his state visit in the next few days," said the Chancellor.

In his state-of-the-nation address, Kohl labeled the research program launched by the U.S. in connection with the strategic defense initiative [SDI] as justified. It served the interests of the West. SDI would make it possible to gradually replace the currently still necessary deterrence through the threat of reciprocal destruction by a strategy based more on defensive elements and which to a large extent would permit the disarmament of atomic weapons. "No one knows today if this wish will come true." A negative decision at this time, however, said Kohl, "would not do justice to the responsibility which we must bear for the future of our country." However, the Chancellor specified conditions of the Bonn government: "The strategic stability between East and West and the unity of the alliance in political and strategic respects must be assured." The NATO strategy of flexible response must continue to be valid for as long as there is no better means for preventing a war. Vis-a-vis Washington, the FRG government would "steadfastly support the view" that America's SDI must above all be of significance for armament control: "A drastic reduction of nuclear offensive systems on both sides continues to be our primary objective."



The deputy leader of the SPD caucus [in the Bundestag], Ehmke, replied that the state-of-nation address was characterized by uncertainty. According to him, Kohl had evaded the issue that mutual security "was a political problem and not a military-technological one." Reagan's proposal was not political but belonged to the realm of military technology. Nothing remained of Reagan's original rejection of the strategy of deterrence. Rather than make plans for space, Ehmke said, one should reduce the number of offensive weapons. Reagan's program would not offer secure protection; it would lead to a mixture of offensive and defensive weapons, but not to the replacement of deterrence. The SPD party did not want any American or Soviet space weapons, he said. There was the threat of an armament race and the danger of "accelerating the militarization of space." That would of necessity render the armament control negotiations more difficult. It could then come to pass that the negotiations in Geneva would in the final analysis only have served both sides for producing ever more powerful offensive weapons in order to bolster their negotiating positions.

Ehmke doubted that the U.S. would seek a "cooperative solution" jointly with the Soviet Union. The SPD shared Kohl's hopes that space weapons would be rendered superfluous by the course of the Geneva negotiations; this was not Washington's position, however. America's space plan would decrease the security of Western Europe and increase the danger of a war limited to Europe. "The American offer of participation in the research should not be accepted." Ehmke based this rejection on the fact that Europe should not permit itself to be "burdened with the political co-responsibility for SDI" and "to be drawn in by the lure of research." Ehmke called upon scientific agencies and industry to oppose a "militarization of basic research." Defense Minister Woerner had already demonstrated that the FRG was on a one-way street with respect to technology transfer to the U.S. It would not be clear where research for space weapons ended and development began. Instead of this, the SPD was proposing its own civil research program of Western European nations and subsequent cooperation with America in extended, but not military, sectors.

CDU/CSU caucus leader Dregger felt that it would be a "tremendous step forward for humanity" if one succeeded in basing the preservation of peace not on the capability for mutual destruction but on the capability of each side to protect itself against destruction. The SPD was already so biased that it could only think of the current military interests of the Soviet Union and in the process was forgetting the security of its own people. Dregger reminded his listeners of the Soviet killer satellites. It must be averted that the Soviet Union, as with the SS-20 missiles, also surprises the West with the development of space-based missile defense systems of its own, without the West's being capable of creating a counterbalance. Otherwise, the West Europeans would soon be victims of military blackmail by Moscow.

Dregger spoke out in favor of participating in research work, since only then could the specifically European interests be brought to bear. Modifying his position, he stated: "We can participate in the research work only if the technology transfer does not go only in one direction; we favor involvement in research, but only under fair and mutually advantageous conditions, also in technological and economic respects." If and to what extent the Europeans could participate in the military utilization could be decided only when research results were available.

The rest of the debate served to bring out the divergent positions of the two coalition partners vis-a-vis the SDI program. While CSU Representative Count Huyn affirmed the SDI program and German participation therein even more clearly than Dregger, and in the process also pointed out that the churches, too, were anxious to have security assured by a means other than nuclear deterrence, and while the defense policy spokesman of the CDU, Wimmer, welcomed SDI as an urgently needed signal by America which should make clear to the Soviets how unsuccessful their threat efforts were, such statements were missing from the speeches of both Foreign Minister Genscher and FDP Representative Schaefer. Genscher hardly addressed himself to SDI directly. Instead, he expressed his conviction that security could only be a product of arms control and disarmament negotiations such as were being conducted in Geneva. Not only individual weapons systems were involved in Geneva, he said, but rather a concept of lasting assurance of peace on the basis of dialogue and cooperation. This would only be possible if the legitimate security interests of all, as well as all issues and points of view, were taken into account.

The foreign minister spoke of the necessity of recognizing the same right to security of all states. The strategic unity of NATO must be preserved. A striving for superiority must be renounced and equal rights of the Soviet Union and America must be accepted by both sides as a prerequisite for strategic stability. SDI raised future-oriented questions of fundamental significance and should therefore not be discussed emotionally. The ABM treaty would permit the American research. An assessment of the program was not attempted by Genscher with the remark that it would be a long time before reliable answers to the questions raised by the program would be possible. The discussion in the U.S. also showed, he said, that opinions about this plan were not yet unanimous. For that reason, there was not the slightest reason for a definitive assessment by the FRG government. Genscher, too, pleaded for a joint and unanimous European reply to the American cooperation proposal. Equal rights and parity were desired, he stated, not a Europe of sub-contractors and licensees.

SPD Representative Karsten Voigt took up this divergence in assessments. Dregger had spoken out in favor of SDI, while Genscher, assuming he took his own misgivings seriously, would have to oppose it. For he [Genscher] was closer to the position of the SPD than to Dregger's chauvinism. In his concluding remarks, he voiced the opinion that Count Huyn and Schaefer, Dregger and Genscher were poles apart. This was an expression of the paralysis of the government and would make the appropriate representation of German interests impossible. Genscher, in his concluding remarks, endeavored to counter this charge, but he did not in so many words contradict the assessment of Voigt. Instead, he limited himself to the assertion that in his state-of-the-nation address Kohl had the support of the entire coalition.

Representative Schaefer (FDP) stated that one would permit neither Swabian nor Bavarian "technology freaks" to force one into SDI, but one would likewise not be impressed by those for whom any means for defaming America were acceptable. Until it became clear what German involvement in this program would really mean, a decision would be impossible. Whoever recommended opposition to the program would have to realize that by so doing he would change nothing at all

in the realization of the program, but instead would only deprive himself of every opportunity for influencing it. Count Huyn then expressed his amazement that Schaefer's speech had contained nothing about the yea-vote for SDI which was contained in the jointly passed resolution. The deputy leader of the CDU caucus, Ruehe, who was the last to speak, attempted to emphasize what the two caucuses had in common. All were in agreement that the SDI research program was legitimate and also appropriate in view of the Soviet research.

For the Green Party, Representative Lange had stated his conviction that for Bonn the road to SDI could only be disastrous. The only admissible criterion in judging this program was the question whether it would, or would not, make war more likely and feasible. SDI was no defensive measure, however, but was part of the American effort to gain the capability for nuclear warfare by the late 1990's by depriving the Soviets of the second strike capability and in this way forcing them to accede politically. He supported the proposal that an international satellite agency should launch observation satellites into space. In this way, all armament and disarmament steps would be placed under international control, the strategic security of all states could be stabilized, and the major powers deprived of the information monopoly they now enjoy.

12689

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SPACE ARMS

GERMAN APPREHENSIONS, RETICENCE ON SDI ISSUE ANALYZED

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 19 Apr 85 p 1

[Commentary by Christoph Bertram: "Clear Words Are Now Called For: Bonn and 'Star Wars': Half-Measures Hurt the Interests of Europe"]

[Text] It has already been 2 years since President Reagan first painted in the skies the vision of a turning away from nuclear deterrence, and America's allies--above all the FRG--are still uncertain about how they should react to it. And the chancellor's government statement this week on the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) has again confirmed just one thing: Bonn is not completely for the American plans but also not completely against them. The Federal Government wants neither to offend its powerful ally nor to be put in its pocket.

But Star Wars is more than just the whim of an old president who will be leaving office in 3 and a half years. The key word "Star Wars" stands for much more: for the in recent years greater and greater desire of many Americans for a change in the existing alliance strategy--away from security through mutual vulnerability, away from compensating for conventional military weaknesses through the threat of the application of nuclear force, and away from traditional arms control, which merely stipulates the rules for the arms race without attempting to question nuclear weapons in principle.

The federal chancellor is failing to recognize this when he still stresses that the Federal Government does not yet need to decide because the technical feasibility of the American plans is still by no means certain. For these plans are already having a political effect. The more zealously they are pursued, the harder they would be to stop later. The less critically they are now accepted in America as well as by the NATO allies, the more effectively they will block any compromise at the Geneva negotiations. And the more technical is the debate, the more certain it is to by-pass the actual political problems. Cooperation in the alliance, Richard von Weizsaecker recently warned justifiably, ought not to be "determined, formed and guided by technological viewpoints."

There is a political intention behind America's technical efforts, and it must be evaluated politically rather than technically. It is, after all, not the first time in the history of NATO that America is rethinking its nuclear doctrine. Again and again, Washington was concerned with avoiding a situation



where in a conflict the United States could be forced into the automatic use of nuclear weapons and thus into nuclear suicide. At the end of the 1950's, that was the reason for turning away from the strategy of mass retaliation. The result was the NATO concept of "flexible response" still valid today. It was the motive behind the search for "selective operational options" in the 1970's. And today it is still a substantial impetus behind Ronald Reagan's Star Wars plans.

But in contrast to the adaptations of the past, which always remained true to the principle of deterrence through retaliation, today Reagan has a true revolution in mind. Through antiballistic defense, nuclear weapons are to be made harmless and therefore superfluous. But a goal is thereby formulated that must even now shake the foundations of the Western alliance, long before technology has caught up with Reagan's dreams. Heretofore, Europe's security has depended upon the fact that conventional defense can rely on the potential threat of the strategic use of nuclear weapons. That would no longer be the case if the Soviets as well as the Americans could protect themselves against each other's strikes behind a missile wall. And heretofore it has been the case that the arms race should be curbed through East-West agreements. But such agreements would hardly have any chance if the race for antiballistic defense necessarily stimulates the race for better offensive weapons as well.

Reagan's space defense is the first step toward an American nuclear doctrine that would not be compatible with the interests of Europe--technology or not. Here lies the actual reason for the FRG's difficulty in frankly acknowledging its concern about the protecting power America. Bonn's leading politicians, not just those in the opposition, do indeed see the dangers involved in the Reagan plan. But so far they have not been able to decide to advise Washington in all friendly candor against the project.

Instead, the Americans are given the burden of proving that the antiballistic defense is not leading to an uncoupling of Europe's security from America and that it is not endangering strategic stability--although it is difficult ever to provide this proof. Instead, they are warned against departing from the deterrence doctrine, but how are we to keep President Reagan from doing so if we cannot articulate our concerns clearly? And instead, there are bashful appeals that the Geneva talks not fail because of SDI, even though the opposite is now probable. The Europeans are trying to give each other courage but so far they have been afraid of candid and clear words.

That is not all. Through its openly displayed eagerness for any possible technological dividends from the U.S. research program, Bonn is also in danger of further undermining the credibility of its political scruples as well. The entire half-baked discussion about a participation in American space research is leaving behind the fatal impression that none of our political concerns is weighty enough that strategic insight could not be bartered away for a lentil pottage of technological advantages.

Thus Bonn's caution easily appears as a negotiating tactic. "If we now go ahead and say that we are definitely participating in the research program, then we would sell ourselves too cheaply in the eyes of our friends in the



United States," is how Horst Teltschik, the chancellor's clever foreign policy adviser, recently stated it. But that, however, means: we will sell ourselves if the price is right. No matter whether in the end a participation program attractive for German industry results (for which the probability is slight at best), one thing has already been achieved through the discussion of West German participation in the Star Wars research: the political objections to the project have become less convincing both at home and abroad.

One can no longer even be surprised by such foolish statements as those of Bernhard Worms, top CDU candidate in North Rhine-Westphalia: "Anyone opposing participation in the SDI research today is going to have to put up with the unemployed of the 1990's." And no one should be surprised when President Reagan makes no secret of the fact that he did not even take notice of the speech of the British foreign minister, who recently called exemplary the strategic misgivings about Star Wars.

What should the Federal Government do?

Above all: it should not be too quick to give the battle up for lost but should recognize that even in America the discussion about the wisdom of the new doctrine has still hardly been concluded. No one knows what the research will bring. Congress is still far from approving the money for the program. The criteria by which the research results are to be measured someday have not yet been formulated. The Reagan administration is still observing the ABM treaty with the Soviet Union, which prohibits both sides from having antiballistic defense in space. The open debate in the United States allows the allies to influence the decision process in America. We should not resign ourselves and lose this opportunity.

In addition, in Europe as well, Bonn would not stand alone with such an action. Especially Paris and London, the most conservative European governments in security policy, have heretofore been the clearest in articulating their uneasiness about the whole matter. No Green world reformer but General Rogers, NATO commander in chief, has warned that the realization of the SDI could lead to the uncoupling of America from Europe. If Bonn were to acknowledge its misgivings openly instead of concealing them behind ambiguities, then it would be in the best of company.

Of course, if the FRG wants to influence American thinking, it cannot press forward alone but can only act in the European union. For much too long, the Europeans have neglected to formulate common interests jointly and to present them in America. There may be an opportunity in this connection at the beginning of next week, when the foreign ministers of the West European Union--in addition to the FRG, other members are France, England, Italy and the Benelux states--meet in Bonn. To be sure, Washington has unequivocally warned the Europeans against working out their positions on strategy and arms control questions outside of the framework of NATO. But the foreign ministers should not let themselves be discouraged by this. In the long run, the alliance can prosper only when the Europeans are not too coy to be energetic in introducing into alliance strategy their own positions in questions central to their security.

Ronald Reagan's vision can only lead to a dead end. Even with a space shield, America will not be able to escape the inherent laws of the nuclear age. For the foreseeable future, there is no alternative to the double strategy: security through deterrence and through negotiations. The president's dream is a desperate attempt to run away from these inherent laws--at the expense of the alliance and arms control. Europe must oppose this. To be sure: the Europeans will not meet their responsibility with tactical finesse and the hope that time will show them the way.

9746

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SPACE ARMS

ATLANTIC BRIDGE TALKS REVEAL U.S., GERMAN ATTITUDES ON SDI

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 5 Apr 85 p.5

[Article by Ralf Zundel: "Together into Outer Space ?—German Hesitation, American Aggressiveness Paving Way to Next Crisis in Alliance"]

[Text] Germans and Americans met for an Atlantic Bridge session in Dallas, Texas to discuss common interests and divergences in their relations. The focus was on the controversy regarding the American government's plans for a missile defense system.

If the smartest brains in the Kremlin had tried to think up a perfidious trick aimed at putting German-American relations to a severe test, they could hardly have succeeded more brilliantly than Ronald Reagan with his plans for a missile defense system—also known as "Star Wars" or SDI, its military acronym. Wherever the political elite of the two nations may meet, the \$64,000 question always is: what is your stand on SDI ?

The Atlantic Bridge conference, where the political leaders as well as members of the business and scientific community of the two nations met for the 13th time running, was no exception. Experienced and successful in its efforts to cushion irritation in the German-American relationship by means of a network of personal relations and to promote understanding for the other side's interests and needs, the Atlantic Bridge inevitably turned into a marketplace of hopes and fears brought on by the favorite project of the American President.

It was no accident that the Atlantic Bridge, which had its origins in the close relationship between the American East Coast establishment and its friends in the FRG, broke with tradition and decided to meet in Dallas, Texas—not only because the political focus in the United States has shifted to the South and West but also because Dallas itself is conspicuous in mirroring the new underlying mood in the United States which in a certain way also inspires the SDI project.

## Glittering Facades

Here [in Dallas] new businesses are springing up and so is new wealth; they are growing rapidly and gigantically. Fantastic architecture is shooting up in this one-time no man's land: skyscrapers no longer squeezed into nondescript square lots, no longer box-shaped, but almost freely burgeoning like huge sculptures with exciting curves, marble-clad, with stylish undulations which are mirrored in glittering facades. The Jackson Pollocks in the high, white halls of the city's art museum almost seem like old masters. The Dallas of today is merely the beginning of the Dallas of tomorrow. The city fathers are saying that it will grow to twice its present size in 15 years' time; even richer, more fascinating and more powerful—"a city of winners."

"The American economy is like a racehorse galloping ahead of the field," Ronald Reagan said just a few days ago. "Other nations, paralyzed by high taxation and weighed down by the burden of excessive government expenditures have a problem keeping up. But our reaction to this cannot be to shackle the American economy." That same line of thinking is also behind the SDI program. But for all that, the European partners are not so sure they want to take part in this race.

It is here that two political cultures collide—despite all the friendship and the oft-cited commonality of values. The one has been taught by experience to shy away from risks, to aim for double or even triple guarantees, to be careful to the point of remaining immobile and the other which is carefree, certain of the future and willing to take risks. It is only natural that this leads to misunderstandings and problems. For the Germans, it is hard to grasp America's hectic policies which are based on shifting arguments and the Americans have difficulty understanding the dilatory hesitation of the Europeans and are readily inclined to interpret this as indolence rather than a manifestation of neurotic insecurity. "What exactly do you want from us?" one American asked. "We are supposed to provide you with total military security and at the same time you want us not to do anything that will jeopardize detente. You can't have both."

The fact is that the American arguments in favor of the missiles defense system in space which were put forward in Dallas are by no means free of controversy. There was GEN Abrahamson, for example, the SDI project director, reporting with the gentle urgency a Buddhist guru might use to proclaim the miraculous wisdom of the ineffable on the breathtaking possibilities of the new technologies. Then there was Fred Iklé, an under secretary in the Pentagon, going so far as to call the project a "turning point in the history of military strategy." There was Dick Cheney, a member of Congress from Wyoming, conjuring up a vision of a better world, free from the fear of nuclear war. For him, European participation [in SDI] was something of a litmus test for allegiance to NATO. "The people



of Wyoming" (where the new MX missiles are to be deployed which President Reagan recently got the Congress to approve) "have assumed their share of the responsibility," Cheney said, "and they are prepared to contribute their share to the price of peace."

As happens often enough in the case of such futuristic military projects—the HARP idea in the early sixties was a case in point—the critics see the most dire consequences ahead, calling the project a Pandora's box while its supporters look upon it as a bag of marvels. One of the newly discovered, marvelous consequences of SDI consists in the fact that it finally opens the way to escape the frightful paradox that effective deterrence must also take account of one's own annihilation—the magic word being "mutually assured destruction." This deterrence must be unstable was, Fred Iklé's verdict now. By constructing an accurate missile defense system, we are creating the possibility of getting around the existing argument for nuclear deterrence which public opinion in the democracies finds difficult to understand and to accept.

A deterrence strategy which is difficult to accept? It is this very charge, one of the Bonn participants remarked, which was the peace movement's main argument against missile deployment in the FRO. This is what we had to contend with and now this slogan is being taken over by American political leaders of all people. For another thing, it was easy to see that the world would have to continue living with the old concept of deterrence for a good many years longer. It might even be an illusion altogether—and a dangerous one at that—to pin such hopes on defensive weapons. GEN Abrahamson, too, spoke of a lengthy transition period with uncertain outcome.

Two different styles of representation and two different types of salesmanship were in evidence here. The one, promoted by Reagan himself, tries to acclaim SDI as a strategic turning point, leading to greater security. The other attempts to designate SDI as a "normal" research project necessitated by the efforts of the Russians—an unavoidable countermove in the missile chess game. Many of the irritations originate here—in Europe as well as in America. But it really is very hard to determine where research allowable under the ABM Treaty ends and where weapons development begins. And, inevitably, the point will be reached where research turns into production and technology turns into policy.

#### A Contentious Issue

American criticism, insofar as it is not of a fundamental nature (which was seldom alluded to in Dallas) follows two general lines of argument. The one school of thinking is that of the diplomats and the other that of the military practitioners. The diplomats do not doubt that there is a need to explore the possibilities of missile defense; but they fear that by overloading SDI with political hopes and expectations, it will turn into an unusually delicate and inexhaustible source of conflict within

the alliance. They are also worried that this conflict will present the Soviets with an opportunity to confuse public opinion in Western Europe—as they were able to do in the years following the NATO modernization resolution. They believe that new Kremlin leader Gorbachev and "Gucci communism" (alluding to Gorbachev's sophisticated style of dress) will be quite adept at this.

The military men are afraid, above all, that they will have to foot the bill for SDI. Of course they would be happy to take over some of the technological innovations which may emerge as by-products of SDI; but they are afraid that the concentration of inventive genius and financial resources on a new project might adversely affect present defense capabilities and that it would become even harder to get the funds for weapons and munitions; that the conventional buildup of NATO forces would fall by the wayside. They are therefore warning that vague visions of the future should not distract our attention from present needs. GEN Rogers, the American supreme commander in Europe, is quite familiar with this type of critique.

On the whole, however, the Americans are taking a far more positive view of SDI than the Germans. American reservations about the program center more on its political presentation, on keeping it within bounds and establishing the appropriate priorities. German skepticism is more pronounced and is based on different reasoning—which might also be attributed to the fact that Bonn did not invent the project. SDI is an American idea; it is an expression of resolute, American leadership. In that sense, it is different from the modernization program where the Europeans—and particularly the Germans—had to take the consequences of their own logic. The dual resolution, after all, was the result, in large part, of a Bonn initiative.

This leadership is not at all squeamish—at least insofar as it is personified by the U.S. Secretary of Defense. The opposition called it an "ultimatum" when Weinberger asked the Europeans to decide within 60 days whether they wanted to take part in the research project. And even the public statement by the Bonn government which positively hates to engage in a public controversy with Washington used language associated with the lower end of the spectrum of diplomatic courtesy. Weinberger's name was not even mentioned; but the statement did list all the conditions that would have to be met before the FRG would in fact participate.

The German position—this also emerged in Dallas—is determined by two considerations. On the one hand, there is a conviction that it will probably be both unavoidable and necessary to take part in the end—in order to give voice to the German interests in the development of future military strategy and at the Geneva talks and, for another thing, in order not to lose even more ground in the area of modern technology. Transfer of technology is the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow.

On the other hand, there is the fear that SDI will jeopardize the already endangered East-West stability even further, making peace even more insecure because now even one of the very last areas at least partially excluded from the arms race—the development of anti-missile defense weapons—will be within the military's grasp. The hoped-for transfer of technology—which is probably just an illusion anyway—would not offset the damage that would be done. The net result then: no participation in SDI.

Opposition to SDI in principle reflects the position of the SPD—as it also came out in Dallas, whereas qualified acceptance of the project reflects the government line. In Dallas, however, that line was subject to different interpretations. Defense Minister Woerner seemed to have very few reservations about the project, stating that the FRG government was ready to support the research program. Horst Teltschik, the representative of the chancellor's office, had a different story to tell. He merely held out the promise that Bonn would observe and evaluate the progress of the program. And whereas Teltschik said that a substantial missile reduction agreement at Geneva might make the deployment of missile defense weapons unnecessary, there was no such statement from Woerner.

Are these just nuances? They are an expression of different ways of looking at things. Woerner seems to have adopted the position of the American government that strategic developments are going in the direction of defensive weapons in any event and that this is not negotiable. Woerner's assumption is that the train has already left the station; the FRG government, for its part, is trying to figure out whether it is on the right track. Teltschik's circumspect statement, on the other hand, is a reflection of the realization that the presently available information—particularly with regard to technology transfer—is as yet insufficient. At the same time, it attempts to keep the Germans from being stowed into a freight car provided they have to tag along in any event.

Which is why SPD Bundestag deputy Voigt reached the conclusion that it was easier for him to go along with Teltschik's position than with the Iklé statements—and with those by Woerner, he might have added. In Dallas, the SPD spokesmen took on the job of presenting all these reservations to the Americans which the Bonn government officials are just as much aware of but which they do not state in open discussion.

Regarding transfer of technology, North Rhine-Westphalian minister of economics Jochimsen asked the Americans: "Are you really prepared to come through?" Horst Emske resorted to even plainer language. All previous experiences—with the Cocon list and with other transfer of technology restrictions—do not offer much hope, he said, that there would be a free exchange of information on, of all things, advanced technology for futuristic weapons. Furthermore, the ABM Treaty specifically forbids the transfer of defensive weapons technology to third countries.

### What About Money ?

Representatives of German industry were skeptical, too, saying that they have had their experiences with political restrictions on East-West trade and with protectionism in the guise of security policy. Former Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger then issued the following warning: If the offer to let the Europeans participate in the research is not serious, then it will only cause harm.

Hanke asked where the money for the project would come from. No provisions have been made for it in the [FRG] budget; not even the projected expenditures on joint Franco-German research projects which go into the billions are covered by the budget.

Would it not be simpler and more logical, the SPD representatives asked, to reduce offensive weapons rather than to try to render them ineffective with the help of a costly defense system of limited efficiency which would create new instabilities and new grey areas in addition ? They are afraid of the dynamism of the SDI project and expect that the DM 20 billion research program over 5 years will inevitably grow in size. But the greatest fear they have is that SDI raises the possibility of an attempt to couple the FRG with the U.S. military-industrial complex and to create firm structures of dependency which go beyond military protection and can no longer be dissolved—in short, power-dictated hegemonial policies.

What will become of SDI ? It is fairly certain that this project can no longer be stopped. The mechanics of the arms race make sure of that. But as to what it will turn out to be, there will be disputes for some time to come—as there were this time in Dallas. "SDI—I cannot bear to hear the word any more," one of the German participants said at the conclusion of the meeting. That will not help him at all. The genie is out of the bottle.

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CSO: 5200/2595



## UPROAR OVER SDI IN DENMARK AFTER FOREIGN MINISTER'S U.S. TALKS

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 18 Apr 85 p 20

[Editorial by 'V.S.': "The Pleasure of Rape"]

[Text] Talks in Washington between Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and his U.S. colleague George Shultz ushered in a new and bitter feud over Danish security policy early this week. Throughout the week, much has been said about Shultz levying the most severe criticism ever of Denmark's security policy. And Anker Jorgensen stormed that Uffe was to blame for this criticism of us.

With respect to Shultz's criticism, one might say that the chicken suddenly developed more feathers after Ellemann-Jensen met with the Danish press in Washington prior to his departure for Denmark last Saturday when he said that Shultz "did not criticize." Rather, the talks were said to be "an exchange of ideas between free democratic countries." It was also said that the United States "does not understand Denmark." The atmosphere was open, friendly and rather serious.

Had the minister of foreign affairs received history's biggest rebuke for Denmark's security policy, he certainly managed to conceal it very nicely. However, what he could not conceal was the frustration over being sent shopping with something he dislikes as much as the Danish Parliament's position on the U.S. "Star Wars" program--SDI. Of course, if the frustration becomes too much for him, he will have to resign.

On the other hand, it is mildly speaking pathetic when Anker Jorgensen says the reason the United States is cross with us is simply that Ellemann-Jensen was not able to state our position well enough. Anker Jorgensen cannot be very serious about his party's position on SDI if he feels the minister of foreign affairs ought to be able to convince Shultz the position has no merit.

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It is a rather controversial matter for the Reagan administration when a NATO country decides to dissociate itself from the Columbus egg it believes has been laid. No foreign ministerial charm could explain this away if it actually means anything to the stated opponents of SDI.

Furthermore, Washington knew very well prior to the arrival of the Danish delegation that the minister of foreign affairs does not agree with the parliamentary majority on this point. When it was announced that, besides paying a visit to the World Bank, Ellemann would also have talks with Shultz, a reporter for INFORMATION at the Danish office in the U.S. Foreign Ministry was told that the two foreign ministers were to discuss a SDI resolution "that had been forced upon the Danish government." Anker will probably say that Uffe called the United States and said the government felt the resolution had been "forced upon it."

The fact is that no such phone call was necessary and, with respect to this fact, the Social Democratic Party chairman might claim it was the foreign minister's fault that the United States knew ahead of time where the shoe was pinching. However, he probably cannot take all the blame because the United States also follows our domestic debate on security policy and no one can rightfully prevent the minister of foreign affairs from expressing his opinions to the Danish public. It is different, of course, when he goes abroad. But the fact that a Danish parliamentary majority opposes his stand does not reasonably require that he not discuss his well-known personal position on the matter. It would be something entirely different if he were disloyal to the majority, Denmark's official position. If the majority feels it cannot live with any of the proposed conditions, it has the duty to remove the minister of foreign affairs.

But perhaps the opposition is not that serious about its security-policy position either? Perhaps wicked tongues are correct when they claim that the big arm-waving in connection with security policy is supposed to divert attention from the fact that the opposition cannot come up with an alternative economic policy.

The Foreign Policy Committee's expected decision quietly failed to materialize as well. Many newspaper headlines assailing Ellemann-Jensen gave way to fewer and less bold headlines concerning the Foreign Policy Committee which failed to come to a decision. The meeting during which Shultz is supposed to have severely criticized our country lasted less than one hour.

Actually, Shultz could not have spent much time on the "unusually severe criticism of Denmark." It must have been done rather quickly. Indeed, it is true that the two foreign ministers were together for almost 4 hours, but only 30 minutes were spent in direct negotiations between the two. The rest of the time was devoted to a party on the training ship Denmark. During the 30 minutes, they also managed to discuss international affairs and bilateral issues, such as Danish ham exportation to the United States.

However, Ellemann-Jensen shall not be completely absolved. He does have the democratic right to his personal opinions on SDI. But the speed with which he sided with the United States is something else. We should be able to request of our foreign minister that he study a situation thoroughly before forming his own opinions. How in the world can he be positively disposed toward something the United States has not even been able to explain to us what it is? Obviously, Ellemann-Jensen is just as interested as the opposition in achieving results in Geneva. But you need not ask many questions of Americans about the SDI program before you get the dreaded feeling that Reagan's real agenda is the defense system which so far can only be characterized as an embryonic fantasy. Has arms control been removed from Reagan's agenda? This is an issue which Parliament and the Danish people must request that the foreign minister provide more answers to than just the United States' assurance that they will indeed be negotiating seriously in Geneva before he whispers to Shultz that the parliamentary majority's repudiation of SDI is foolish.

It is obvious that quite a few West European resolutions against the program cannot stop SDI research. It is already well under way at research institutions throughout the United States, and an SDI office has also been established in Washington to coordinate research efforts on the part of the navy and the army.

Because of this, however, the minister of foreign affairs should not be giving Washington the signal that what the Danish government really means is that when rape becomes a fact you should "lean back and enjoy it"—if Parliament will allow it.

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SPACE ARMS

SPAIN ANNOUNCES FORMATION OF SDI STUDY GROUP

PM251416 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 22 May 85 p 3

[Andres Ortega report: "Narciso Serra Announces in Brussels Creation of Inter-ministerial Study Group on 'Star Wars'"]

[Excerpt] Brussels — "The Spanish Foreign, Industry, and Defense Ministries are working within the framework of the SDI," according to Defense Minister Narciso Serra on his arrival in Brussels, where he attended yesterday's meeting of the NATO Eurogroup and where today he is to attend the Defense Planning Committee meeting. Spain's military officials have also ratified Atlantic defense plans through the year 2000, plans drawn up by the Atlantic alliance's Military Committee.

This is the first time the formation of an SDI study group has been announced in Spain, and it is expected to be extended to other ministries and sectors of industry and research, according to Spanish sources. So far, the only mention has been of a study group within the Foreign Ministry. However, in recent weeks delegates from the Defense Ministry, including General Angel Salas Larrazabal, have attended meetings in Brussels with General James Abrahamson, director of the SDI program. Narciso Serra answered in the affirmative when asked whether the SDI study is a coordinated interministerial one.

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SPACE ARMS

SPAIN'S GONZALEZ DISCUSSES SDI RESEARCH

PA300654 Mexico City EXCELSIOR in Spanish 13 May 85 pp 1 A, 10 A, 11 A

[Part three of a report on an interview with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez by Regino Diaz Redondo]

[Excerpt] Madrid, 12 May -- [Diaz] Mr Prime Minister, what is your opinion of the "star wars" [initiative]?

[Gonzalez] There is a great deal of talk about this and nobody knows anything specific about it. To begin with, for anyone who is not involved in this type of activity [ava-  
tares] it is difficult to understand it. This is hard to understand even for special-  
ists. This is what the North Americans say they are looking for -- and there is no  
reason to doubt it because this forms part of the history of mankind -- and most prob-  
ably the Soviets want it too. What they say they want is to overcome the so-called  
balance of terror. Ever since man was created, that is, since he invented the arrow,  
one prepared himself to invent the shield, and did so. The history of mankind is a  
history of the arrow and the shield constantly pitted against each other. Every time  
one discovers how to make a more powerful arrow the other one has to try to make a more  
powerful shield and also an arrow of the same or larger capacity to destroy.

Then, there was no shield against the nuclear warheads carried by the long- and medium-  
range missiles. There was simply the balance arising from the knowledge that if one of  
these warheads was fired it would result in other warheads being fired and in mutual  
destruction.

[Diaz] Is this the balance of terror?

[Gonzalez] This is the balance, the awful concept of the balance of terror. It is not  
reached because forces are identical and respect each other -- that too -- but because  
the capacity to destroy is complete and, consequently, terror is what controls, the un-  
leashing exerts control by keeping a conflict from being unleashed. Such a [degree of]  
aberration has been reached with regard to weapons development that, in order not to  
dramatize it too much, I say: Why is there a need to have nuclear weapons capable of  
destroying every vestige of life on earth 10 times? Those who are fond of nuclear  
weapons could be killed once to demonstrate the killing capacity of these weapons. It  
is enough for us to be killed once. We could devote the other nine times to something  
else. It is an enormous expense. Practically speaking, let them kill us just once.  
Let's devote the other nine times to other things.

Now, back to what we were discussing regarding an initiative for strategic defense or  
the so-called "star wars." This is in reply to a question that was asked and which the  
U.S. President explained to me and which he discussed with his technicians and staff.  
The question is this: Is it possible to have a screen or a shield that destroys nuclear

warheads before they can damage our territory? Is it possible to create a shield against that new terrible arrow? The technicians say: Yes, it is possible, research is to be carried out. A great deal of money is to be spent. After research, the system will be tested.

Of course, this presents very serious problems. The Americans say that technicians doing research are also convinced of what they are researching, regardless of what one or the other says. The difference is that the Soviets do research discretely. The research phase is not public, while the Americans begin their research by telling everyone about it. They say: We are researching this or that.

However, it is possible there is more advanced development. The United States is surely more technologically advanced than the Soviet Union.

[Diaz] Meanwhile, there is an imbalance, right?

[Gonzalez] I will give you my opinion. I think it is technically impossible to build a shield -- at least in the foreseeable future, let's say in 15-20 years -- so perfect as to prevent 2,000 nuclear warheads from being intercepted before landing. It might be possible to intercept 10, 20, or even 50 percent of them; it's all the same to me because the rest would be enough. With just four it would be enough to do great damage.

[Diaz] It would be enough if only one passed through the shield.

[Gonzalez] No, not one, but 4, 5, 20. It would be enough to wreak havoc in New York, San Francisco, and other cities. There is no longer a quantitative problem, but a qualitative one. We deal here with the destructive ability of one of those weapons.

[Diaz] Mr President, it has often been said that it is through crisis that we make progress in the world, not democracy. What do you think of this?

[Gonzalez] I think the two really move us forward. Of course, democracy does move forward. If we look at the Latin American continent, we cannot help but notice how democracy prevails. Now, we have a serious problem. The crisis can endanger democracy in some countries. I mean, I am convinced that political systems cannot be asymmetric. Every political system corresponds to a specific socio-economic response.

If this imbalance is too pronounced, then the democratic system can barely survive. Therefore, there has to be a certain symmetry between a proposal for liberties and the expected economic and social response.

The crisis advances. There are responses to the crisis also. I don't think the crisis will go on indefinitely, but it will last for a long time. This is a serious crisis because it coincides, not only with a downward movement that some relate to higher oil prices, but with an unprecedented technological revolution.

[Diaz] Mr President, will the Geneva disarmament talks make any progress?

[Gonzalez] The talks will last a long time. I think they can make progress. What we mentioned before -- the Strategic Defense Initiative from the Soviet viewpoint -- is an obstacle because they say that they are willing to discuss the reduction of long- and medium-range nuclear weapons that they describe as strategic and tactical. This is another of those whimsical descriptions because strategic weapons kill Russians and Americans, while tactical weapons kill Europeans. Strategic weapons seem to be more important. I think they are all the same. Well, we mean long- and medium-range weapons.

We are willing to negotiate this, provided the research on Strategic Defense Initiative is paralyzed. We will not separate the two; we must discuss them at the same time.

I think it is possible to assume reasonable stances to make progress because the research in strategic defense in space will take time. The fewer threats there are of atomic weapons, the less necessary will research and the implementation of the system be. This is obvious.

Common sense would then make one think that the Soviet Union would make some progress in its aspiration — its double aspiration to seek a peaceful solution, like the other side — by saying: Sure, we will drastically reduce nuclear installations and set up verification mechanisms. We will offer to have all possible control and verification mechanisms established in order to create a climate of confidence. Let's try to make as big as reduction as possible. If this reduction goes as far as to make nuclear installations disappear, the strategic defense strategy does not make any sense.

Let's say we can reason like this. The Russians still do not accept that. They say: The Americans want to make us compromise. The Soviets will never accept this. If they have a shield [escudo], there is nothing else to discuss. They will ask us to surrender.

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SPARE ARMS

HUNGARIAN PAPER ON STAR WARS DANGER, NEED FOR TALKS

AU281227 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 24 May 85 p 4

[Article by Peter Vajda: "Star Wars Danger"]

[Excerpts] The official propaganda in Washington calls it the SDI, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and the world press calls it the "star wars" program. The foundations were laid by the U.S. President, who, in his speech on 23 March 1983, called space "the last frontier" to be conquered by the United States, and declared that it is necessary to establish there in space a system of arms with which the United States can defend itself from the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles, by deploying an impenetrable "defense shield."

An extremely powerful opposition to this plan has emerged. One of the central issues of the U.S. debate is the feasibility and practicality of the plan, that is, the extent of realism in aiming to establish a 100 percent foolproof missile defense system that provides absolute security for the nineties, or for the turn of the century, for that matter. Another question is whether it is possible to create a system that provides adequate protection not only against missiles launched from silos, but also against submarine-based missiles, cruise missiles, and against all other nuclear weapons.

The majority of U.S. and Western scientists and researchers have given a negative answer to this question, claiming in part that certain elements of the missile defense system still belong to the realm of the fantastic, and in part that the deployment of such a system involves expenditures that cannot be borne even by the U.S. economy. All these are very plausible arguments; in other words, the creation of a totally impenetrable defense system seems indeed remote; this, however, does not reduce at all the danger inherent in the plans of the U.S. military leadership.

The "Partial Invulnerability"

The basic danger is that if they succeed in creating a system capable of destroying not all, but a great number of enemy missiles, this could provide an extraordinary temptation. Until now the fact that the "nuclear aggressor" prepares his own destruction, has not been questioned. Partial invulnerability — or even the illusion of it — however, is almost as dangerous as full invulnerability. This represents a temptation also to carry out a surprise strike with first-strike weapons, believing that the counterstrike of the enemy's remaining missiles would be weakened to such an extent that it would become bearable. In other words, a strategy would become predominant which starts from the premise that a nuclear war can be fought, because one "can get away with it," because the losses would be bearable.

We know that there are ideologists and theoreticians in the United States who consider the death of several tens of millions of Americans "bearable."

#### The 12th Hour

The other intention can hardly be separated from the one mentioned: It is expected from the development of new types of weapons that they will force the USSR to create similar or alternative weapons systems and thus engage in huge expenditures.

The more sober-minded Western experts are pointing out, however, that the USSR can perhaps succeed in making efficient countermeasures with less expenses. One can read about such examples in many professional U.S. publications.

The big question is, of course, whether we will be successful in avoiding the U.S. program on the militarization of space through political solutions. There is no doubt about the fact that this program has been started: In his latest interview, General Abrahamson promised genuine tests in 1987. To date, there is no precedent in the history of the arms race on halting a military program fully in motion. That is why we are at the 12th hour, and this — together with the extent of what is at stake — provided particular importance to the socialist diplomatic initiatives and to the Geneva talks.

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SPACE ARMS

BRIEFS

FRG CABINET SDI DISCUSSIONS--The Bonn cabinet today for the first time dealt with the U.S. SDI plans. Chancellor Kohl plans to deliver a government statement on this problem to the Bundestag Thursday. The United States had recently asked the European allies to participate in the research program. Bonn quarters said that there are still some objections to such participation within the Federal Government, the reason being that the Americans still have not explained what such a participation should be like and whether Washington is prepared at all to impart the technological findings to the partners. [Text] [Hamburg ARD Television Network in German 1100 GMT 16 Apr 85]

CSO: 5200/2591

**INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES**

**FLEMISH SOCIALISTS' TOBBACK REJECTS EUROMISSILES**

Brussels L'EVENEMENT in French Apr 85 pp 36-39.

[Interview with Louis Tobback, Flemish Socialist Party member of the House of Representatives, by Jean-Claude Ricquier; date and place not specified]

[Text] The youthful Louis Tobback is a hard-working, competent, radical but urbane member of the SP [Socialist Party (Flemish)], and as such inspires respect. He heads his party's group in the House of Representatives where his interpellations are dreaded by the government, heeded by the House membership, and extensively reported by the press. This is quite rare in a House where so many representatives indulge in doubletalk, a tactic to which they may indeed owe their very seat. Louis Tobback is one of the exceptions in this reductive system which ultimately alienates the general public from these legislative assemblies which it has nevertheless elected. In his interview, our assistant editor J.C. Ricquier centered his questions on those national defense issues of major concern to the current opposition Flemish Socialist Party. Louis Tobback's arguments relative to these issues are formidable in that he is also fundamentally determined not to support the next government if it fails to meet his demands for withdrawal of the cruise missiles.

Question: For more than 30 years there had been a consensus in Belgium on national defense matters. What prompted you to disrupt that general agreement?

Answer: But that consensus was a myth. It never existed. For the simple reason that in Parliament there was never any real discussion of defense matters. Yet the very notion of consensus implies that after wide-ranging debates on the basic issues involved, a general agreement takes shape, an agreement in which all political parties concur, even though some concessions are made. Such a wide-ranging debate never took place. When in 1974--and somewhat by chance, I might add--I became a member of the National Defense Committee, I noted that its discussions were practically limited to draftee

problems, such as whether one or two sons per family would be liable to compulsory military service, etc. In short, the committee discussed side issues.

In 1977, during the first governmental negotiations on which I kept a close watch, Andre Cools and Paul Vanden Boeynants had come to an agreement on defense matters before the party congresses were held. As a result, in those congresses the defense program was neither on the agenda nor even mentioned. Furthermore, later when the famous 30-billion franc "deal of the century" [purchase of F-16 fighters] was under consideration, Parliament did not examine the basic issue, namely that of our national security, but concerned itself solely with the contract's economic and industrial offsets! Hence don't talk to me about a consensus, and a fortiori about the SP having allegedly disrupted such a consensus. Even though I would have no qualms about disrupting it, one cannot possibly disrupt something that does not exist!

Question: That may be so, but the fact remains that it was when the socialists became an opposition party in 1981 that the defense issue came to the fore of the political debate.

Answer: Absolutely not. Back in 1976 when we were indeed in the opposition, I interpellated the defense minister at the time, Paul Vanden Boeynants, and stressed the point that we had to reexamine our military commitments or inexorably get ourselves into a situation where we could no longer financially fulfill those commitments. And I subsequently continued to hold that view even when we were in the majority. And I still hold it most strongly today at a time when the defense budget is the only one authorized to increase in real terms while all other budgets remain frozen. It is my firm opinion that where defense matters are concerned there are absolutely no grounds for the people's elected representatives to be reduced simply and solely to rubber-stamping policies established by the general staff, for which the only imaginable consensus is the one that consists in concurring, without discussion, in its views.

Question: You will admit, however, that your present position on the missiles completely transcends the simple budgetary issue.

Answer: Of course. Our position on this is as follows. We have opposed deployment of missiles on our territory ever since such action was first suggested. In our view, such deployment is terribly dangerous. Moreover, our consciousness of that danger has but increased with every passing day. Not to mention the risk these missiles would entail for us after their deployment. I believe that our position has not hardened. We have stated not only that we are against this deployment but also that if it were to become a reality, we would not join a new government unless that government pledged beforehand to withdraw the missiles from our territory. This is not a hardening of our position. It is the logical consequence of our initial stance.

Of course, if the first 16 missiles were installed by the time of the next elections, we would not demand their immediate removal as a condition of our participation in the new government. But we would demand that the remaining

[32] missiles not be installed. And we would refuse to continue our participation if removal of the first 16 missiles did not become effective within a reasonable period to be determined.

On the whole, I would categorically refuse to put myself in the position of the Liberals who after campaigning on a tax-reduction platform are still trying to obtain their first tax reduction after spending 3 years in the government.

Question: What specific danger to our country and our people do you perceive in the deployment of these missiles?

Answer: To make you understand how I view this matter, I shall use a sort of fable. Let us assume that we find ourselves in a situation akin to that of someone who has a neighbor whose garden is guarded by a ferocious Doberman pinscher, a dog who is especially ferocious because he is growing old. This neighbor with the vicious dog is the Soviet Union. I want to make it perfectly clear, however, that the proximity of this animal definitely worries me, and that I do not underestimate the risks it makes us run. So one of my friends, an ally, offers to lend me his Bengal tiger to protect me against the Doberman's aggressiveness. But this friend expressly asks me to let the tiger move freely about my garden. Yet my friend is the only one who can control the beast. I reject this defense system, this type of deterrent, because I believe it is sheer madness. In my view, it is fraught with even more risks than the situation it is supposed to remedy.

Question: When you say that the friend, the United States, is the only one able to control the beast, are you championing our national independence?

Answer: There is some of that, but national independence is a means. It is not an end in itself. What I have primarily endeavored to show you by my short fable about the Doberman and the tiger is something the SP has, in fact, been saying for years, namely that this deployment of missiles in the West is going to revive the arms race. This is already evident in the fact that the deployment [of cruise missiles] in Great Britain and Sicily has caused the USSR to increase the number of SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23 missiles targeted on us from bases in Czechoslovakia and the GDR. We have thus been drawn into the deadly system of mutually increasing threats of retaliation. There have never been as many offensive weapons in Central Europe as there are today. And these weapons are even more accurate and less detectable than heretofore. Consequently our current situation is more threatening than it was just a few years ago, and this despite the fact that we had been promised that the dual-decision system [of installing new nuclear missiles in Europe while also trying to negotiate limits on these missiles with Russia] would gradually ward off the threat to us.

Question: In your view, is this aggravation of the threat favorable or unfavorable to the resumption of disarmament negotiations?

Answer: It has long been our stated view that this aggravation caused by the cruise missiles will make negotiation practically impossible. Observation satellites are capable of checking and maintaining surveillance of certain

offensive weapon systems like the SS-20's or the French missiles deployed on the Albion Plateau. Whereas there is no possible surveillance of cruise missiles. Since this means control or verification of these missiles is no longer possible, on what do you expect to negotiate?

Question: But if the missiles were not deployed in the West, what assurance would you have that those in the East would not be deployed, or would be withdrawn?

Answer: This is a question that naturally comes to everyone's mind. Our view of the situation is as follows. We consider the deployment of missiles in the West as resulting from the American desire to "decouple" the U.S. defense system. I know that not everyone thinks as we do. I know that everyone chooses his own assumptions about this problem and then, without any doubt, develops his own argument based on those assumptions. In my opinion, however, the basing of missiles in the West leads to decoupling, in other words to separation of the security system. Indeed, I believe that a limited nuclear war--in Western Europe and Central Europe--is becoming conceivable I purposely do not say "possible" but "conceivable". Moreover, President Reagan did acknowledge this fact, even though he subsequently retracted his statement. We must realize that as long as a major power is aware that if it uses nuclear weapons it will itself receive the fallout from this use, then we are in a state of relative security. The fact is that this use is per se a deterrent. On the other hand, if this use were to cause fallout solely on others, the temptation to resort to nuclear weapons would thereby be considerably greater.

Question: But wouldn't this temptation be as great on the Soviet side as on the American side?

Answer: I am not sure of that. The Soviets know that if they use nuclear weapons, retaliatory strikes will fall upon their territory and not on the territory of their East European satellites. Hence while I do not believe that the Soviets are thoroughly well-intentioned, I do, nevertheless, very clearly perceive that they realize the victims of enemy reprisals will be their own cities and their own civilian population.

Question: If I understand you correctly, you suspect the United States of wanting to gain decisive military victories without itself taking the risk of becoming the victim thereof by retaliation?

Answer: I think that if I were in the United States' position I would try to obtain the same advantage. I remind you that this is exactly what the Soviets tried to obtain during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. In fact, they had no reason whatever, neither technical nor military, for installing launchers in Cuba. The threats the Soviets posed with their aircraft and submarines were definitely sufficient. But if they wanted to be able to pose their threats from terra firma, it was obviously so that any possible American response would be directed against Cuba and not directly against the USSR. We are now faced with the same theory: a nuclear attack launched from a third-party country is infinitely less risky than one launched from the country actually instigating this attack. Suppose, for instance, that the Soviets had used the rockets



they would have succeeded in basing in Cuba. Destruction in the United States would have been terrible, but not necessarily against the USSR, unless we assume that Washington had decided to start an all-out nuclear war. And that is certainly why President Kennedy did his utmost to prevent the basing of Soviet missiles in Cuba, even to the point of risking a world war. You will remember that he compelled the Soviet ships transporting the rockets to turn back before reaching Cuba. Well, it is my contention that Western Europe is currently in the process of becoming for the United States what Cuba could have been for the Soviets in 1962. I do not want that to happen and I will oppose it as much as I can.

Question: Does this mean that you refuse to acknowledge the deterrent value of the U.S. rockets deployed in Western Europe?

Answer: The effect of those rockets is to lessen Western deterrence of the USSR, inasmuch as they relieve the United States of direct responsibility while at the same time establishing ours. You will recall, in this connection, Henry Kissinger's argument that the United States is a global power and accordingly has global interests. Western Europe is now but a regional power with regional interests. If the two interest systems coincide, so much the better. If they do not, so much the worse. Imagine, for example, the United States intervening in Nicaragua to further its own interests which would have nothing to do with European interests. And imagine that the USSR considered this intervention unacceptable. But the USSR would not proceed to dash into Central America. Where would it retaliate? In an area where it has strength. In Berlin, for example. Where would the Americans attack in response? Probably in Cuba. In that case, what other area would remain open to a Soviet counterattack except Western Europe or at least one of its constituent parts? Thus the protection of U.S. interests in Nicaragua would draw us Europeans into a nuclear conflict. This is nothing short of aberrational. Nor can I see how any European, even the most fervent Atlanticist, could endorse such a so-called defense system. We would find ourselves embroiled in a horrible conflict without even having necessarily endorsed the validity of its origins.

Question: When Francois Mitterrand says "I note that the pacifists are in the West and the missiles in the East," what is your reaction?

Answer: My reaction is simple. It is that Francois Mitterrand no longer has confidence in his nuclear strike force ("force de frappe"). It does not take an exceptionally logical mind to grasp that fact. I personally do not agree at all with the pacifists. I am by no means prepared to let myself be devoured by my neighbor's Doberman pinscher. Yet when I refuse to accept my "friend's" Bengal tiger, is that a display of pacifism or of common sense? Nor am I an advocate of nonviolence, but I do refuse to play in a game that is not mine, a game in which, moreover, I run the risk of losing everything.

Question: To revert to more immediate political considerations, it would appear that the very clear-cut position you have outlined for us would practically prevent you and your party from joining a government. Is that so?

Answer: Admittedly my party's platform is clear-cut, contrary to other party platforms. It is likewise true that opinion polls favor us. The European elections showed our strength. Consequently we shall hold to what we have promised. In any case, we shall be true to our platform, because it obviously inspires voter confidence. Now according to everything I hear, no socialists are wanted in the government, and especially no SP. Well if the Liberals and Social Christians retain their small majority, you can be sure they will not come looking for us. If they do not retain it, they will need us. And in that case, they will have to put up with certain of our essential demands. We shall then see whether they really want to render Belgium ungovernable simply because some of them want to install missiles at Florennes. And if the other parties remain intransigent on this issue, they will not obtain our collaboration. I can't put it any plainer than that. And if our refusal makes it impossible to form a government, well then let us hold another general election. But in that case, the CVP [Social Christian Party (Flemish)] will have to take a clear-cut position on the missiles, at long last. Otherwise, we shall cut that party to pieces.

Question: Would you join a government without the PS [Socialist Party (Walloon)]?

Answer: To me that would seem impossible. Not for ideological reasons, but for strictly political reasons. If that were to happen, I would be in a two and a half-party coalition government. What concessions would you expect me to make to the Liberals and Social Christians? And in the end, after having won the election I would be the weakest party in the coalition. That would make absolutely no sense. Besides, why would the SP enter the government and the PS remain in the opposition, or vice-versa? Such a scenario has no real credibility.

Question: Do you view the Ecologists as a threat?

Answer: They pose no more of a threat to us than the other parties do. I believe that the Ecologists draw their support from a rather broad spectrum of the electorate. Indeed, they could make a most successful showing in the next election, thereby requiring everyone to give very serious consideration to their demands. I would personally welcome such a development.

Question: Does such a clear-cut position as yours on defense issues herald similar positions on foreign policy in general?

Answer: Yes. Those days when a few "nice persons" in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established foreign policy are now over. Such policy was their private domain. "Peasants" like us had no say in the matter. The time has gone when Davignon and a few representatives of the nobility were the only ones qualified to handle foreign affairs. In our embassies today, there is still some "hand-kissing" diplomacy, even though a number of our diplomats no longer belong to the aristocracy. Our Ministry of Foreign Affairs must henceforth be democratically representative of the people, as is indeed the case in all neighboring countries.

Question: If some day you were to become a cabinet minister, what portfolio would you like to have?

Answer: This may perhaps surprise you, but I have no ambitions in that regard. I do not wish to become a minister. I am engaged in politics, which, in my opinion, is not the same thing as managing a ministerial department. Furthermore, I have seen so many parliamentarians accede to a cabinet post only to ultimately find it but an "empty egg" [in English in text]. I have no desire to obtain such an egg.

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CSO: 5200/2619

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE-PROPOSALS

MINISTRY OFFICIAL: FINLAND SERIOUS ABOUT NORDIC ZONE EFFORT

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 12 May 85 p 2

[Article by Foreign Ministry Political Undersecretary of State Klaus Tornudd:  
"Measures Support Nuclear-Free Zones"]

[Text] There was a political cartoon on the editorial page of the 27 April issue of HELSINGIN SANOMAT in which a nuclear weapon laughs at the gullible Nordic countries when they try to get themselves a nuclear-free zone based on defense. The cartoon illustrates one thing that pertains to all nonnuclear nations and zones, namely the fact that nuclear weapons can be directed toward every corner of the world. Missiles that can be fired from airplanes, submarines and other war vessels and from land-based positions can be aimed at any point on earth. No agreement concluded among nonnuclear nations can remove the nuclear nations' ability to strike everywhere.

The cartoon can also be interpreted in another way. It can be taken as a prediction of how nuclear weapons may be used in a tight situation. Nuclear weapons would all the same be used against nuclear-free-zone nations or those nations would be threatened with nuclear weapons. So the prediction belongs to the class of predictions that says: "agreements are not worth the paper they are written on in a war." That is, of course, possible. The prediction cannot be proven to be wrong, nor can an optimist prove that his prediction to the contrary is right.

A third way of interpreting the cartoon might be that the destructive effect of nuclear weapons in a war, through radioactive fallout or climatic change, for example, would indirectly also extend to the nuclear-free-zone nations, even though nuclear weapons are not directly leveled at them. This prediction cannot be proven to be wrong either. Very somber appraisals of the consequences of a major nuclear war for the population of the entire globe have been made.

So what then can be achieved for the nonnuclear nations by a zone agreement? We can look for an answer to this question by posing a still more general question. If the nonnuclear nations in general want to stay out of the sphere of influence of nuclear weapons, what can they do, what goals can they strive for?

It is in itself easy to list numerous measures by means of which we have attempted to eliminate or at least reduce the threat and the fear produced by the existence of nuclear weapons.

#### Elimination of Stockpiles

The first of these we will mention is the complete destruction of nuclear weapons at readiness stations and in stockpiles. This objective is an essential component of the total disarmament the UN General Assembly has often endorsed as a general goal of mankind.

In January 1985 the Soviet Union and the United States in a joint communique confirmed the fact that they were striving "for the complete destruction of nuclear weapons everywhere." If they were to achieve this, nuclear-free zones would no longer be needed — actually the whole world would be a nuclear-free zone.

How would other special measures associated with the regulation of nuclear armament then be necessary with the exception of the supervision of production plants since a ban on the manufacture [of nuclear weapons] would also have to be imposed in connection with the destruction of stockpiles.

The complete destruction of existing nuclear weapons really appears to be a long way off. Only the nuclear nations can decide on that among themselves.

The nonnuclear nations can indirectly exert their influence in the same direction primarily by themselves refraining from procuring nuclear weapons for themselves or their territories. At the same time everyone can maintain a system of controls over the peaceful use of nuclear energy so that possible suspicions relating to a shift to weapon production may be removed.

A more modest goal is restriction or reduction of the number of nuclear weapons being held in readiness or in stockpiles. Within the framework of the so-called SALT process the Soviet Union and the United States have concluded or tried to conclude just such agreements.

The wording of the agreements is complicated. Several units of measurement may be employed in them, such as the number of transport mechanisms and warheads and the explosive force or various combinations of these. It is almost impossible to achieve full comparability because the nuclear armaments of the parties to the agreements have been developed under different circumstances.

Depending on the agreed-on limits, restriction of the number of weapons in practice at the same time also means regulation of production. Achieving these goals too will decisively depend on the nuclear nations themselves. As for the nonnuclear nations, they can, insofar as is possible for them, try to pressure or encourage the nuclear nations to conclude agreements.



## **Banning Use**

Next, let us mention the banning or restriction of the use of nuclear weapons. In the opinion of some jurists, the use of nuclear weapons conflicts with the international laws currently in effect, especially when we take into account their far-reaching and unpredictable destructive effects.

Being considered separately is a proposal to ban the use of nuclear weapons in a preemptive strike. This would mean that the use of nuclear weapons would be permitted only for a counterstrike when the opposing side has used them first and therefore violated the ban agreement.

Realization of such an agreement has so far not been in sight. NATO's calculations are indeed based on the scare effect which is viewed as arising from the possibility of making a preemptive strike with tactical nuclear weapons to ward off an overwhelming attack in Europe. Starting a war by a preemptive strike involving the superpowers' intercontinental nuclear weapons is probably an alternative that is in practice excluded without an agreement — except perhaps in a situation in which an attack by the opposite side is considered to be inevitable.

Agreements between the nonnuclear nations will certainly not effectively suffice to ban the use of nuclear weapons, but they can at best at least restrict their planned use regionally. The nuclear nations too could achieve a great deal through regional agreements. They could even establish nuclear-free zones on, say, the high seas, where the use of nuclear weapons would, that being the case, be banned.

## **Nuclear Freeze Agreement**

A ban or limitation on the spread of nuclear weapons may involve either just the possession of nuclear weapons or also their emplacement. The nuclear freeze agreement now in force bans the possession of nuclear weapons by any nation other than the five well-known nuclear nations. It does not, however, ban the emplacement of nuclear weapons in the territory of any nation.

The comprehensiveness of the nuclear freeze agreement is imperfect. If all the nonnuclear nations subscribed to it and in addition pledged themselves to ban the emplacement of nuclear weapons in their territories, nonnuclear-nation zones would no longer be necessary.

Since this has not happened, the nonnuclear nations could make it their business to both support a universal nuclear freeze and create zones. Optimally, the nuclear nations could either separately or as a supplement to a zone agreement agree to arrangements for disengagement and phasing out.

## **Nuclear Test Ban**

An important issue is the banning or restricting of the testing of nuclear weapons. The current partial test ban agreement is inadequate in two respects: Two nuclear powers are not parties to the agreement and the agreement permits

underground test explosions. The realization of a complete ban on nuclear tests has been under consideration for a long time now, but the issue of supervision of underground test explosions in particular has hampered negotiations.

As for the nonnuclear nations, they have tried to promote achievement of a total ban on nuclear tests by, among other things, developing a seismological control network by means of which tremors produced by explosions in the earth's crust may be tracked.

The establishment of a nuclear-free zone, of course, excludes any test explosions from the area in question. The agreement pertaining to the Latin American nuclear-free zone permits nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under certain conditions, but this possibility appears not to have in practice been considered.

#### Security Guarantees

Security guarantees by nuclear nations are promises not to employ nuclear weapons against nonnuclear nations nor to threaten to employ them. All the nuclear nations have made promises to this effect. With the exception of China, they have, however, attached different kinds of reservations and conditions to their promises. The issue of making these security guarantees uniform and of getting them into a binding, agreement-based form is under consideration at the Geneva disarmament conference.

Finland has, among other things, laid emphasis on the fact that security guarantees must be so formulated that they correspond to the development of arms technology. Thus the possibility that cruise missiles may fly through a nation's air space must be taken into consideration, even though the target may be outside the territory of the nation in question.

Apparently not all nonnuclear nations are interested in obtaining security guarantees. Several of them have, however, been hoping for universal guarantees and, in the opinion of many, these should also be strengthened regionally in connection with some agreements. A separate protocol which the nuclear nations have entered into involving security guarantees is part of the Latin American zone agreement.

#### Hopes in Northern Europe

While decisive results do specifically depend on the nuclear nations, the non-nuclear nations can exert their influence on the possession, limitation and banning of the testing and use of nuclear weapons by through their own actions subscribing to already concluded universal agreements, among other things. Furthermore, they can support and endorse these agreement systems by means of which efforts have already been made to ban the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the ocean bottom, on celestial bodies and in orbit in outer space.

Every nation can also ban such emplacement on its own initiative. In a way this is emphasized in Finland in the new nuclear energy law, in which the importation of nuclear explosions is absolutely banned; there can be no talk of the

emplacement of nuclear weapons. By establishing nuclear-free zones, we can regionally agree on the elimination of nuclear weapons (if they are in the region) and on a total ban on their possession, use and emplacement.

Zones can therefore extensively promote the elimination and restriction of nuclear weapons. If the zones are further backed by other measures that reinforce international security, these will constitute an assurance of their own consolidation and the establishment of international relations.

Perhaps such zones would not be respected in a war and perhaps they cannot exclude all the effects of nuclear weapons. Zones do not render civil defense unnecessary. Nevertheless, zones can reduce the probability of a war situation's arising in which we would have to question the value and credibility of agreements that have been concluded.

Those who doubt the value of nuclear-free zones in the world of today have usually pointed to the continuation of the arms race and the large number of nuclear weapons located in different parts of the world. In their opinion, regional efforts are not worthwhile. Nothing, however, prevents us from working for the elimination or restriction of nuclear armaments universally and regionally, side by side. In Northern Europe the conditions for doing so are better than in many other areas.

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CSO: 5200/2680

## NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

### ANZUS CRISIS PROMPTS 'STRATEGIC REDIRECTION'

#### Majority Supports New Defense Goals

Sydney THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD in English 13 Apr 85 p 23

[Article by Hugh White: "ANZUS Crisis Puts a Broom to Old Problems"]

[Text]

**T**HE ANZUS crisis is over in New Zealand. They are no longer worried about preserving or restoring the old strategic status quo under ANZUS; the job now is to build a new one.

On one thing almost everyone in New Zealand is agreed — ANZUS will never be the same again. And surprisingly many Kiwis seem to be relishing the strategic spring-cleaning that the end of the old ANZUS has precipitated.

None of this was intended or expected by Mr Lange when he launched his Government's nuclear ships policy. He believed that the nuclear ships issue was not fundamental to New Zealand's strategic standing, and could be lopped off without affecting the basic structure. Washington decided otherwise.

There is no doubt that the nuclear ships ban is popular. Support has actually grown since the Reagan Administration spelled out the cost to Mr Lange in Los Angeles in late February. A record 77 per cent of Kiwis supported the ban in a recent poll.

So if Mr Reagan has been trying to bully New Zealanders into taking his ships back into their ports, he seems to have failed.

But the real point is not that the nuclear ship ban is here to stay. Much more important is that the ban itself now seems to have become incidental, or even irrelevant, to the process of strategic redirection.

Support for a strategic rethink extends even to the New Zealand

Opposition, which opposes the bans policy. In Canberra a couple of weeks ago, the Opposition Leader, Mr Jim McLay, said that he no longer sees the ban as the major issue in the ANZUS crisis.

"I do not see it simply being resolved by New Zealand sitting down and saying, 'The nightmare is over, the ships can come in, and we want to be part of ANZUS again'. Things could never be the same after the last few months."

Mr McLay said that New Zealand should step up defence links with Australia to replace what he regarded as the permanent gap left by US retaliation over the nuclear ship ban.

The Lange Government spelled out its view of New Zealand's new strategic direction in a Cabinet paper released last week in Wellington — during the visit of the Minister for Defence, Mr Beasley. "Trilateral co-operation (under ANZUS), if and when it reappears, will be on a more self-reliant basis as far as New Zealand is concerned," the paper said.

The paper also laid great stress on the need to concentrate New Zealand's defence efforts in its immediate region, the South Pacific.

Self-reliance and regional concentration are not exactly new defence concepts. In Australia they have formed the staple of defence debate for over a decade.

Even in New Zealand, defence reviews in recent years have acknowledged self-reliance in a vague way as a goal to be aimed for. But the fact is that

New Zealand's strategic outlook and defence posture remain even more tied to the 1950s and 1960s than Australia's, both in its lack of independent capacity and its continuing focus on "forward defence" in Asia.

New Zealand's armed forces are still very much designed to serve with the larger forces of its allies. The New Zealand Navy for example, has only three major ships. All of them are anti-submarine warfare (ASW) frigates, and they are basically intended to function as a part of a larger allied fleet in war. The NZ Navy does not have its own tanker or supply ship, so its frigates cannot range independently over the Pacific.

But, if anything, the deployment of New Zealand's Army is even more anachronistic. One of New Zealand's two infantry battalions, and the only one in anything like fighting condition, is based in Singapore. It has been there since 1955, when New Zealand forces joined Australians and British to fight communists during the Malayan emergency.

Both the issues were raised in New Zealand's Defence Review in 1983, but there's nothing like a good crisis to put a stiff broom through old problems, and that is exactly what the ANZUS crisis has done here. As a result, both issues have been stood on their heads.

In 1983 the Muldoon Government decided after some soul-searching that the Army should stay in Singapore. This policy was endorsed by Mr Lange as recently as last month.

But last week in Wellington, the Cabinet paper on foreign affairs spelt out a new and contrary course.

New Zealand's "immediate and practical" strategic requirements since the ANZUS crisis "will involve a new concentration of New Zealand effort on our immediate neighbourhood", the paper said. That means the South Pacific, which "must become the focus of our efforts".

You cannot get much plainer than that. Suddenly, New Zealand has bitten the bullet and realised its most urgent defence tasks are no longer in Singapore, but much closer to home.

When the troops come home, New Zealand will start moving strategically from the 1950s to the 1980s. Equally hard-thinking is now under way about the Navy.

In 1983, it was decided to replace the NZ Navy's ASW frigates with submarines, to be brought in tandem with Australia's replacements for the Oberon. Buying subs makes a lot of

sense for the Kiwis, and it would have made them in some ways more self-reliant because submarines are a powerful independent deterrent.

But the fact is, New Zealand cannot afford to run both a surface fleet and a submarine fleet — it has to choose one or the other.

A few weeks ago, Mr Lange announced that he was pulling out of the subs' deal, and his Defence Minister, Mr Frank O'Flynn, drove the point home loud and clear when Mr Beazley tried to re-open the issue in Wellington last week.

Instead of submarines, the NZ Navy is now going to get a supply ship to give its surface ships more range, and plans are apparently being laid to buy a new generation of general-purpose surface warships when the frigates wear out in eight or 10 years' time.

Underlying all this, is a Government commitment to spend more money on defence generally. New Zealand's small and ailing economy makes defence spending, and particularly expensive equipment purchases from abroad, very painful.

But the ANZUS crisis seems to have jogged New Zealanders across the political spectrum into spending more. The precise expansion of the defence budget is expected to be announced by Cabinet soon.

**N**EW Zealand finds it no easier than Australia does to identify the enemy they need to be defended against.

Last week's NZ Cabinet paper on defence and Foreign policy followed a hallowed Kiwi tradition in kicking the Russian can. The papers' warnings of Soviet penetration of the Pacific coincided with the news that the Soviet Union will sign a fishing agreement with one of the tiny island states, Kiribati, and is hoping to do the same with others.

But there are signs that the Russian threat is being conjured up mainly for public consumption, and that behind the scenes a more subtle threat assessment is emerging from the hard post-ANZUS thinking. The decision-makers in Wellington see the possibility of local political instability in the tiny island states to NZ's north as more worrying than Soviet fishing deals.

The recent Cabinet paper stressed the need "to underpin the security of the South Pacific countries". Reading between the lines, it seems the overhaul of New Zealand defence forces now under way, is intended to give the



capacity to police the tiny island states if they do start coming apart at the political seams.

The NZ Army's major priority, the ready-reaction force, seems designed to do just that, as the decision not to buy submarines confirms. New Zealand soldiers lay a lot of stress on tropical warfare, and half of the Army's training is devoted to what one soldier described as "counter-revolutionary operations". There are no jungles in New Zealand and few revolutionaries.

Wellington is naturally rather coy about these strategic priorities, because they will not go down well among their friends in the island states themselves.

But the fact is that the island arc stretching from Vanuatu and Fiji eastwards to the Cook Islands is the New Zealander's equivalent of our north-west coast — they see it as their front line.

However, New Zealand does not see armed forces as the only way of keeping the peace in their front yard. Last week's review stressed more aid of all kinds to the island states to help keep them on an even level.

It also stressed more defence co-operation with Australia and Mr Bearley's

visit last week was meant to explore the possibilities. Interestingly, he seems to have found that New Zealand is enjoying its new-found independence, and is not anxious to snuggle too closely to Australia.

As one official put it in Wellington: "Having cut the apron strings, first with Britain and now with the US, we are not about to tie ourselves up again to Australia."

New Zealand is keen to co-operate with us on specific projects, but is reluctant to be drawn into anything that looks like another dependent relationship with a great and powerful friend. This is apparently why the Kiwis scotched Australia's suggestion that new defence co-operation should be loosely formalised under the old ANZAC Pact of 1944. They are happy to keep things loose.

Underlying that attitude is a certain traditional Kiwi jealousy about the South Pacific. They regard the South Pacific as their backyard and their business, and unofficially there is a lingering reluctance to see Australia take on too big a role there, for fear that we might take the place over.

### ANZUS Status Reviewed

Sydney THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD in English 13 Apr 85 p 23

#### [Text]

Where has the ANZUS crisis left ANZUS itself?

The answer depends on who you ask because the fact is that the three partners have always had different views of the treaty, and they still do.

Despite the ANZUS crisis and the strategic rethink which it has caused New Zealand believes that the treaty's basic guarantees of assistance in time of trouble remain valid, although detailed defence co-operation has lapsed. Australia's view seems to be almost exactly the opposite.

"In strategic terms, any threat that did develop would also affect Australia and almost certainly the United States as well. The fundamental security guarantees remain valid," according to the New Zealand Cabinet last week.

"New Zealand's ultimate security rests with the guarantees encompassed by the ANZUS treaty. What has changed is the way in which ANZUS has operated up to now in terms of military and intelligence co-operation."

The Defence Minister, Mr Bearley, putting the Australian view the next day, revealed a completely opposite emphasis.

He regards the basic guarantees against threats given by the ANZUS treaty as becoming less and less important as Australia's independent defence capacity increases.

He believes that Australia can and should be able to defend itself, as a matter of national sovereignty and dignity, against any regional threat. We can provide ourselves for "Australia's primary defence requirements", he said.

He says ANZUS is important, not

because of "guarantees of assistance" if attacked, but because of the huge range of day by day co-operation on intelligence, equipment, exercises and all the rest.

What, then, do the Americans think of it? They have made it plain that they regard the treaty as in eclipse because of the ANZUS crisis, not finished.

But there is no evidence that they have yet come to terms with the possibility that the "crisis" is here to stay.

When the message clicks in, it will probably only reinforce the view that they have stuck to since 1969, when Richard Nixon declared in Guam that America only helps those who help themselves, and then only against attack by nuclear powers. ANZUS has not really been the same since then.

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONES PROPOSALS

NEW ZEALAND OPPOSITION WOULD LIMIT NUCLEAR LINKS

Wellington THE EVENING POST in English 19 Apr 85 p 9

[Text]

Under a National government, United States submarines carrying intercontinental ballistic missiles would not enter New Zealand ports and New Zealand forces would not exercise with them, the Opposition's defence spokesman, Mr Doug Kidd, said today.

National would have to embark on a period of "constructive re-engagement" with the United States on returning to government, he said in a speech to the East Cape Supporters Club in Whakatane.

"There will be no reduction in our sovereignty."

New Zealand would not, as it had never done, "receive or engage" with United States global nuclear forces, Mr Kidd said.

"We will not have their intercontin-

tal ballistic missile submarines in our ports, or exercise with them.

"Nor I believe would we receive or engage with the intermediate range nuclear forces now being employed in their fleet.

"Sea-launched, land attack type cruise missiles are no part of the defence of the South Pacific," Mr Kidd said.

## Not stored

In February the Opposition released a policy statement that said a National government would not allow nuclear weapons to be stored in New Zealand, but would not ask whether visiting ships and planes of allies were carrying them.

The Leader of the Opposition, Mr McLay, said then that the policy was a credible alternative position to the anti-nuclear policies of the Government. —

CSO: 5200/4327

THAI PAPER SEES U.S. AS LOSER IN DISPUTE WITH NEW ZEALAND

Bangkok MATICHON in Thai 4 Mar 85 p 6

[Article by Phisian Khurathong: "When the 'Kiwi' Is Harassed By the 'Eagle'"]

[Text] President Ronald Reagan is very angry with Mr David Lange, the prime minister of New Zealand, for refusing to allow U.S. warships to dock in New Zealand since the United States refuses to disclose whether these are armed with nuclear weapons. The policy of the present government of New Zealand is to oppose all types of nuclear weapons.

That Reagan is angry can be seen from the fact that he refused to welcome Mr Lange personally even though Mr Lange wanted to visit the United States in order to explain his position and resolve the misunderstanding. But Cowboy Reagan refused to welcome him and sent a very low-level official, that is, Mr William Brown, the deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, to go meet him in California.

The Reagan government has never done anything like this before. Normally, Reagan invites the leaders of friendly countries to visit him in Washington. And if Mr Reagan cannot greet the person at the airport, he usually sends a high-ranking government official such as Mr George Schultz, the secretary of state.

But on his trip to the United States at the beginning of last week, Mr Lange was not invited to visit Washington, D.C. Instead, the U.S. government sent only a "deputy assistant" to meet him at Los Angeles, California. This treatment accorded Mr Lange shows the Reagan government's displeasure with Mr Lange.

But besides this, does the Reagan government plan to take any further action against the New Zealand government? Mr Paul Wolfowitz, the U.S. assistant secretary of state, said that no economic measures will be taken against New Zealand. However, in Los Angeles, Mr Lange disclosed that the Reagan government has taken the following retaliatory measures against New Zealand on the defense front:

1. It has cancelled the joint military exercises in which New Zealand was to take part.
2. It has stopped providing New Zealand with military intelligence.
3. It has taken steps to end the military program for New Zealand military personnel in the United States.

Why is Reagan so angry at New Zealand? The reason cited most frequently is that the Reagan government is afraid that other countries will follow New Zealand's example by opposing nuclear weapons and refusing to allow U.S. warships to dock.

At a time when opposition to nuclear weapons among the peace groups in western Europe is very vocal, the Reagan government is afraid that the New Zealand affair will serve as an example and result in the peace movement voicing demands even more vigorously.

Thus, the Reagan government has taken measures to retaliate against Mr Lange. While Reagan has not "cut anyone's throat," the refusal to welcome Mr Lange properly is considered to be a very serious matter at the level of international relations.

The actions taken by the Reagan government against New Zealand are too strong. The side that will be hurt will be the United States, not New Zealand. Since the United States is a great power, the Reagan government should realize that New Zealand's policy opposing nuclear weapons is a policy that is supported by the people of New Zealand. That is why they elected Mr Lange.

Applying such pressure amounts to opposing the wishes of the people of New Zealand based on the democratic system. Besides this, Reagan should realize that New Zealand still intends to participate in ANZUS, in which the United States is the senior member. New Zealand has not withdrawn but still wants to remain close to the United States on defense matters.

New Zealand feels that, strategically, its location does not require it to compete in the nuclear arms race, which is different from western Europe. This is something that the Reagan government must understand. It will be the United States that loses if it continues to harass New Zealand.

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CSO: 5200/4312

THAI PAPER HAILS LANGE NUCLEAR STANCE

Bangkok DAILY NEWS in Thai 5 Mar 85 p 2

[Around the World column by Udorn Wongthapphim: "From the Green Peach Group to Lange"]

[Text] Those who follow the world situation and the changes on the international political stage are probably aware of a change that has taken place recently. What is referred to here is the great interest being shown in peace by people all over the world. During the past two centuries, there have been many wars all over the world.

All these past and present conflicts and wars have gradually generated a desire for peace in people throughout the world. They have gradually united to form a powerful force, like small tributaries flowing into the main river.

Peace movements have arisen in many corners of the world. The group that has played the greatest role and that has the greatest popular support is the Green Peach group in Europe. This group has won seven seats in the European Council. The anti-nuclear party in Australia, which loves peace and which has fielded candidates in the elections, has won seats in the House of Representatives. This has greatly frightened the conservative and labor parties.

The peace movement in New Zealand has developed to the point where it now has the support of the majority of the people. Newspapers there regularly conduct public opinion polls on this topic, as do well-known research institutions. These polls show that New Zealanders are very concerned about the peace issue and that the great majority strongly oppose nuclear weapons.

Polls conducted by the Helen Research Center in New Zealand show that support for allowing U.S. warships armed with nuclear weapons to dock in New Zealand declined from 50 percent in 1982 to 46 percent in 1983. The latest poll conducted on 9 February 1985 shows that 52 percent oppose allowing these ships to dock in New Zealand; only 37 percent support this.



The McNair Poll, which conducted a public opinion poll on this subject for THE DOMINION on 12-13 February 1985, found that 56 percent opposed allowing U.S. nuclear warships to dock in New Zealand.

The government of Mr David Lange is a democratic government that listens to the people and that views the wishes of the people as commands. It administers the country and implements policies based on the desires of the people. It does not put its own views in the center in making decisions as do leaders in other countries who profess to support democracy but who act in a dictatorial way.

What is praiseworthy is that Lange has listened to the people rather than Reagan, the movie hero who has become president.

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CSO: 5200/4312

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE-PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

SHIP BAN LEGISLATION DELAYED—The government is delaying the introduction of legislation formally banning nuclear warships from calling at New Zealand ports. The prime minister has said the bill will not be presented to Parliament until after the August meeting of the South Pacific Forum, which includes New Zealand, Australia, and 12 other Pacific states. The BBC said this morning Mr Lange's move was seen as an attempt to avoid New Zealand being isolated at the meeting. The majority of forum members approve in principle of setting up a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific, but are expected to agree to visits by nuclear vessels. [Text] [Wellington Overseas Service in English 0000 GMT 25 May 85]

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